As international pressure mounts for reform in the Arab world, Hassan Abu Taleb analyses the preconditions for lasting change One year on from the occupation of Iraq, the political and intellectual debate in the Arab world now revolves around the issue of how to achieve reform and spread freedoms while ensuring both Arab and regional security. These subjects are analysed and discussed in great detail in the Arab Strategic Report 2003- 2004. The report looks in detail at both international projects and movements within the Arab world. It also devotes considerable space to the situation in Iraq, which it views through the optic provided by theories of state-building. In all these areas, the report's main conclusion is that the need for reform in the Arab world is real, not hypothetical. It is unacceptable that things should remain as they are, since the current situation no longer allows the Arab citizen to improve his life and pursue his own best interests. His history and culture, his religious identity and his status as a human being, are all neglected, when they are not despised. Moreover, there is nothing to protect the Arab citizen from the many external factors that pose a clear and unmistakable threat to his well- being. Just as there can be no doubt that responsibility for reform is an internal matter, which lies with both the rulers and the ruled, it is also true that had it not been for the European and American interventions of the past three decades, Arab regimes would be radically different today, and infinitely more acceptable to the societies they govern. The West has aborted all attempts at Islamic and Arab self-development and thus bears direct responsibility for the current state of political stagnation. These facts suffice to explain the Arab citizen's doubts when confronted with foreign proposals calling for political and economic reform. At the same time, it is hard to deny that foreign pressure and proposals of the kind that have been made recently, calling for change in the region and the reform of its political regimes, have played an important role in giving impetus to the debate within the Arab world. This pressure has also generated opposition nationalist initiatives, many of which make demands that had already been raised over the course of the previous three decades, but which had not met with the hoped-for response from the ruling elites. What matters now is not just to raise these issues, but to transform words into action, and wishes into realities. This transformation is the true problem facing Arab societies today. The Arab citizen is constantly aware of this, and the repeated failure to effect this great leap forward only leads to frustration, provoking a mass flight from the responsibility of preparing for a future filled with challenges. The choices facing our societies are limited in number: either we buckle down and live with reality and all its bitterness, indifference and reactionary tendencies; or we search through legal channels for another society that will provide people with the space to pursue their freedoms and material ambitions; or if our legal attempts fail, then we struggle through extra-legal means in order to bring about the changes we desire. All three of these paths will exact a heavy price from the Arabs. We may be condemned to a steady decline in development. We may witness the material and spiritual assassination of an entire generation. Our actions may even provoke the disintegration of our social and political systems, which could well lead to the call for foreign intervention on an unprecedented scale and the absence of safety and security for an unknown length of time. And indeed, something like this latter prediction has already been borne out by the ongoing occupation of Iraq. Yet even as Arab societies appear set to continue their decline, knowledge, total globalisation and the communications revolution have become vital elements in the daily lives of all individuals and societies across the planet. Whatever criticisms we may have of one or other of the components of globalisation and the communications revolution, and however much these elements may be opposed to our direct interests, they are part of a future that must be embraced. The wisest course of action is to exploit these developments as far as possible, and use the innovations and dazzling new products they bring with them to improve our living standards. It is therefore both astonishing and pathetic that there are still some Arabs who believe themselves to be the exception to the rule -- that the reality of globalised information is one thing, and that what we must do as Arabs is another. Such people believe that their ability to cling onto power and enjoy its benefits is stronger than the combined force of all these larger processes which are now at work in the world. Such thinking is pure fantasy. But it is this wild conviction which accounts for much of the hopelessness, bureaucratic weakness and moral and material bankruptcy throughout the region. Even just a quick glance at the two documents dealing with reform in the Arab world and other Islamic countries issued by the G8 summit of the eight major industrial nations in June 2004, tells us that we have reached an extremely significant milestone on the road to reform in the Middle East and North Africa. The first document is entitled, "Cooperation for the sake of a shared future", and lays out general principles defining an overall framework for comprehensive reform from an international perspective. The second proposes practical mechanisms for the application of reform in various fields, and lays out the main contributions to these efforts to be made by each of the G8 countries. Despite the gestures made towards the sovereignty of each country, the two documents taken together confirm that comprehensive reform is no longer merely an internal issue for individual Arab countries; it has become an international issue, to be addressed through a combination of internal measures and other procedures which depend on international institutions and agencies. Many of the programmes and activities laid down are such that they can only be carried out under international supervision, whether this means involvement in the planning stage, or in funding, or the application of international oversight. The principles sketched out in the first document, it is true, insist that each country will pursue its own unique social and political experiment, that each country has its own path to reach these goals, and that there is no one model that can be imposed on all countries in the region. The reality, however, will be something else altogether. In particular, there are a number of international agencies that will be responsible for monitoring reform in our region. The most prominent of these is Minbar for the Future, which has both an official and an unofficial role. It is clear that the Minbar's objective is not just to identify the distortions made in official reports, but also to monitor actual failures and successes in order to create the preconditions for change. In addition, it will function as a means to confront governments with their responsibility for democratic transformation, the market economy and social change, the last of which is to be addressed by spreading education, combating illiteracy and improving the living standards of the poor. Despite its political and moral dimensions, the Minbar will above all be both an international and a local mechanism for evaluating those who make promises and fail to carry them out. It may well develop to become a body which can help other international agencies to take specific measures against those who reject reform, and to increase funding programmes for those who have proven their genuine commitment to comprehensive reform. In short, it will take the form of an international guardianship, and offer both legislative