Syria's alliance with Iran is not working in the favour of Damascus but rather against the whole Arab world as Persian regional influence deepens and extends, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* The Iranian-Syrian alliance is an unusual exception to regional ties that form and dissolve in upheavals which have become standard to our region. It has persisted for nearly 28 years despite major geo-strategic changes that have swept the region and the world. It is also unique in being maintained despite the contradiction between growing Iranian regional influence and Syrian isolation. If we add indications of what is to come, we can largely conclude that the current stage of the alliance is that preceding breakage, despite media and political affirmations made by politicians from both countries. The future hangs on Washington's decision concerning its strategy towards Iran -- either to recognise its growing regional role or to confront it by all means available. Recognition of the regional role of Tehran will not imply it is maintaining all of its regional alliance, for that would be a form of American submission to Iran. Damascus will be the object of bargaining but not party to it. As for the possibility of confronting Tehran by all means, Damascus will not profit from pressure on its regional partner due to the difference in power between Damascus and Tehran. Here, lessons may be learnt through consideration of Arab efforts not to confront Iran but rather to decrease the efficacy of its regional rush forward, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq. Reviewing interconnected regional events leads to the formulation of a strategic goal that Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, must strive to meet: Syria's withdrawal from its Iranian alliance and return to its natural Arab milieu. TEHRAN REACHES OUT: By way of its Syrian alliance, Tehran now commands geographic regional influence that passes west of Iran through Iraq, reaching Lebanon on the borders of the occupied Palestinian territories. As such, Tehran holds a wild card that allows it to impose its regional influence either directly on borders with Israel or through major ideological pressure on primary Arab states amid an intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran is historically and ideologically connected to Mount Amel in Lebanon, and thus Syria also serves as a connection tying Lebanon to Iran. Iran's efficiency in weaving alliances, whether with parties under the umbrella of the "great Satan" of the US in Iraq or with others in Lebanon ideologically inimical to Washington, has made its regional policy a daily model of incomparable political pragmatism. Thanks to Syria's geographic location between Iraq and Lebanon and Palestine, Iranian influence stretches west all the way to the Mediterranean. Iran's regional influence stems from changes in the structure of the regional and international order in 1990 and 2001, as well as the major explosion that took the form of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, in which Iran is fully invested. The occupation of Kuwait in 1990 was a lifesaver for the Iranian regime, allowing it to escape regional isolation from its Arab neighbours. Likewise, the "war on terrorism" targeted, among others, the principal Arab states. These two pivotal events laid the groundwork for Iran to step towards regional ascendancy. The occupation of Iraq brought that ascendancy to a new height thanks to the political, ethnic and sectarian character of the new Iraqi authority, placing Iran in the position of controlling Baghdad's authorities for the first time since the establishment of Iraq in 1921. Despite the immense importance of external factors in paving the road for Iranian ascendancy, no fair analysis can overlook Iran's persistent efforts to build and maintain a network of alliances that allow Iran to enter into the region's equations. Its alliance with Syria serves as its primary point of reference. Whereas the Iranian-Syrian alliance began as purely defensive, and throughout the 1980s and 90s remained essentially focused on Lebanon, the occupation of Iraq led Iran to weigh in on the region's balances. A historical analysis of the ups and downs of the Iranian- Syrian alliance must start with a consideration of its Lebanese component, which is an accurate thermometer for various regional dynamics. RELATIONS AND INTERESTS: The ideological animosity Syria adopted towards pre- revolutionary Iran gradually transformed into Syrian-Iranian relations balanced by the conflict with Iraq and the regional situation. Political steps taken by Syria and Iran reflected on economic relations, an agreement between the two countries being signed in 1974. This advancement was crowned by the visit of late Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad to Tehran in December 1975. At this time, Iran had signed the Algiers Agreement with Iraq containing mutual concessions on Shatt Al-Arab borders and support for the Kurds. Although Syrian-Iranian relations peaked in the decades following the fall of the Shah, they had previously represented an important indicator of Syria's realisation of Iranian weight in the Middle East. In addition was the emerging possibility of cooperation between the two countries on Lebanon, even before the Iranian Revolution, due to the historic importance Iran granted to Lebanon. When the Safavid Shah Ismail announced Shia Islam as the official sect of the Safavid state in 1501, he summoned its scholars from Mount Amel in Lebanon, historically connecting Iran to the mount from that point to this day. The deposed Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi continued a policy of interest in Lebanon, not this time from