What should the Arabs expect from their league? Gamil Mattar* weighs into the debate Some Arab intellectuals are still insisting, not only on reforming the Arab League, but that the reformed league should in turn reform the social, economic and political order in the Arab world. In unleashing their imaginations in this direction, they appear to have overlooked an important fact, to which those familiar with the rules and procedures of the league have repeatedly drawn our attention. The general-secretariat of the Arab League does not have the right to pressure members to reform their domestic affairs. The league does not possess an army for liberating occupied territories, for resisting the American invasion of Iraq or militarily confronting new challenges in the post-Saddam era. Nor does it possess a will independent of the wills of its member nations. The general-secretariat cannot, above all, make a bid to include Israel in the league, as a full member or as an observer. By even embarking on such a step the league would forfeit the legitimacy it so needs in these difficult times. Naturally, this is not the first time the Arab League has come under concerted criticism. However, the current campaign differs from its forerunners in intent. If, in the past, critics of the organisation and its resolutions were venting dismay and, perhaps, anxiety over the collective fate of the Arabs and their league, today, the thrust of the campaign aims at deriving a new formula for Arab cooperation and Arab identity in which the Arab component of these terms is left out. I am not exaggerating or reading more meaning than exists into the statements and articles issued by the planners and leaders of the campaign. The league, they maintain, should be transformed into an institution whose form, substance, charter, activities and title conforms to the new realities in the region. One of the realities is the growing impact of nations bordering the Arab world, notably Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia. Another is that one of the members of the league has become a major item on a superpower's domestic policy agenda. The issue here is not how accurate these contentions are, but rather that the people who assert them believe they are telling us something new, whereas the questions of neighbouring powers and the hegemony of superpowers have posed themselves in various forms for decades. Some of the critics have been bolder and more explicit. Among them are those who hold that the true reason behind the insistence on overhauling the Arab League is that we have come to live in an Arab ghetto surrounded on all sides by Israel, which can penetrate or control this ghetto whenever and however it wants. Therefore, they argue, we should take the initiative and invite Israel into the league, after which the league will automatically be transformed into a regional organisation and, as a natural outcome of this, its members will drop the modifier "Arab" out of deference to the sensitivities of the Israelis and other neighbours. Others have been franker yet. After the occupation of Iraq and in view of the Arabs' weakness, in general, especially in the face of American dictates, many Arabs are contemplating abandoning "Arabism". This is the first time I have ever heard of a people discarding their identity before having found a new one. True, there are those who speak of the "new Arab identity" and the secretary-general of the Arab League has come up with the expression, "neo-Arab nationalism". However, I, along with many others, am at a loss as to what those terms mean. Perhaps the clearest explanation I have heard is that the "new Arab identity" is derived from the implicit and contractual agreement between a number of Arab states to work directly with Israel without fear of domestic or outside opposition and to bow to the reality of American hegemony and move closer to those nations located on the other side of the political boundaries of the Arab world. It hardly bears mentioning that this succinct explanation still eludes our grasp. Certainly, it has failed to convince anyone apart from those who are preaching that new identity. What is particularly interesting is that some of the advocates of liberating the Arab League from its identity, its past, its resolutions, indeed, its whole legacy, say that if it wants to survive it must prove its ability to do so in the realm of regional -- Middle Eastern, not inter-Arab -- cooperation. Others, undoubtedly out of the best intentions, have joined their ranks and presented the secretary-general of the Arab League with another list of demands. One of the more noteworthy proposals called upon him to form a fact- finding committee to investigate the state of human rights and civil freedoms in the Arab world and submit an annual report similar to those generated by the United Nations, the US State Department and the European Union. They also suggested that the general-secretariat produce a report on unemployment in the Arab world, identifying the relevant social discrepancies in member nations, pinpointing governments' shortcomings in addressing the problems and offering appropriate recommendations. Other writers have suggested that the Arab League be conferred the right to judge the success or failure of foreign policies and performance of its member states in accordance with a set of criteria it devises either independently or in cooperation with organisations or persons with expertise in these matters. There