Ayman Al-Sayed Abdel-Wahhab* details the report's conclusions on developments in the Arab world, and in the particular case of Egypt Relations within the Arab order during 2003 pointed to the lack of progress with both inter-Arab cooperation and the functioning of the Arab League. The League's approach to the Iraqi crisis, in particular, has clearly shown that the crisis within the Arab order is coming to a head. There are only two possible ways forward from here: either the Arab League must be sidelined altogether, or else a comprehensive plan must be drawn up for reforming both the Arab order and the League itself. At the level of projects and ideas, there has been quite radical change. But this transformation has not yet reached the implementation stage. Officially, Arab governments have interpreted this development as a further step following on from the reforms made by the Arab League in 2002, which were based on a proposal put forward by the League's secretary- general, Amr Moussa. Both externally and internally, the Arab world's relations during this period were affected by international developments. The region witnessed intensive discussions on a number of hot topics, including internal reform, the situation in Iraq, Sudan, and the nature of Arab political regimes and their relations with the United States. These discussions pushed Arab countries towards a certain acceptance of international pressures, in order to try and limit their effect on current national and regional equations. It is worth describing here the most significant common denominator of all inter-Arab and Arab-American interactions: the weak performance of the regional Arab order and its inability to confront either foreign challenges or any major threats to its own existence. Despite their great variety and often contradictory manifestations, it is possible to identify two main types of threat. The first is connected to the nature of the order itself, its institutions and its member states, while the second is related to the political environment and the limits placed on the Arab order's ability to deal with it. Taking this reciprocal relationship between the pressures and challenges imposed on the Arab world as a starting point, the report examines internal developments within the Arab world, especially those associated with US calls for reform in Arab countries. These calls are based on the belief that the political, economic, cultural and educational conditions in Arab and Islamic countries provide an environment conducive to the growth of extremism and terrorism. ( See article by Hassan Abu Taleb.) Although most Arab governments reject foreign pressure, it is difficult for them to ignore it entirely. The commonest tactic employed by these countries is to introduce just enough reforms to reduce foreign pressure, and back up their claims that they are taking the matter seriously but with a caution appropriate to their own particular circumstances. Generally speaking, one cannot say that such steps have yet resulted in serious reforms in any Arab country. Indeed, the dominant principle in most Arab countries is not "reform to change the status quo", but "reform in order to preserve it". Alongside reform, the issue of Sudan has emerged as a new dilemma for the Arab nation and its relations with the international community. The situation in Darfur and attendant efforts to widen the problem, have highlighted the great dangers facing the future of the Sudanese state. The decline of the security situation in Darfur in February 2003 marked the beginning of a general Sudanese decline, and had a major knock-on effect on the balance of power between Sudan's various political factions. As regards inter-Arab relations, the report takes the case of the Arab West as an example of the obstacles that prevent Arab cooperation from getting off the ground. All the events and interactions witnessed in the Arab West in 2003 failed to contribute in any noticeable way to creating radical change either regionally or within individual countries. North African relations continued to oscillate between a desire to maintain their existing level of communications and collaborative institutional activity, and their reluctance to impart any real dynamism to the relations themselves. For example, the profound changes in Libya's foreign policy and the holding of elections in Algeria have had no visible effect on North African relations. The state of political stagnation in relations between Algeria and Morocco continues, and the North African summit was yet again delayed. Following on from this analysis, the report identifies two levels of interaction which need to be taken into account. The first is external. Here the report focusses on the radical international and regional changes in Libyan foreign policy, including halting its support for "terrorism", restoring its relations with Europe, ending its enmity with the United States and resolving the Lockerbie crisis by accepting its responsibility and paying compensation. Indeed, Libya has admitted possessing WMD and promised to destroy them, as well as acknowledging that Israel does not pose a threat to Libyan national security. These new policies began unannounced following the imposition of international sanctions on Libya in 1992, and were made public three years ago. They aim to create "a fundamental re-acceptance of the Libyan Republic" and the transformation of its image from that of a "revolutionary state" making