an ideological perspective but rather from that of expanding Iran's regional influence. The meeting point between Syria and Iran appeared with the growing role of Iranian national Musa Al-Sadr, who migrated to Lebanon in 1957 and made an undeniable contribution in mobilising Lebanese Shias towards demanding greater representation in the Lebanese state. Syria considered Lebanon a local, Syrian matter, while pre-revolutionary Iran never gave up its regional ambitions. In the early 1970s, Lebanon was the meeting place for Iranian political forces -- Islamic, nationalist and leftists. Many of the leading personalities of the Iranian Revolution were historically tied to Lebanon through residence and political activity. Among these Iranians was Ibrahim Yezdi, the first foreign minister in the revolutionary government and spokesperson for Imam Al-Khomeini during the revolution. Others included Sadeq Qutb Zadeh, former Iranian foreign minister, and Islamists such as Sadeq Tabtabai, former spokesperson for the Iranian government and nephew of Musa Al-Sadr; Mustafa Shamran, defence minister in the revolutionary government and founder of the Iranian Revolution Guard; Mohamed Muntazari, the son of Ayatollah Muntazari; Jalaluddin Al-Farisi, candidate for the presidency of the republic following the revolution; and Ali Akbar Muhtashimi, subsequently one of the founders of Hizbullah and former ambassador to Damascus. BIRTH OF AN ALLIANCE: Balances in the region changed following the Iranian Revolution and Iran's new visibility with regard to opposition to the West and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. The same year of the revolution, 1979, Syrian-Iraqi relations had reached their lowest point. Baghdad accused the Syrian regime of planning a coup against it and mobilised military forces along the border with Syria. Syrian politics fell into crisis due to its losing relations with Egypt and Iraq at the same time, relations it had excelled in employing to off- balance rising Israeli influence with counter alliances. The Iraqi invasion of Iran in the autumn of 1980 increased Syria's weight in Iran's eyes. With regard to ideological propaganda, relations with Syria were, from the Iranian perspective, more than important in preventing the Iraqi-Iranian war from turning into an Arab- Iranian war or a Sunni-Shia war. Syria closed the Iraqi Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline, depriving Iraq of financial resources and in return received inexpensive Iranian oil. Should Syria have aligned with Iraq it would have weakened the Iranian position, completing the geographic blockade of Iran while supporting Iraq with additional reach and cutting off Iran's path to Lebanon. Syria built diplomatic relations with states in the Arabian Gulf that bridged the way to Iran and became an excellent channel for indirect dialogue between Arab Gulf states and Iran. Damascus used this channel to support its military efforts and achieve some balance with Israel, while supporting its economy with Gulf aid. From the Syrian perspective, relations with Iran offered a reasonable alternative to the absence of Syria's historical partner, Egypt. Complementary to the Syrian-Iranian alliance, military developments on the ground in late 1982 -- the beginning of the Iraqi attack faltering -- and the entrance of Iranian forces into Iraqi territory in 1983, all led to rapprochement between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to prevent Iraq from collapsing and bringing down the then regional security order. The occupation of Beirut in 1982 led to the emergence of an Iranian presence on Lebanese territory with Syrian approval that allowed Tehran a geographical overview of the northern borders of Tel Aviv for the first time in its history. Syria's approval of an Iranian element entering Lebanon stemmed from the clear power imbalance with Israel exemplified by the invasion of Beirut. Yet despite these considerations, Syrian assent to Iranian influence was not without conditions. Syria aspired to maintain its local proxy, the Amal Movement, as a party in the Lebanese arena to counterbalance Iran's ally, Hizbullah. The latter embodied a discourse of unity and struggle in the framework of the Iranian-Syrian alliance, in that its establishment was based on a struggle between Iran and Syria via Hizbullah and the Amal Movement. After Syria had worked on making Lebanese parties play off each other within the framework of Syrian domination, the formation of the Islamic resistance under the leadership of Hizbullah was a sign that Lebanon was slipping out of full Syrian control due to Iranian influence. Iranian- Syrian relations rocked power balances within Lebanon between the two parties' proxies. Iran stopped shipping oil to Syria in early 1986 because of Damascus's debt to Tehran. Damascus then responded to a Saudi initiative to normalise relations with Amman, Iraq's first ally at the time. This led Iran to resume shipping oil to Damascus and to affirm the importance of the Iranian-Syrian alliance. Hojjat Al-Islam Hashemi Rafsajani's becoming the president of Iran in 1989 and his adoption of pragmatic policies towards the Gulf was a breeze that blew the card of mediation between the two coasts of the Gulf out of Damascus's hands and made Syria desire urgently a resumption of relations with Egypt. In the late 1980s, Syria was still Iran's top Arab ally, although Tehran began to diversify its regional relations. The greatest common denominator between Damascus and Tehran was the agreement to maintain the Lebanese resistance and its weapons as deterrence against Israel. Yet the roles of both parties to the alliance in Lebanon began to change in the favour of Iran. SYRIAN PRESENCE SHRINKS: The 1990s began