Towards reforming the Arab League, Mustafa El-Feki* argues for looking to matters of process At the invitation of the secretary-general of the Arab League, a relatively small group of Arab intellectuals and Arab nationalist thinkers, representing tendencies from across the political spectrum in the Arab world, met to discuss the future of the Arabs' regional organisation. Away from the glare of the media, the panel was able to concentrate on its task, which entailed reviewing the many proposals for rescuing the Arab League from its current predicament, imbue it with new life and, perhaps, to radically amend its charter. As the sessions were closed, I cannot discuss details, however, I will permit myself to make a few general observations. First, it is obviously impossible to speak of reforming the Arab League outside of the context of the Arab order with all its ills. The league is inherently a reflection of the general state of affairs in the Arab world, and the product of the interplay between its constituent centres of power and external pressures. It is impossible to conceive of a robust league against the backdrop of an ailing Arab world and it is unjust to use the league as a scapegoat for the blunders by its member nations. Second, even the most negative assessment of the Arab League must concede that the organisation has given much to the Arab world. It suffices to mention that Arab foreign ministers meet twice a year, at least, in accordance with the league's charter. More significant, the institution, itself, has remained a symbol of Arab unity, surviving even the bitterest inter-Arab political- ideological rifts. Perhaps the most salient example of this occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the Arab world split between "progressives" and "republicans" versus "reactionaries" and "monarchists". Even Abdel-Nasser, with all his pan-Arab charisma and political clout, did not attempt to override the league and, indeed, called for the emergency Arab summit of 1964 at a time when inter-Arab tensions were at their most acute and complex. Third, the Arab League, whose charter is more than 55-years-old, needs to be revived in spirit and content -- a vital process some of its member nations have already begun themselves with varying degrees of success. Band-aid solutions -- striking a paragraph here and tweaking the wording of a provision there -- will not do when present day realities demand a much broader, forward-looking vision. Fourth, the league has been isolated from many of the profound and sudden changes that have taken place in the world today. It must be freed of the constraints that impede it from performing its role in a dynamic fashion. In this regard, I refer readers to an article by Gamil Mattar (Al-Ahram Weekly 646) in which he cautioned against an unrealistic dogmatism that would risk encumbering the league with roles that would be unfeasible for it to sustain. Fifth, I still feel that in spite of the efforts of its current secretary-general, the league is at a far remove from the standards of the contemporary polity. Among its members are nations that are undemocratic and have little respect for the rule of law and human rights. Nevertheless, the league is not empowered to stipulate such conditions for membership. If it were given such powers -- however difficult effecting this might be -- they would elevate the league to a morally lofty position, making it a mechanism for ensuring that Arab regimes, without exception, were required to adhere to performance standards. In such an event, the league would be able to prove itself not only capable of self-reform, but of playing an integral part in a comprehensive reform movement in the Arab world. There can be no overestimating the urgency of this demand, especially in recent years. Sixth, from an Arab nationalist perspective the notion of a "Middle Eastern Order" is inherently odious because it is redolent of ulterior Israeli and Western motives. Nevertheless, realities in the region demand that the league revise its thinking about its approach to our non-Arab neighbours, which include Iran, Turkey, some nations on the Horn of Africa, as well as Israel, the latter of which has an extraordinary capacity for ensuring that US policy serves its own insidious designs. It is, therefore, essential that the Arab League be able to address Jewish pressure and decision-making centres abroad, especially in the US, as well as developing the ability to influence public opinion inside Israel itself. Effective lobbying is one of the essential tools of a regional organisation with a supra- nationalist mandate and it will remain impossible for the league to attain a level of sophistication in this skill if its hands continue to be tied by a charter that has far exceeded its shelf life and by outmoded mindsets incapable of addressing regional and international developments. Seventh, reform, whether of the league or individual Arab governments, requires, above all, political will. Herein resides the crux of the Arabs' current crisis. All are aware of the extent of the perils that surround us. Yet, our countries prefer to go their own way in bilateral arrangements, without consideration of those who share their predicament. Eighth, it is absurd to entertain the notion that Arab integration should proceed at two separate paces, whereby two or three nations take the helm and the rest either rush to catch up or are left in the wake of the leading states. All Arab societies face pretty much the same problems and challenges and we certainly have no potential "superstars" at risk of being held back by others. At the same time, there is no denying that individual societies should strive to achieve whatever progress they can attain, so long as the rewards of their success are available to all. Ninth, reforming the league entails more than making the secretariat-general more efficient or creating special commissions dedicated to such pressing issues as the media, the dialogue of civilisations, Arab civil society or Arab communities abroad. However useful such initiatives are, the central concern of the league should be the reform of Arab political rhetoric. It is also imperative that as we shed hackneyed jargon and outmoded bombast, we sharpen our focus on exposing the perils of Israel's being the region's sole possessor of a nuclear arsenal and the security arrangements between certain parties in the Middle East. Indeed, I do not believe it too ambitious to look forward to a day when the Quartet will not be alone in paving the way for a final settlement to the Palestinian problem, when the Quartet will have become a quintet, the fifth partner being the Arab League, the primary regional organisation in the area of the conflict. I am aware that numerous obstacles and pitfalls lie in the way of realising such an aspiration. But what gives one hope is the fact that the league had been instrumental in bringing about the return of international arms inspectors to Iraq -- even if the US decision to wage war had been taken beforehand and ultimately prevailed. Tenth, the Arab League in its new form should have a supreme ministerial council, a united Arab parliament, an Arab court of justice and a commission to oversee the conducting of day-to-day business. It should develop strong relations with both the EU and the OAU and give greater attention to economic and cultural policies that promise political dividends. I would also say that the creation of an Arab peace-keeping force will be necessary in the future, especially after the charter is amended to release the league from the captivity of unanimous vote. The preceding are not the 10 commandments of Arab League reform. There is no ready recipe for solving all the league's problems in one go. In any case, it is not so much what reforms we institute, but summoning that long absent will to reform that counts. I am, therefore, among those who subscribe to the belief that reform must be a sustained, voluntary process, rather than a sporadic response to fleeting pressures. And, fortunately, we have an example to draw on. The EU created all its institutions on the basis of referendums; it never imposed such institutions on member nations or held them remiss if they refused to approve them. Such results were achieved because the EU operates on the principle that the will of the people determines the level of commitment on the part of national governments, and not the reverse. I believe that if the Arabs, too, adopt this principle, they can look forward to the day when the Arab League, standing on the banks of the Nile in Cairo, will be a source of pride and support for us all, because it will be a league that embodies the spirit of the times and lives in the present -- not one mired in nationalist sentimentality which can neither confer legitimacy or sustain its existence. * The writer is chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the People's Assembly.