trouble for the great powers to that of a state that complies with the rules of the international order. The second level of interaction highlighted by the report is internal. Here, the report examines the effect that the Algerian and Mauritanian elections had on the process of reform and democratic change. The year 2003 represented a transitional moment for Algeria in particular: a dividing line between the years of chaos and bloodshed, and those of political and social stability that the country is now striving towards. The year saw a change in government, and a fierce battle between the president of the republic, Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika, and Ali Bin Fleis, the secretary-general of the National Liberation Front Party, which held the majority of seats both in parliament and in the national and local councils. The conflict was caused by Bin Fleis's announcing his intention to run for president in the Spring 2004 elections. Initially, the indicators were in Bin Fleis's favour, making him a worrying candidate for President Bouteflika. However this preliminary sparring bore no relation to the election results, in which Bouteflika won a sweeping victory, taking over 84 per cent of the vote, with the remaining 16 per cent distributed amongst his five remaining opponents. It was more like a popular referendum on Bouteflika's years in power, and indeed, despite the many crises the country has been through, its economy now seems to be in much better shape than it was before he came to power. In Mauritania, the coup attempt on 6 June 2003 in the midst of preparations for the presidential elections revealed the true nature of the dilemma facing President Ma'awiyya's regime: political apathy, economic problems and discontent in some army units. The regime had begun to prepare the political climate and make deals with certain opposition figures in an attempt to guarantee its continuity and absorb -- at least in part -- popular discontent and displeasure. A set of measures were enacted that helped limit voter disinterest and smooth the way to President Ma'awiyya Walad Al-Ta'i's third term, which he won with 66.7 per cent of the vote. Alongside regional and internal political developments in the Arab world, the report also addressed Syria's defence policy as part of its discussion of the military doctrines of countries in the region. The report examined the American pressures to which Syria is subject, the Israeli military escalation that took the form of an air strike on a Syrian military base in October 2003, and the new reality imposed on Syrian defence planning and operations by the occupation of Iraq. The American-led war posed a severe strategic threat to Syria, embodied by America's military presence in Iraq. However, this did not change Israel's former position as Syrian defence policy's number-one priority. Indeed, Syria not only declined to position any significant forces on its borders with Iraq to confront actions which might be taken by American forces, but still would not budge even in response to American demands to prevent the infiltration of Arab volunteers into the battle against the American occupation forces in Iraq. The issue of reform was the main topic of debate in Egyptian political circles during 2003. Although neither the subject itself nor the extent of the discussion were new, the interaction of a number of factors, both local and international, heightened the ruling elite's sensitivity to calls for change. The occupation of Iraq and the questions of political reform it raised, the decline in Egypt's economic performance, the rise in the prices of basic goods, and the negative effect of this trend on the life of ordinary Egyptian citizens, helped spread the call for change through comprehensive political reform. This political contest generated a number of proposals on reform, its mechanisms and the time frame needed to implement it. These ideas can be divided into two main categories. First, there are those which were adopted by non-governmental political forces and opposition parties, which called for a comprehensive and rapid reform based on lifting the state of emergency, amending the constitution, abolishing laws limiting political freedoms and establishing judicial oversight of elections. In the second category there are the propositions supported by the National Democratic Party. These stressed the primary importance of changing the country's cultural infrastructure, improving the relationship between the state and the citizen, encouraging youth, women and civil society to play a more active role, and reviewing certain laws governing organised civil political activity, most importantly the laws governing elections, political practice and professional syndicates. Viewed from this perspective, there are three ways in which attempts to escape the stagnation that dominates political life in Egypt might succeed: by establishing new parties; by forming a front between existing political parties; or through moves such as the call made by President Mubarak during his speech to the nation, which appeared to offer a chance of sweeping changes in both party and political life. However, general immobility remained the central feature of Egyptian party activity in 2003, with only the NDP and the Tagammu Party managing to escape the surrounding stagnation. The former presented its vision for comprehensive reform, while the latter offered a model example of how to make changes in party leadership by implementing internal democratic mechanisms. The professional syndicates complete the picture of public political life, providing further evidence of a general movement towards political reform. The general stagnation that affects the vast majority of these syndicates is the result of Law no.100/ 1993, which has effectively stifled most civil society institutions. 