with the occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent second Gulf war, which opened the door wide to ending Iran's isolation from its Arab neighbours. The Madrid negotiations and the peace process they produced put Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East under enormous pressure due to the inclusion of all concerned Arab states in the process, including its ally Syria. Damascus obtained international and regional authorisation to control Lebanon. The first thing it did following its declaration of participating in the international allied forces against Iraq was to remove the military government led at that time by General Michel Aoun. And thus Syria secured its new role through its authorisation to implement the Taif Agreement and enforce it among Lebanese factions, or, more precisely, between two political endeavours represented by late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri, allied with Riyadh, and Hizbullah, allied with Tehran. While Syria became involved in the Madrid peace conference and continued negotiations with Israel, Iran, which did not warmly welcome Syria's involvement in the peace process, maintained its position in Lebanon during each episode of the Lebanese- Israeli conflict. It did so, for example, in 1993 and 1996, during which the April agreement was concluded under French-American- Iranian-Syrian auspices and which limited fighting between Hizbullah and Israel to military targets. The second half of the 1990s saw the victory of the reformist current in Iran represented by President Mohamed Khatemi. This period saw an improvement in Tehran's international image. Concurrently, the Middle East peace process was in a state of decline due to the policies of the Likud Party, which was governing Israel. These three factors blew the ship of Iranian foreign policy into the tumultuous seas of the Middle East. Iran anchored its Arab strategy on three points ranging from moderate to extremist -- Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon. The first defined Saudi Arabia as the focus point for Iran's Gulf relations, with the goal of strengthening the Iranian presence and its regional acceptance, as well as opening up international relations for Saudi Arabia. The second continued to view Syria as a primary partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict and offered Iran's symbolic, political and economic support in its engagement. The third concerned Lebanon and securing the Hizbullah endeavour in its south. As for Syria, it anchored its regional weight in Lebanon, particularly following Ankara's pressure on it due to its support for Kurdistan's Labour Party led by Abdullah Ocalan, and especially following the declaration of the Turkish- Israeli alliance. When Damascus was forced to ask Ocalan to leave Syrian territory, Syria's regional political efforts had reached their lowest ebb. CHANGE OF GUARD: The Iranian-Syrian alliance was not shaken by the death of late Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad in 2000. Rather, it remained standing under the leadership of the new president, Bashar Al-Assad, in light of the same delineations that had defined it in the 1990s. Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in mid-2000 verged on a major accomplishment for the Iranian-Syrian alliance, which began to place symbolic pressure on states supporting the Arab- Israeli peace process. Both Tehran and Damascus were careful to condemn the events of 11 September and to cooperate logistically, and in terms of intelligence, with Washington to fight terrorist organisations. In Lebanon, the construction project led by Al-Hariri proceeded alongside the resistance led by Hassan Nasrallah, while Syria continued to play the role of balancing the parties. Then came the occupation of Iraq in 2003, upturning the region's balances and revealing contradictions even in the Iranian-Syrian alliance. While Damascus was subject to major American pressure on the Iraq issue -- on the claim that it opened its borders to resistance operations against the occupation -- Iran was distanced from criticism because the new rulers in Baghdad were careful to maintain American-Iranian interests. Syria, despite its geographic borders with Iraq, does not have any political, ethnic or sectarian reach there, in contrast to Iran that has all. But Syrian losses did not end there, for incidents in Lebanon revealed hidden threats against Syria's regional role through UN Security Council Resolution 1559 demanding that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon and disarm militias there. As threats closed in on Syria, Iran dealt with the situation calmly for several reasons. First, its proximity to Afghanistan and Iraq placed excellent cards in its hands. Second, its Lebanese ally Hizbullah had imposed its overwhelming presence in the political and military arenas, so that and its disarmament, despite the UN resolution, was improbable. Third, Iranian-Saudi agreement in Lebanon via local allies was no longer necessarily connected to the Syrian role as an arbiter between factions. Fourth, Iran's ally, Hizbullah, represented the greater proportion of a major Lebanese sect, whereas Syria had no such ally. The Amal Movement is but a faction in the Lebanese Shia arena. As for the rest of Syria's allies in Lebanon, who continued to remain loyal to it, they bore no representation of Lebanese sects, which is a primary condition for continuing in the Lebanese political game because the Lebanese constitution distributes posts between sects. In early 2005 came the major Lebanese explosion -- the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri. International and Arab pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon continued, and indeed it took place. