After years of isolation Syrian diplomacy is suddenly scoring successes, writes Sami Moubayed The Doha Agreement, hammered out between warring Lebanese factions last May, seemed tailor-made to suit Syria. Although the Syrians did not go to Qatar, the deal had Syrian fingerprints all over it. Damascus succeeded in securing the Baabda Palace for a pro-Syrian officer, Michel Suleiman and the Hizbullah-led opposition was given greater representation, and veto-power, in the Lebanese government. Doha, though, did not come at no cost. Eighty-two people were killed on the streets of Beirut during internal fighting, and part of the agreement was that the Syrians open an embassy in Beirut. President Suleiman was in Syria this week to discuss the exchange of embassies with Bashar Al-Assad. The Syrians are reported to be eager to start the diplomatic exchange process, one of the conditions set by French President Nicolas Sarkozy before he visits Damascus. Sarkozy is due in Syria on 4-5 September. He already hosted Al-Assad in Paris in mid-July, infuriating many in Beirut, Riyadh and Washington. The Syrians have embraced the French initiative, calling on Sarkozy to play a role in indirect peace talks with Israel and appointing an ambassador to Paris, a post that had been vacant since 2005. The French U-turn is based on Europe's conviction, not shared by the US, that nothing can be achieved in Lebanon without dealing with Damascus. Most European capitals now believe that the only result of isolating the Syrians has been to empower groups like Hizbullah and Hamas. The Americans, more interested in Iraq and Iran than Lebanon, have yet to reach the same conclusion. As one French official put it: "The Americans start off their day with a lot of good intentions vis-à-vis Lebanon. By mid- day, however, they get swamped with so many foreign policy issues that Lebanon is put on the backburner. By evening Lebanon gets pushed off the list in favour of Iraq and Iran." The Syrians understood this well and decided to build upon it. Since 2005 Syria has been telling the world that if it is able to destabilise Lebanon and Iraq it can -- by extension -- help stabilise both. European dignitaries -- including EU Chief Negotiator Javier Solana in March 2007 -- began visiting Damascus. The Americans remained reluctant to acknowledge that in order to get results in Iraq they had to talk to either Syria or Iran, though two feeble attempts were made in April and May 2007. Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the White House, visited Syria, sending shockwaves throughout Iran, and then Condoleezza Rice met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Mouallem. Nothing came of either attempt though Tehran was furious that Syria's options, which seemed so limited in 2005, turned out not to be so limited after all. Syria has always insisted its friendship with Iran will not be affected by opening up to the rest of the world. The Iranians were critical of November's Annapolis Conference but Syria sent a delegation anyway, saying restoring the Golan Heights through a peace process was its priority. Washington responded by not vetoing Syrian-Israeli peace talks, as it did in 2003, when George W Bush said that Syria was a "weak country" that must wait for all other regional issues to be resolved before it re-engaged in peace talks. There is now a fear among the US administration that talks between Syria and Israel are going too well (Jimmy Carter has said that 85 per cent has already been finalised) and that peace might be ready before the end of 2008. If the Americans refuse to endorse the process the Syrians will have to wait until Bush leaves the White House in 2009, in which case non-state players will likely take the law into their own hands and work to try and wreck any Syrian-Israeli agreement. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the perception of Syria began to change and Damascus embarked on its rehabilitation from problem-maker to problem-solver. It is not that long ago that Syria enjoyed strong ties with, among others, the US, Great Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt, yet these seemed to evaporate overnight and Damascus was left with only Iran. Ties with Iran are neither new nor born of the crisis in 2005. That the two countries disagree on a variety of issues, not least relating to secularism, autonomy, and theocracy in Iraq, led the West to think that driving a wedge between them would be easy. They were mistaken. Damascus knew it would be madness to abandon Iran for a US-led Western world that was calling for regime change in Syria. Some in the Arab world thought they could benefit from Syrian influence in Tehran and that Damascus might convince the Iranians to moderate their behaviour. Syria was more reasonable than Tehran, they argued, and did not have a history of anti-Americanism. That Syria helped release 15 British sailors captured by Iran in 2007 and secure the freedom of BBC reporter Alan Johnston in Palestine reinforced the notion that it was important to keep a back-channel open to radical non-state players in the Middle East, and that the channel went through Damascus. Which goes a long way to explaining why Al-Assad, after meeting with Sarkozy in Paris, showed up in Tehran last week, no doubt to discuss ways of finding a solution to Iran's ongoing nuclear problem with the international community. In an op-ed in The Washington Post during the 2006 war in Lebanon, former US secretary of state Warren Christopher recalled how he twice asked for the assistance of then Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad to calm the situation in Lebanon. "We never knew exactly what the Syrians did, but clearly Hizbullah responded to their direction," he wrote. It is exactly what the Europeans want from Syria today. They do not know exactly what the Syrians will do but they know that Syria can influence Hizbullah, Hamas and Iran. (see p.7)
