There is a bitter irony in the fact that reforming the Arab League may also require a little nudge from without, writes Gamil Matar* As Arab countries turn their attention inward and wrestle with the problems of domestic reform, a dwindling minority anxious over the future of the Arab League worries that this preoccupation will distract Arabs from the question of Arab League reform. But opinions over this issue vary as well. The strongest argument holds that the Arabs were never really so concerned about League reform to begin with, and even openly wondered what point it would serve. To many member countries, the league is a legacy that our forefathers bequeathed to the Arab nation and which its heirs are powerless to alter. The fact is that until now none of these heirs has been able to fathom the ingenuity of this inheritance, and as a result it has remained, in all its unyielding immutability, an impenetrable mystery if not a disagreeable onus. "If only it would just go away!" is the barely unspoken wish, to which is quickly added the rejoinder, "But as long as it's there it might as well stay." Doubtless this is why, when flaws surface or the institution proves unable to adjust and acclimatize, no one can summon any enthusiasm for reform, except the secretary-general in his capacity as guardian of the bequest. And if the members do respond to the secretary-general's pleas then reform is in form only, while the original substance remains the same. Altering the foundations, it seems, is simply too big a burden and responsibility to bear. As the League approaches the commemoration of its 60th anniversary its members are getting only more phlegmatic on reform. The other, albeit weaker, argument counters that the league's backwardness is the sum product of the weakness of its members. No rational person -- so the proponents of this view argue -- can expect a member nation to show any enthusiasm for the reform of the league as long as that nation's ruling elite has shown even less enthusiasm for reforming their own system of government and modernising their society. If decision-taking inside those countries remains adamantly grounded in the principle of autocracy, how can the representatives of these countries to the Arab League be expected to accept the principle of majority rule? Governments that operate on the principle of conformity within will never agree to a regional order in which a group of member nations have the right to impose their views and decisions upon it. The objection stems not so much from the desire to protect national sovereignty, as some imagine, as it does from the need to protect a cherished homogeneity -- of opinion or power -- from democracy and alternative views. The proponents of this view -- that the countries that most urgently require domestic reform are the least likely to participate in the reform of their regional organisation -- also claim that the US, which is bent on reforming and expanding the Middle East, has little interest in the Arab League. After all, Washington and Israel have come to realise that this supranational organisation no longer jeopardises the project of marketing Israel to Arab governments, peoples and civil society. There was a time when the Arab League was the podium upon which Arab leaders vied to win the support and adoration of the Arab masses. Railing against Israel was one means towards this end, taking jabs at America and its military presence in this or that Arab country was another. That time is long gone. However, the idea of a podium remains, if in a less potent form. Some Arabs, for example, still expect the secretary-general to make certain pronouncements or to stick to a certain plan. People know that no one else, apart from the rare exception, can say some of the things he says and that, perhaps, he will be the last person to stand at that podium. On the refusal or reluctance to reform the Arab League we have heard the sly remark: "Can there ever be reform in the Arab world without American pressure?" To be sure, Arab League reform is not high on Washington's priorities for the region, at least for now. Nor will it assume priority until Arab ruling elites, and perhaps the US as well, realise that the Arab countries will never achieve true reform or development until each of them resolves pending questions affecting their national security, such as border problems, ethnic and sectarian issues, and their position on regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these problems can only be solved in a framework of regional cooperation. If the resolution to bilateral security questions was a prerequisite to the process of reform in Latin America and elsewhere, this applies even more strongly to the Arab world in view of its particular country-region dialectic. Recent developments offer tangible evidence of the "special" interplay between the country and regional levels in the Arab world. Was not the banner of reform turned against Syria and escalated into a regional crisis whose immediate theatre was Lebanon? Did not Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE, Morocco and the Arab League secretary-general each in turn hasten to mediate? The reform of Syria has transcended the country level to become a regional priority. Similarly, the American-imposed "reform" of Iraq had to be presented as a regional issue even before the US embarked on its military invasion and occupation. Nor can we overestimate the repercussions this reform campaign has had on regional and sub-regional balances of power and on the status and reputation of individual regional powers. It is now being rumoured that Arab League members have decided to postpone discussion of creating an Arab parliament until after the summit. Nevertheless, the idea has already been approved at the level of Arab foreign ministers and, as an indication of the sincerity of their intentions -- or perhaps more accurately their true intentions -- the ministers voted to base the parliament in Damascus, one of the staunchest Arab governments in its resistance to both foreign and domestic pressures for reform. The ministers' decision further stated that the four parliamentary representatives to which each Arab country is entitled would be selected by appointment from their legislative bodies. The plan, in other words, is for Arab countries to parade themselves in the forthcoming regional parliament exactly as they are, without domestic reform or improvement, so that the refusal to change at the country level will be mirrored at the regional level and the intransigence at one level will reinforce the intransigence at the other. The creation of an Arab parliament was central to the appeal of Arab reformers. Their hope was that domestic reform would spontaneously lead to reform at this level of regional cooperation. Surely they are aghast at the prospect of an Arab parliament as a copy writ large of national parliaments as they currently exist. We see a similar process in the works on the matter of "stimulating" Arab NGOs under the umbrella of the Arab League. It is undeniable that some, if not all, of the impetus given to this sector of civil society in recent years was the result of outside pressure from the US or Europe. Nor can we refute that in some Arab countries NGOs and other grassroots organisations not only began to proliferate but also enjoyed a margin of freedom greater than that permitted to political parties or professional syndicates. However, as outside pressure for reform mounted to the point of intimidation, some Arab governments discovered a way to control that tide of NGOs demanding the right to exist and work. Their solution was to create semi-official "mother NGOs" to "coordinate" the activities of the NGOs orbiting in their constellation. Otherwise put, broad sectors of Arab NGOs are being nationalised and, like the Arab parliament, this "hybrid" civil society will enter a series of historic partnerships with Arab governments beneath the emblem of the Arab League and the banner of reform. So dissipates yet another dream of Arab reformers. The regional legislators for whom reform of the Arab League was one of their highest aims never imagined that their project would be voided of all substance even before the ink on their bill had dried. They failed to take into consideration that governments so heroically digging their heels in against outside pressures to reform would work to undermine this project with equal determination. Perhaps it is time for these legislators to take stock of the breakthroughs outside pressure made possible and to encourage a little more, to help them make their dreams for reform a reality. * The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