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was the lowest point of Syrian influence there in decades. As for Iran, its presence and influence in Lebanon was unaffected, for its primary ally, Hizbullah, was the strongest military party. Its alliance to Iran was not governed by a political ceiling, but rather one much higher -- that of the sectarian authority represented by Supreme Guide to the Iranian Revolution Ali Khamenei. Contrary to appearances, the Syrian withdrawal was useful to Iran from the perspective that the Syrian army was the only party able, theoretically, to disarm Hizbullah. Following Syrian withdrawal was the emergence of the 8 March opposition alliance, led by Hizbullah, representing the Shia sect and allied with a large sector of the Maronites and a small sector of the Sunnis and Druze. It opposed the 14 March group led by Al-Mustaqbal (the Future Movement) and representing the Sunni sect with a sector of the Maronites and the majority of Druze. Syria sympathised with the 8 March group, yet Damascus no longer held any real cards in Lebanon's political arena. Hizbullah then succeeded in capturing two Israel soldiers, ostensibly to exchange them for prisoners detained in Israeli jails. Israel's response, however, was the 2006 Lebanon war, which lasted more than a month during which Israeli aircraft destroyed Lebanese infrastructure while Hizbullah performed well, raining missiles upon Israeli cities. The war confirmed that Iran had become the main player in the Lebanese arena and that its developed military capabilities, of which Hizbullah exhibited a small part, was one of its most important cards. Thus the Lebanese crisis will remain as is awaiting determination of Iran's international position. The fundamental ramification of this is that the keys to Lebanon are now in Tehran, not Damascus. Iran also holds the keys to Iraq at a time when Syria's neighbouring role is meagre. Syria may now be concerned about the future of Kirkuk, from which runs the Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline along the Syrian coast. Syria and Iran agree on preventing the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, but they do not share any other real interests in Iraq at the moment. BEFORE SPLITTING: Following a reading of the Iranian-Syrian alliance and its historical ups and downs, Iranian presence in our region seems to be the result of three factors: first, the absence of an Arab role; second, the importance of Syria's geographic position in Iranian strategy; and third, the scandalous mistakes committed by the US in the region. These three factors are more important than that which is given concerning Iran's ability to impose its regional presence. On the other hand, Syria seems to be in a state of inertia having lost its political influence in its geographic neighbourhood due to the trap of the Iranian- Syrian alliance and the hope that gains would be made at the expense of other parties. Damascus is now closer to returning to the Arab fold than at any other point in its history. Because this is the case, it must be dealt with carefully, in a manner in which the mistakes of the past can be assimilated and in which the shortcomings of the present can be overcome. Syria should not be dealt with again through Lebanon but rather should be required to play a positive role in this country whose territory is witness to a clash of wills coming from outside its borders. Damascus should also be required to positively cooperate with the international court investigating the assassination of Al-Hariri, and to come in under the Arab roof. In order to place Arab politics on its feet to confront the regional and international challenges facing it, these requirements demand in turn that the primary Arab states guarantee that the international court is not politicised. Continued pressure on Syria in this regard by Lebanese parties would leave it no option but to cling to its Iranian alliance. This alliance would augment further Iranian influence in the region, which would subsequently reflect negatively on all the Arab states and their allies in Lebanon. Imminent changes in the region are larger than Lebanon, Syria, or any Arab country alone, for the Iranian-American confrontation will produce one of two results: either an allotment between the two parties that would be at the expense of Arab states and their interests, or a devastating confrontation in which Arab arenas -- foremost Lebanon and Iraq -- would pay dearly. Any allotment, should it take place, would guarantee for Tehran a regional role with a green light from the United States under the ceiling of common interests. Such as result would demand, according to the matter's logic, a deep-rooted transformation in the Iranian position with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relations of alliance it produces. At such a time, the barricade Syria is leaning against in its current crisis would disappear, it becoming one of the prices Tehran would pay as a sacrifice for its regional ambitions once all the regional and strategic aims of its alliance were exhausted. As for the choice of an American confrontation with Tehran using all means possible, this would result in Syria being drawn into the confrontation whether it wishes to or not. The outcome of such a confrontation would not be to the benefit of Syria, isolated from the Arabs. Short and sweet, what is desired is the facilitation of Damascus returning from the trap of the Iranian-Syrian alliance to the Saudi-Egyptian- Syrian compact of mutual understanding, a return without complications or entrance procedures. He who returns is one of the household, so the saying goes. * The writer is an Egyptian expert in Iranian affairs.
