The mood in Damascus is defiant as the Syrians gleefully seem to be celebrating a victory of sorts over the Americans, writes Sami Moubayed in Damascus As Syria prepares for the forthcoming referendum to re-elect President Bashar Al-Assad into office on 27 May, 2007, the festive atmosphere and surrounding rhetoric all sound triumphant. The Syrians have every reason to feel victorious, given all that they have endured following 11 September, 2001. First they were accused of being supporters of terrorism for harbouring Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Then they were accused of welcoming Saddam Hussein and his henchmen after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Following closely on the heels of these accusations were allegations of supporting the Sunni insurgency. The final barb thrown in their direction was the international community claiming they were behind the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in 2005. But after feeling isolated during the past six years, they are now feeling confident. Two years ago, during an interview, Assad said that the world will eventually come to its senses and come knocking on Syria's door, claiming that all Middle East issues cannot be resolved without the help or cooperation of Damascus. He repeated this last week at the opening session of Syria's new parliament, saying that those who tried to isolate Syria were actually, isolating themselves. On what is this new political confidence based? One reason is the newfound friendship with the Arab world, after several years of less-than- cordial relations with major Arab capitals like Riyadh, Beirut, and to a lesser extent, Cairo and Amman. Following the brouhaha in the wake of the Hariri killing, when most Arab countries were giving Syria the cold shoulder, they developed a close relationship with Iran which only served to raise the ire of the Arabs even further. This newfound friendship, especially regarding the Lebanon issue, angered Saudi Arabia amongst others and this was exacerbated following Assad's ascorbic remarks about other Arab leaders being "half-men". However, Syria defiantly increased its support for Hizbullah, especially during the Lebanon war. This was problematic for the United States as Syrian-Saudi divisions made it hard to resolve Lebanese and Iraqi issues. The Sunni street in Iraq after all, which controls the insurgency, is divided between Syria and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis control the influential tribes while the Syrians control former Baathists and Sunni notables. Combined they could help to tame this insurgency, estimated by the CIA to have "tens of thousands" of members. King Abdullah wants to help stabilise Iraq, and is angered by the anti-Sunni activity carried out by Shia militias which are allied to Tehran. He has also become increasingly disenchanted with the agenda of his allies, the Lebanese 14 March coalition, after they called for the adoption of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to impose an international tribunal in the Hariri affair, on Lebanon. This would in effect internationalise the crisis at a time when Abdullah was trying to localise it. In as much as he wanted to strengthen his allies in the Hariri bloc (who are anti-Syrian) against their Iranian-backed opponents, he nevertheless did not want to disrupt the status quo in Lebanon. Too much is at stake, politically, economically and morally, if fighting breaks out between Sunnis and Shias in Lebanon. The Saudis will never allow it. That is why they sent Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, the national security advisor, to meet the Iranians when violence did break out earlier this year. The Saudis know that in order for a deal to be struck on Lebanon, Syria had to be rewarded and included. Syria's allies in Lebanon were therefore pleased when the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa came to Beirut and said that pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud would remain in office until the end of his term in November 2007. Although they have not won their stand-off against Fouad Al-Siniora's cabinet (which started in December 2006), they have not backed down and are calling for the early reconvening of parliament in a bid to oust the 14 March coalition. During the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, not only did the Saudis treat the Syrians with deference but the Saudis also paid scant attention to the Lebanon issue. The Saudi king invited both Siniora and President Lahoud to attend the conference but kept his distance from both men. King Abdullah's silent message was that the anti-Syrian approach no longer held any credence for him. Furthermore, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal added that the Lebanese had to resolve their own problems. Abdullah also announced that the upcoming summit would be held in Damascus. The Saudis and Americans want to see the Syrian-Iranian relationship continuing as it could be a bridge to Tehran. Syria is a moderate country without a history of anti-Americanism. It has pragmatic leaders they can negotiate with. It would be far more practical for the Americans to swallow their pride and talk to the Syrians over Iraq, rather than being forced to talk to the Iranians. During the recent crisis when 15 British sailors were abducted by Tehran, the Syrians were asked by Tony Blair's envoy to intervene to secure their release, given their strong relationship with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. That is the point Syria has been trying to communicate during the past six years, "we can and will help stabilise the Middle East, but we will not do it for free." And the rewards have been coming. In October 2006, Blair sent an envoy to Syria, the first senior British official to visit Syria since the Iraq war began. He gave the Syrians a priority list, which was understood to be an Anglo-American one, especially in light of his recent visit to Washington DC and discussions with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice where the two discussed Syria and more importantly Iraq. Both countries expressed the desire that Syria support the cabinet of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. The Syrians responded promptly by sending Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualim to Baghdad, where both countries established mutual embassies and Syria invited Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Al-Boulani to Damascus to discuss security on the Syrian-Iraqi border. Syrian support for what many Sunnis consider an "illegitimate" Iraqi government is very relevant as it boosts the credibility of the Iraqi prime minister in the Sunni streets of Iraq. Importantly, the United States has acknowledged that ignoring the results of the Baker-Hamilton report, which calls on the White House to re- engage with Syria, was a mistake. When Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House, visited Syria in April 2007, the White House threw a temper tantrum but stopped short of accusing her of committing treason. Many said that this was merely a ruse and as the third most politically powerful person in the US she was actually representing the administration. Last week's International Compact for Iraq conference in Sharm El-Sheikh was a turning point for Syrian-US relations. Moualim met Rice; the first encounter of a US and a Syrian foreign minister since Colin Powell went to Damascus in 2003. Moualim agreed to invite American participants to attend Syrian-Iraqi security meetings. He stressed, however, the need to strengthen political and diplomatic ties between Damascus and Washington, and called for the restoration of ambassadorial ties. His tone echoed that of Rice on several issues, mainly, implementing Maliki's Baghdad security plan, disarming the militias, amending the constitution, and reversing the de-Baathification programme, a step that would help to alleviate the fears of many Iraqi Sunnis. The issue of Lebanon, which aggravates Syrian-US relations, was neither raised by Moualim nor Rice. So was the Bush-Pelosi confrontation over Syria really a bluff? Is the US administration really interested in engaging the Syrians once again? This time, it was not Pelosi meeting the Syrians, it was Rice. Meaning, it was as good as George W Bush being there in person. Indeed, Bush had raised the anti-Syrian tone to such an extent that it proved to be too difficult for him to retreat without embarrassing himself. Bush realised he was wrong -- the Syrians were right -- and he needed a back channel to Damascus to help bring about stability in Lebanon and Palestine -- and, more important, Iraq.