was also that piece of advice given to the secretary-general that he intervene personally, with the weight of the league behind him, to promote the establishment of civil society organisations in its member states and the establishment of federations linking these organisations with their counterparts across the political boundaries of the Arab world. Perhaps the giver of this advice had forgotten that Arab governments had nationalised a good many non-governmental organisations and subjected sectors of civil society to semi-official control. Perhaps he is also unaware that Arab governments reject the UN and US State Department reports on human rights violations in their countries and are extremely unlikely to agree that writing such reports should become one of the functions of the Arab League. One of the toughest challenges that the secretary-general of the Arab League has to contend with stems from the following question: What can he do to make member states want the changes that he wants for the league? In other words, how can he win the support of member states for reforms that would render the Arab League a tool, not for him to wield against the interests of its member nations, but an instrument that member nations can avail themselves of in order to better their domestic circumstances and that will support them in their foreign relations against the forces of hegemony, aggression and occupation? If he is unable to do this, at the very least he should urge member states, or at least most of them, to agree to stay quiet or to put into effect, if only grudgingly, some of the reforms he would like to introduce gradually for the sake of the higher Arab interest. In a meeting that was held recently to discuss the challenges before the Arab League, I couldn't help but notice the pessimism and despair in the eyes of some of the participants. The problem, they said, is far greater than the secretary- general trying to convince member states of the need for change, however important that is. His most formidable challenge in the coming weeks will be to hold his ground on keeping the word "Arab" affixed to the institution he is heading. In this regard, more than one participant said that the crucial problem we all face, as people concerned with the future of the league, is the assault on "Arabism" by some Arabs who are totally immersed in the illusions of ultra-realism. No wonder, they say, lines of attack have been as follows: Arab civilisation, the nations leading the Arab regional order, Arab nationalism, Arab solidarity, the Arab common market and the Arab League. What is under assault is the entire Arab order, from its philosophical and ideological principles and its historical legacy to its institutions and infrastructure. When a participant said we will have to prepare for the day when the secretary-general finds himself in front of a delegate from Iraq carrying credentials signed and stamped by the American governor, another participant remarked, "Let's not deceive ourselves. We have two types of members in the league: those who maintain that they control their own fate and those who recognise that their fate is controlled by others." The response reflected the opinion of some, even if they did not voice it openly, that it was pointless to discuss such details when our greater task was to come to terms with the reality that the region was under US hegemony. Another voice aired the view that by the time we get around to discussing what to do with the Iraqi delegate, the league will have already admitted non-Arab observers and perhaps non-Arab members, at which point the problem will have effectively solved itself. At that point a tone of bitter wit was injected into the meeting. One participant said that delegates and ministers meeting within the framework of the Arab League all speak the same language, whereas if non-Arabs are admitted as observers people will have to be brought in to translate between Arabic and other languages, perhaps even Hebrew. A second participant countered, sarcastically, that many Arabs who have attended Arab League sessions felt they could have used a translator to interpret what was being said in Arabic. So much of what is said in those meetings is impossible to follow because of the ubiquitous slogans and the emotion-packed oration. Somebody was needed to translate all that political rhetoric into something workable. However, what most intrigued me in the meetings on the crisis of the Arab order and the Arab League was that appeal issued by an Arab intellectual to the secretary-general to call upon the Arab Foreign Ministers Council to draw, in addition to the "negative" lists, containing the names of millions of Arabs who would be banned from travel across inter-Arab borders for reasons pertaining to security and terrorism, a "positive" list allowing for the easy and rapid movement of across borders, without visas, of millions of other individuals who have something to contribute to inter-Arab cooperation, such as investors, skilled labour, producers and transmitters of knowledge and know-how and all who are keen to promote the political stability and prosperity of the Arab nation. Certainly, the millions on the second list merit a portion of the attention of Arab foreign ministers, if the desire for domestic political reform and the intention to rescue the Arab people, the Arab order and the Arab League from their crisis are sincere. * The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
