The US has no choice but to engage in dialogue with Iran, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The first public meeting between Iran and the US concluded in Baghdad a few days ago, but its ramifications are yet to be fully understood. The meeting was crucial, not just because the two "foes" sat down together to talk, after 25 years of diplomatic hiatus; and not just because the meeting took place in the Green Zone of Baghdad, a location with a certain symbolism in regard to international politics. The meeting was crucial because its timing and context meant that the US was publicly recognising Iran's regional influence -- although the Americans were going out of their way to dismiss this aspect of reality. The symbolism wasn't confined to the venue, but also to the selection of negotiators. Iran, which everyone knows was keen to hold talks with the Americans, made a point of not looking so desperate, and wanted to put more pressure on the US administration. Initially, Tehran said that it would send its deputy foreign minister to the meeting, then it decided on its UN envoy. Right before the talks started, moreover, Iran hinted that the chief of the North America Department of its Foreign Ministry would represent it in the talks, then it finally chose its ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, for the task. The Americans named their man right from the beginning: Ambassador Ryan Crocker. He is the current US ambassador to Iraq, but at one point was charge d'affaires at the US consulate in Khorramshahr in Iran. So a level of symbolism existed on both sides. The US-Iranian negotiations continued for four hours, and both sides termed them "positive" and "constructive". But these talks followed four years of behind-the-scenes badgering on both sides. Since the US occupied Iraq, Tehran has gone out of its way to make things harder for the Americans. Iran has thrown its weight around, allying itself with a secession of Iraqi Shia groups and spreading its influence in southern Iraq in an unprecedented manner. During the four hours of talks, the Iranians listened quietly to the Americans complaining about Tehran's interference in Iraqi affairs and its obstruction of the Iraqi political process. When it was their turn to respond, the Iranians proposed a three-way mechanism comprising Iran, the US and Iraq to run security in Iraq. What the Iranians suggested, to put it bluntly, was that Tehran -- the country that has the political leverage -- should share the authority with Washington -- the country that has the military leverage. So once the rhetoric abated, the diplomats finally spelled out their positions. Washington knows that it cannot fight Sunni resistance and the Shia militias at the same time. Should the current situation persist, Washington's international prestige and credibility in the region would suffer even further. Not to mention the political trouble at home. Tehran, for its part, wants to achieve several objectives. These are, namely, to reap the fruit of its hardline policy in the region and in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran wants to keep the profound differences among Iraqi Shias hidden from view. And it wants the international community to stop talking about its nuclear ambitions. Tehran is also hoping to make as much capital as possible, from the current weakness of the US administration. This is because Tehran has learned a lesson or two from its dealings with Jimmy Carter. During the US-Iranian confrontation that followed the hostage crisis in 1979, the Iranians refused to lend a political hand to Carter. Tehran only released the hostages after Carter's opponent, Ronald Reagan, won the 1980 elections. Then Reagan proved to be more anti- Iranian than Carter was. So this time around, the Iranians toned down their ideology. Both sides concentrated on politics and no references to the Great Satan or the Axis of Evil were made. Why not? After all, Tehran and Washington have several common objectives in Iraq. They're both averse to the creation of a strong and centralised Iraqi government with a powerful army. They are also against Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups gaining ground in Iraq. Furthermore, both countries want to see a dominantly Shia Iraqi government, that is capable of containing the Sunnis, in power. And they want a federal arrangement involving a fair distribution of resources among the north, centre and south of the country. The time element is crucial for both sides. Bush is one year away from the presidential elections of 2008 and wants to achieve some progress on the Iraqi front. Tehran wants to push ahead with its nuclear programme, and the talks with the Americans are buying it much- needed time. So far the Iranians have used a skilful mix of diplomacy, guile and regional leverage to obstruct US objectives and to pressure the neo-con administration. Tehran is using the US to buy time for its nuclear programme. And Washington is running out of wriggling room. The Iranians are so far advanced in their nuclear programme that there is no longer any point in asking them to stop enriching uranium, as Mohamed El-Baradei admitted a few days ago. Tehran has not only refused to stop its enrichment programme, but plans to have 3,000 centrifuges operating shortly, with another 50,000 to come. Since the beginning of this year, Tehran has quadrupled its enrichment of uranium, and is now operating 1,312 centrifuges. Politics is a two-way street. Tehran is not going to help Washington without a quid pro quo. Although Washington wanted to focus on Iraq in the talks, the Iranians managed to get something of a reciprocal nature going. They began a process which may lead to a strategic partnership in the future. While posing as the ultimate hardliner of the region, Tehran is telling the Americans that they need to share if they want to stay. Iran has won the first round of talks on points. But US policy is not run by the White House alone. Many pressure groups -- the industrial-military complex, the Zionist lobby and the oil lobby -- will have their say, and not everyone is in favour of rapprochement with Iran. To all intents and purposes, the US administration is running out of time. It has to choose between two courses of action. Either it accepts full partnership with Iran, or fights it. Neither option is reassuring for the region.
