The tripartite alliance of Syria, Hizbullah and Tehran will only get stronger in the absence of the broader Arab nation, writes Mustafa El-Labbad In resuming uranium enrichment operations in Natanz, Tehran has galvanised the international community against it as never before. It is only a matter of time before the Iranian nuclear case is brought before the UN Security Council. All that remains now are few formalities, such as a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors supporting the move. The probabilities are very high that soon after this support is furnished the Security Council will issue a resolution reducing the status of Iran from a fully sovereign peer in the international community to a pariah state punishable in accordance with the rules and conditions of international legitimacy. What is certain to come under the spotlight in the course of these procedures is Iran's alliance with Syria and Lebanon's Hizbullah, raising the possibility that all these parties will be affected by the forthcoming resolutions. This unprecedented development in the history of international relations begs a number of questions regarding the fate of that alliance and the future domestic politics of its constituent members -- Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Although the Lebanese Hizbullah is not a state in any political or legal sense, it has accumulated six Security Council resolutions against it, albeit without mentioning it by name. The first three of these -- resolutions 1496 of 2003, 1525 of 2004 and 1553 of 2005 -- demand, with increasing severity in tone, that the Lebanese government take the necessary measures to reassert control over the south. Marking a turning point in the Security Council's approach to the Lebanese situation, Resolution 1559 of 2005 demanded the dissolution and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. The shift in spirit and emphasis could not be missed. Whereas previous resolutions were more general and applied to a variety of concerns, such as the need for the Lebanese government to re-activate emergency forces whose task it was to monitor Lebanon's international boundaries, the latter homed in on the militias and those of Hizbullah in particular. Subsequent resolutions -- 1583 of 2005 and 1614 of 2005 -- reaffirmed the substance of previous ones. Syria has come under similar diplomatic fire. Indeed, 2005 was a political disaster for Syria, subject as it was to four Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1559 ordered Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon; a demand with which Damascus complied, bowing to international pressures and ending three decades of political and military control over Lebanon. Resolution 1595 created an international investigatory commission into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. On the basis of the commission's report, the Security Council issued Resolution 1636, supporting the commission's allegations of direct Syrian regime involvement in the assassination. On the heels of this followed Resolution 1644, demanding Damascus cooperate immediately and unconditionally with the investigatory commission. The latter resolution, moreover, added that the extent of Syrian cooperation would be evaluated every three months, augmenting the likelihood of an endless series of mounting demands intended to back the Syrian regime further into a corner. Evidence of the way things are headed for Damascus can be found in the fact that the Syrian security officials who are testifying before the commission are no longer referred to as witnesses, and in the fact that -- in another Security Council precedent -- the list of individuals wanted for questioning includes the head of the Syrian state. Of all the members of the tripartite alliance, Syria is at the greatest disadvantage. Iran is a major regional power with great regional ambitions and the oil and gas revenues to support the economic and military development needed to fulfil these ambitions. While Syria occupies a central geo-strategic position, history has borne out that it is unable to capitalise on this position without a regional alliance that includes one of two regional powers: Iraq or Egypt. Without such a foundation, it cannot vie with Iran's more autonomous sources of economic, military and demographic strength. Syria, thus, is currently unable to fulfil its natural regional potential, all the more so as there are no pan-Arab platforms that Syria can integrate into. Because of the lack of such alternatives, this internationally and regionally isolated country is almost forced into an alliance with Iran and Lebanon's Hizbullah. Against this backdrop it is possible to understand Iranian President Mahmoud 's visit to Damascus, which will then be followed by a visit from Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council. The purpose of these visits is to forestall the collapse of the Syrian component of the alliance. Syria is by far the weakest link, all the more so since the breach in its ruling structure following the resignation of Syrian vice- president Abdul-Halim Khaddam. On the other hand, Syria's weakness may be its sole remaining strength, as the collapse of the Syrian regime would send powerful and perhaps unmanageable shockwaves throughout the region. Hizbullah's position appears much more secure. The Lebanese politico-religious grouping has considerably more influence over the south of the country, the Beqaa Valley and the southern district of Beirut than the central government. As the political and military representative of one of the largest Lebanese denominations, its inclusion is virtually the sine qua non of any Lebanese government. In addition, Hizbullah continues to bask in the glory of its reputation of having forced Israel, after enormous sacrifices, to withdraw from Lebanon, scoring the first Arab victory in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran, in turn, was quick to claim the Lebanese Shia party's victory as a victory of its own. The Islamic revolutionary regime in Tehran had founded Hizbullah precisely with the purpose of gaining a foothold in the region, and the Lebanese party could not have been more suited to its ideological and political aims, for through it Tehran was able to promote itself as both a defender of Shias in the region and a champion of the liberation of southern Lebanon from the Israeli occupation. Because of the powerful brew of sectarian, ideological and political motives that govern Tehran's attachment to Hizbullah, we can regard the Lebanese party as the second strongest player in the Iranian-led alliance. Although Iran faces a formidable alignment of international forces, its alliance with Syria and Hizbullah is strong enough to withstand both the mounting wave of pressure and possible international sanctions against Tehran, as well as the ongoing attempts on the part of local Lebanese forces to restrain Hizbullah's bid to augment its political and ideological power and influence in Lebanon. Apart from the above-mentioned sources of strength that these two members of the alliance enjoy, there is another highly instrumental factor that supports this conclusion: the absence of alternative regional alliances. Ordinarily, a regional alliance whose horizons are being closed off and whose constituent parties lack the element of initiative -- as is the case with the Iranian-led alliance -- would have a proscribed future. However, the absence of alternative regional alliances or power fulcrums forces the Iranian alliance, regardless of how strongly it is buffeted by international pressures, to absorb the shock and eventually reassert itself in the empty regional field. By empty, here, I am referring to the Arab "withdrawal" from the fray; as a result of which neither will they be able to influence its outcome nor hide from its fallout.