2003 may have witnessed elections in the Press Syndicate and a series of important developments in the Engineers' Syndicate, which had been suspended since 1995. However, these two cases were the exception that proved the rule, and the rest of the professional syndicates remained largely paralysed. It was logical, therefore, that calls for political and constitutional reform should include the professional and labour syndicates. There was consensus on the need to guarantee the independence of syndicates and civil associations by abolishing Law no.100/ 1993 along with a ban on all legislative interference in syndicate affairs without prior consultation of their elected councils and general meetings. As well as this, the syndicates should be granted freedom of movement in constructing their organisations, Law no.84/2002 -- widely seen as the latest in a series of restrictions on the role of civil associations -- should be abolished, and there should be a return to the provisions of civil law which were abolished by Presidential Decree no.384/ 1956. Whilst the report found the political factor central to any explanation of the syndicates' paralysis, it did not discount the responsibility of a number of other factors in reducing many syndicates to a stage for narrow political manoeuvring and disputes. This in turn has caused a decline in their ability to meet their responsibilities towards their members. In some cases it also drained their financial resources, thus weakening their power to meet their members' basic requirements, such as paying their pensions. This situation had a knock-on effect on state institutions, the most prominent of which were the People's Assembly and the Supreme Constitutional Court. The report's discussion of the People's Assembly was confined to the issue of membership and related issues such as resignations, by-elections, and the acceptance of new members. The media has invented the term "recruitment deputies" to describe this problem, thus encapsulating the pressing need both to overhaul the entire electoral process and reform the party system. This need was embodied in the flurry of political and theological debate over the legality of the resignation of deputies who had not performed military service. The report also attempts to describe the momentous impact the Supreme Constitutional Court has had on Egyptian life through its monitoring of the constitutionality of laws, while posing the question whether the best form of constitutional oversight is preventive, or retroactive. The Supreme Constitutional Court carries out its duties within the framework of the present political regime and in the interests of this regime and its goals. It thus plays a variety of different political, economic and social roles, which means that it can introduce profound changes into many areas of Egyptian life, as well as creating additional freedoms and protecting the constitution itself. In the political arena, the court sought to define the nature of the popular referenda that can be organised at the president's discretion, the rules which should govern such a referendum and the consequences attendant on the people's approval of propositions which might be put to them. The court's action in the economic arena is an offshoot of its political activity, as can be seen from its judgements that removed a number of the legislative foundations of the socialist economy enacted in the period between the July revolution and the mid- 1970s. The report makes quite clear the enormous impact the court has had on contemporary Egyptian life over the last quarter of a century. Arguably, the court's main achievement has been to adopt articles from the constitution originally intended to consolidate the socialist goals of the revolution and use them as a tool to promote political pluralism, individual rights, economic freedom and market economics. The report concluded this section with an in-depth look at Egypt's economic performance, together with comments on a number of important economic issues that have occasioned much debate in Egypt, such as the future of social insurance funds, monopolies and competition in the Egyptian market. The report also addresses Egypt's role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict through its work on the Palestinian-Israeli track. It considers Egypt to have been the most effective party when it came to confronting a number of external challenges resulting from changes in Israeli society and regional developments relating to the war in Iraq, which effectively left Ariel Sharon with a free hand to pursue his aggression against the Palestinian people. Internal challenges were posed by certain Palestinian factions, and their often harsh criticism of Egyptian efforts, which created a major problem. It concluded that although Egypt has been very active, and was a force to be reckoned with, it was unable to have much impact on the situation due to the many changes in both the internal situation and the context surrounding the conflict. * The writer is the managing editor of the annual Arab Strategic Report.