and practical guidance. Comparing the formulation agreed upon by the G8 summit with that leaked by the United States in February 2004, we can see wide-reaching and radical differences. According to the G8 document, the purpose of reform is not confined to confronting terrorism and protecting America's national security interests (as it was in the earlier formulation), but should focus above all on achieving prosperity, stability and growth in the region as a whole. Similarly, the proposed development model is no longer a series of changes tailored to the American perspective. Instead, change is to be derived from local visions and congruent with regional initiatives. This means that the summit's vision of reform is now supported by the demands and reform projects coming out of the region itself. The G8 documents also show a better understanding of the relationship between the regional environment and the provision of better conditions for advancing towards complete reform. It is on this basis that suggestions are made for resolving the region's conflicts, in particular for how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with international resolutions and the efforts of the Quartet, and on the need to help Iraq regain its sovereignty and freedom and construct a truly democratic political system. Arab countries and major European powers such as France and Germany insisted on these points as a vital condition for the success of any reform efforts. However, the practical consequences of this development pose a real threat to local supporters of reform, whether governments or civil society groups. One aspect of the challenge is that in the future it will be difficult -- though not impossible -- to oppose reform plans formulated by international consensus in collaboration with the countries of the region. To express any doubts about such plans will immediately be judged by the great powers as a step backwards, at a time when the region's societies are in need of radical and complete change. Herein lies the impending problem of how to deal with this international vision. Arab governments have based their rejection of any international intervention in internal reforms on the principles of sovereignty and local religious and social sensitivities. They also say that Arab societies are gradually implementing home-grown reform projects, and that a single model for political reform cannot be applied to all Arab states at one stroke. This is not to mention the absence of regional security, the ongoing Arab- Israeli conflict and the ever- worsening situation in Iraq, which together stand in the way of any project for comprehensive and rapid political reform. These publicly-held positions have not stopped the crystallisation of different responses by Arab states to foreign plans for reform. Some see it as a completely internal affair; others are prepared to accept selective interaction in the form of technical and economic aid that is free of specific political pressures; while others are unreservedly welcoming, believing that these proposals in no way contradict locally formulated reforms. But whatever position Arab governments take, their attitude always begs the following questions: Can Arab societies sustain true and total reform without making a complete break with the political experiences of the past? Can the ruling elites -- who are held responsible for past failures both by their own people and by the international community -- lead the implementation of reform plans which are predicated on the fact that some of them will have to be removed from power? These are profound problems and questions, and without a clear and honest attempt to find the answers, the results will inevitably be disappointing. Theoretically, the elites should lead this change, preach its principles and equip civil society to carry it out. Yet civil society itself is just one more part of the ruling elite, and appears unprepared to call for a change that it knows will eventually have to happen. A large part of the problem is that Arab civil society is weak and disconnected from ordinary citizens. The Alexandria document is a good example of this dilemma: it contains all the reforms you could wish for, but is unclear as to the actual mechanisms that should be used to convert these reforms into reality. This can be explained by the fact that although the document's authors are all Arab intellectuals of note, they treat the matter as a purely theoretical one and not as an issue of action and dynamism. In the case of most of them, this failing can be attributed to their distance from the concerns of ordinary citizens, and even those amongst them who may once have worked to raise the consciousness of their fellow countrymen have long since abandoned this role. The case of Egypt is a useful pointer to the many kinds of practical and theoretical difficulty which reform is now facing. There can be no doubt that the debate about reform constitutes an intrinsically positive step, as do the movements that have sprung up around this debate over the past two decades. Certain actions taken by influential members of the ruling National Democratic Party and the government are also encouraging signs, as are the contributions of a number of intellectuals close to the government. However, the question remains: are these measures enough to create a qualitative transformation in Egyptian society? The fear must be that they are merely an attempt to buy time and sap the strength of foreign and internal pressures currently opposed by the political regime. We might agree, for example, that there is a pressing need in Egypt and the Arab world for a new cultural and religious discourse that upholds rationalism, critical thinking, the right to disagree and qualities of tolerance, democracy and pluralism whilst condemning violence and material and moral terrorism. Yet at the same time, we see that the error lies in casting the problem of reform as a problem of political or intellectual discourse, that is, as a theoretical problem completely detached from political and social reality, when it is that reality which gives rise to a traditional cultural and religious discourse that enshrines stagnation and backwardness. Not only does that discourse deserve to be utterly rejected, but the reality that nourishes it needs to be changed. Reforming cultural and religious discourse as a precondition for political reform confuses political priorities. For without the emergence of a new kind of politics that guarantees rights and freedoms, allows true pluralism and enables various political forces to participate in decision-making on national development, it will be impossible to carry through any process of comprehensive cultural reform. Yet every intellectual conference and exchange that has been organised of late on the issue of the renewal of religious discourse has ignored the very factors that produce, sustain and disseminate this discourse. This blindness will create a serious problem for the future: for how can values of pluralism and cooperation be established within a reform process that is based on ignoring anyone who disagrees with one's own opinions, assumptions and logic? How can one work to change the thinking and practices of those that produce the very cultural and religious discourse that needs to be changed, without bringing them within the framework of democratic activity, if only gradually and experimentally? What the Arab world needs is a culture of cooperation and inclusion in place of the xenophobia and exclusion which dominate at present. But there is no way we can create such a culture, unless we first substitute transparent forms of political practice for the short-term manoeuvring that harms everyone whilst ultimately benefiting nobody. The writer, an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, is editor-in-chief of the annual Arab Strategic Report .
