Designs to fragment the Arab world make reform of the Arab order imperative, writes Ibrahim Nafie Several weeks ago I began a series on the current state of inter-Arab cooperation, an issue cast into relief by unprecedented threats. The central premise was that the Arab world is the object of a major conspiracy which is currently manifesting itself in both Iraq and Palestine. I further maintained that there is a high degree of coordination in the planning and execution of this two-pronged conspiracy between the ultra-conservative administration in Washington and the extremist right-wing government in Israel. If the US defines its interests in the region in terms of the free flow of cheap oil and the security of Israel, the occupation of Iraq has served to further both objectives. The US is now in a position both to directly control Iraq's oil resources and to deliberately weaken and fragment Arab cultural and political bonds, thereby paving the way for an Israeli bid for regional hegemony. Although certain events during the past two weeks have had to take priority in this column, these same events suggest that now is the time to return to the question of collective Arab action. In Palestine, Israeli occupation forces have escalated their rampage of death and destruction against the Palestinian people. Indeed, such is the scale of outrage that even Israeli pilots have staged a protest, refusing to mount aerial raids against Palestinian civilian targets. Simultaneously, Israeli officials declared their intention to either expel or assassinate President Arafat, the legitimately elected president of the Palestinian people and the symbol of their cause. Meanwhile, work proceeds apace on the separating wall, its course planned so as to annex more occupied territory in the West Bank to Israel. On the Iraqi front the US has snubbed the demand voiced by France, Germany and Russia to set a date for popular elections and a timeframe for the transfer of sovereignty. More significantly, the Israeli connection in this arena of the conspiracy has become increasingly palpable with the infiltration of an Israeli presence into this sister Arab nation, and with the vicious slur campaign being waged against the Arab press by various Israeli agencies, which have levelled against it the spurious charge of racism. However, the gravest gauntlet Israel has thrown down before the Arabs is its aerial strike on an area near Damascus which, it claimed, served as a training camp for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing in Haifa. This strike constituted a flagrant violation of the principles and provisions of the UN Charter and a blatant provocation against Syria and all other Arab countries. Undoubtedly Israel's primary purpose was to test the Syrian, Arab and international pulse preparatory to pressing ahead with its designs for regional hegemony. But there are other reasons that make this the appropriate time to return to the issue of effective inter-Arab cooperation. The first is the First Annual Congress of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) held two weeks ago. In this conference, the NDP espoused a forward looking yet practical vision for overcoming our current challenges and laying the foundations for the comprehensive revival of our nation. The significance of this vision in terms of inter-Arab cooperation cannot be overestimated. After all, the Arab world has always looked to Egypt, at its heart, to sound the starting pistol to the major projects of Arab revival, from Mohamed Ali through the July 1952 Revolution to the present. Secondly, this week marked the 30th anniversary of the October War of 1973. That war still has much to teach us on how the Arab nation can, with careful planning and close coordination, capitalise on its strengths and overcome an enemy backed by powerful American support. The victory in October 1973 was a purely Arab victory, and as such it restored dignity and respect to the Arab nation and set in motion the machinery for liberating the territories that Israel had occupied in its surprise attack six years earlier. That victory also tells us that the Arabs have it in their power to counter and defeat the conspiracies being hatched against them today as long as they summon the will, sustain their faith in the collective powers and abilities of the Arab people, and channel these energies in accordance to a common vision. The Arab order has succeeded in overcoming severe crises and sharp divisions in the past and I have no doubt that it will be able to do so again, given time. However, it is equally certain that we cannot allow the Arab order merely to muddle its way through and make minor adjustments to accommodate to new realities. For while it is certain to survive, the upgrading of its institutions and the improvement of its performance will continue to proceed too slowly to meet the aspirations of the Arab people and to enable it to rise to the unprecedented challenges before it. The current crisis makes it imperative that we adopt a fresh and dynamic approach, an approach characterised by a new mode of creative thinking and a forward looking vision that will not only see us through the current crisis but will also lay the groundwork for strong and effective inter-Arab cooperation. In