Inter-Arab cooperation, the role of the Arab League, the efficacy of Arab economic and security agreements: where are they heading, asks Ibrahim Nafie Following recent events in the region we hear the same refrains over and over again. Arab cooperation has failed. Now is the time to sort out the chronic obstacles that make our agreements hardly worth the paper they're written on. The Arab League is futile, incapable of containing and resolving the tensions that propel us from one crisis to the next. The Arabs have paid a heavy price for their failure to solve their problems within the framework of the "Arab house". The war in Iraq and its aftermath have made this poignantly clear, and suddenly Arab writers and politicians are rushing to offer recommendations for change. Some have suggested redrafting current agreements to render them more practical and realistic. Others have appealed for the amendment of the Arab League Charter in order to free that body from the demands of unanimous voting. A simple majority for routine matters and a two-thirds majority for more serious issues should give the League the flexibility it needs, they say. However important such remedies the problems lie far deeper. No regional framework for cooperation stands a chance of getting off the ground in the absence of both the collective will to make it work and the capacity to lay concrete foundations upon which to build. President Mubarak graphically underscored this need when addressing recent demands to put the Joint Arab Defence Treaty into effect and recent criticisms of the Arab League for its failure to forestall the war on Iraq. How can we speak of collective action among a group of nations whose volume of trade with one another amounts to barely eight per cent of the total, he asked. Without a doubt the collective Arab will and the concrete bases for cooperation lag far behind the principles and provisions of the many agreements Arabs have signed. In fact, I would wager that most Arab countries signed those agreements in the certainty that not a single article would be put into effect. Arab cooperation is something to be pulled out only in times of need, at which point they invoke this article or that from an agreement that had long remained lifeless. Vivid in my mind are the instances in which certain Arab leaders, experts in the old game of playing to their public, have called for the implementation of the Joint Arab Defence Pact, once to support the Palestinian Intifada and once again to support the regime of Saddam Hussein. Not only had these leaders never given a thought to this agreement beforehand, but they expected others -- Egypt in particular -- to bear the brunt of the action, without the slightest consideration to what they could contribute. The key to promoting Arab cooperation resides in our attitudes. Collective will requires not public proclamations and verbal one-upsmanship but an earnestness of intent emanating from the conviction that it is in our interests for Arab nations to work together effectively. Effective will entails a high level of sustained commitment. Participants in any project for cooperation must be prepared to invest their time, effort and resources towards the promotion of a collective activity the material and moral benefits of which they have decided outweigh the costs. It has become common practice for those Arab nations that belong to, or seek to belong to, more than one regional organisation to instantly shift their priorities in accordance with perceptions of the immediate advantages to be gained. A case in point is Morocco which, in addition to being a member of the Arab League has long entertained aspirations of joining the EU and more recently, has embarked on a drive to join African cooperative frameworks. What is required is clarity of vision rather than the customary scrambling back and forth in response to temporary exigencies. Partners in inter-Arab cooperation must set their sights firmly on the future and be prepared to subordinate other affiliations over the long term. As President Mubarak indicated it is imperative for the Arabs to address their mutual economic relations. The eight per cent volume of inter-Arab trade falls far short of the material basis necessary for any regional cooperative framework. The Arabs must look at themselves honestly and make a serious choice. Either Arab nations decide to put individual interests first, in which case each might as well pursue its foreign relations as it deems fit, or they recognise that there is such a thing as a higher Arab interest and the need for a framework that promotes the welfare of all Arab nations. In the event of the latter it becomes legitimate to ask Arab nations to abide by the dictates of their higher common interests and to work towards developing and expanding the scope these interests. An open invitation to Arab economic experts to give their input on the best framework for promoting inter-Arab economic cooperation would lend this process impetus. Avenues to closer cooperation in the more difficult realms of political policy and security must also be pursued. This will require both higher levels of resolve and commitment and thorough economic groundwork. I would suggest we study the possibility of creating some joint Arab industries and exact a commitment from participating countries to support these industries. We could also consider an arrangement whereby we identify source countries for the purchase of certain goods and equipment, on the condition that such products conform to price and quality specifications. Also, in view of the fact that many Arab countries are in urgent need of various forms of material and technical aid, might it not be possible to formulate a collective Arab mechanism for channeling foreign aid? Would not such a mechanism go a long way to freeing some Arab countries from the political price they have long been forced to pay in exchange for aid? Arab investment habits also require closer study. Perhaps this will help clear up the mystery of why Arab investors still prefer to funnel their money abroad in spite of the fact that Arab countries now offer far more attractive incentives and guarantees on investments than are offered in major industrial countries. The crux of the problem resides in the overriding lack of confidence between Arab countries. It is imperative that we examine ways to dispel this corrosive climate to reach a point at which Arab nations become convinced their interests are intertwined, that they have the ability to grow together and that the development of individual Arab states advances the interests of the whole. I have no doubt that we have much to learn from the experiences of others who have preceded us in the domain of regional cooperation. In particular we should look to our neighbours north of the Mediterranean. They have much to teach us: they have, after all, made the transition from erstwhile enemies that fought two world wars to an unprecedented degree of economic cooperation. Within half a century these countries mended their fences, launched a common market, launched a common currency and began to expand their scope of cooperation to the realms of foreign policy and security. Indeed, it may not be long before we see a United States of Europe. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from European and similar experiences is that building an effective framework for cooperation demands, above all, the abandonment of traditional modes of thinking that begin and end with political posturing. True political will must manifest itself in a practical resolve to lay the material foundations for cooperation, beginning at the economic level. Laying one brick after the other to create a solid structure is a long term process and, as such, demands that we adopt new attitudes and new approaches to work. We must cease this pattern of acting in panic. We must summon the necessary spirit of dedication and perseverance. Hopefully, the latest round of appeals to reform the Arab order will not turn out to be a transient product of the shock following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, only to be forgotten until the next crisis erupts. The Arab peoples need creative initiatives backed by commitment and the allocation of the necessary practical resources. Against this need the preoccupation with such questions as redrafting existing agreements or amending the Arab League Charter misses the point. The business of building an effective basis for Arab cooperation cannot be reduced to such simplified formulas. The Arab world must take advantage of fact that events in Iraq have thrown our pressing issues sharply into relief. We must, this time, set off on the right foot in constructing a truly solid foundation for inter-Arab cooperation.