so doing, we should draw on already existing successful models for regional cooperation. Naturally, the EU springs first to mind. Although that project of regional integration began seven years after the Arabs initiated theirs, it leaped ahead at breathtaking speed to create economic unity, and has since struck out into the realms of collective foreign policy and political integration. Indeed, not only is a proposal for a constitution for a "United States of Europe" under study, the EU Summit in Rome agreed to establish the kernel of a European army. Meanwhile, Arab cooperation agreements have remained no more than ink on paper. The EU experience offers invaluable instructions on how to manage differences while safeguarding and building upon cumulative achievements. Certainly, President Mubarak was acutely aware of the potential of this process when he called attention to the danger looming over the Arab world and initiated a drive, in coordination with Syria and Saudi Arabia, to stimulate a revival of inter-Arab cooperation. Towards this end, too, Egypt has recently submitted a proposal for the comprehensive reform of the Arab League. It is Egypt's conviction that whatever reservations people may have about the league it remains the "Arab House" and, therefore, merits our fullest dedication to safeguarding it and promoting its efficacy. One thing is certain. As a first step towards creating a solid basis for rising to the unprecedented challenges posed by the conspiracies against us, we must overcome the prevalent negativism towards the Arab League. After all the Arab League is the sum product of the positions and attitudes of its member states; it will work if they summon the will to make it work. This, in turn, demands that we concentrate our efforts, first on identifying the shortcomings of the league, since such an awareness is a first step to the appropriate remedies that will empower the league and help it perform its various functions. The search for effective reforms also requires that we keep our minds open, objective and realistic. To persist in setting idealistic, unachievable goals, such as those that are touted by certain leaders playing to the gallery, will only guarantee that existing inter-Arab agreements remain unimplemented and that our league will continue to stumble along as it is. Naturally, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Arab leaders have already produced many ideas and initiatives; these are on the table and ready to be discussed. Not only will drawing on such proposals spare great time and effort, it will ensure that all member nations have a say in shaping the frameworks for future cooperation. But, if these ideas and initiatives are to work at all, we must summon the resolve to help the Arab League do its job. It is quite obvious that some Arab countries lack the will, and perhaps the desire, to give fresh impetus to the league, and have even indicated a preference for alternative regional institutions. Nothing could be, and has been, more detrimental to the league's task of containing problems before they escalate to full- fledged crises. We have instances of Arab governments that refused to bring their disputes before the league, opting instead for other organisations; and of governments that were party to international crises that refused to let the league support them with ideas and diplomatic backing. Iraq is a case in point. Former President Saddam Hussein refused to bring his initiatives to the league, presenting them instead to the UN secretary-general, which greatly undermined the ability of the Arab League to handle the Iraqi crisis effectively and ultimately worked against Iraq itself. Clearly, then, a prerequisite for reforming the Arab League is to establish once and for all that this institution must be the Arabs' primary conduit for collective action. That said, there are several practical reforms that should be instituted. One is to amend the Arab League Charter, specifically with regard to the outmoded and obstructive principle of the unanimous vote as the basis for decision-making. It will also be important to contemplate ways to enhance the league's powers of collective diplomacy and to formulate mechanisms for improving the general-secretariat's capacity to follow through on and enforce resolutions adopted by the league. Yet, even as we contemplate such details, it is important to keep our sights trained on the general dynamics of reform and progress. Here too, we can draw on the accumulated experience and expertise of such regional organisations as the EU and ASEAN. When we look at these experiences, we find that the key to their success lies in the fact that their projects for collective action took off from an economic platform. By concentrating first on cooperation in various economic activities, they succeeded in generating an ever increasing scope of mutual interests. Then, at a certain stage, it became clear that defending these interests required closer integration of foreign policy and collective security. Perhaps now we can better understand why the Arab Defence Pact has been worth little more than the paper on which it is written; we had begun at the top, whereas joint defence requires a concrete foundation of joint interests to defend.
