Expertly Iran has played for time and favours and looks set to reach its goal of being recognised as a nuclear power -- that is if its gamble that the US can't strike pays off, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The Iranian nuclear crisis, which tops the current international agenda, is the most salient aspect of Tehran's showdown with the West over its ambition to assume a more influential regional role at this juncture. In this article, I would like to address the crucial question as to who holds the keys to decisions regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. The answer to this question requires a review of Iran's negotiating experience with the West and an examination of the hierarchy of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) that has been in charge of Tehran's management of the crisis since Iranian-EU negotiations in 2003. This should help us identify the different mechanisms and priorities that shaped Iran's actions over three negotiating phases, presided over, successively, by Khatemi and Rohani, Ahmadinejad and Larijani, and Ahmadinejad and Jalili. While it is still too early to predict how the current phase, which began with the replacement of Larijani by Jalili, will play out, it is safe to presume that it, like the one prior, represents a logical extension of its predecessor phases as opposed to a radical shift in thinking prompted by ideological motives. Indeed, it is not so much to individuals that we should look when assessing shifts in strategy and tactics on this issue as to the dynamics of the growth in Tehran's regional presence since the US occupation of Iraq and, more recently, domestic changes in Iran that led to the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency. IRAN'S NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE: Iran's geopolitical environment has undergone profound changes in a relatively short time. Five newly independent countries came into being along its northern borders following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s. Then came the American occupation of Afghanistan to the east in 2001, and of Iraq to the west in 2003, precipitating radical shifts in the regional balance of powers. Although Iran proved quite adept at turning the regional and international contradictions that arose as a result of these sweeping changes to its advantage, it is noteworthy that the international negotiating experience of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary regime before this period amounted to no more than two instances. The first took place via intermediaries, during the hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran in 1980. The second took place with the Iraqi government following the cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Therefore, negotiations with the EU3 (Germany, France and Britain) made for an entirely new and unprecedented experience. Never before had the Islamic Republic entered political negotiations of this degree of gravity and with such serious implications and with such a degree of complexity of political, legal, technical and security- related dimensions. It was at this time that there first emerged significant differences between the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) primarily over who would be in charge of negotiations, the policies that should be adopted during the various negotiating phases and the negotiating priorities. The world was given a glimpse of the extent of tensions at the time when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asked then senior Iranian negotiator Hassan Rohani permission to inspect Iran's nuclear facilities. The positions of the AEOI and Foreign Ministry could not have been further apart: to the former it was not such a serious question; to the latter it was a matter of the gravest concern. One lesson Tehran learned from this was that in negotiations of such a critical and complex nature it needed to be represented at a very high official level. From this point forward, negotiations would be steered by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) with the AEOI, which had steered negotiations until then, acting as no more than a junior partner. THE SUPREME NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: The Iranian SNSC inherited the powers of its predecessor, the Supreme Council for National Defence, established in 1979 in accordance with Article 110 of the post-revolutionary constitution. The parent agency consisted of only seven individuals: the president of the republic, the prime minister, the defence minister, the chief of staff, the commander-general of the Revolutionary Guard and two advisors to the republic's supreme guide. When the constitution was amended in 1989, reflecting the shake-up in the ruling hierarchy following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the succession of Ali Khamenei as spiritual leader of the revolution, the status of the Supreme Council for National Defence was considerably enhanced. Its name was changed, to the SNSC, its powers expanded and its membership increased to include, among others, the head of the judiciary, the head of the Council for the Guardianship of the Constitution, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the minister of intelligence and the minister of finance. Because of the vast constitutional powers vested in him, the supreme guide controls the council. In addition to having the right to appoint the council's secretary and to designate most of its members, the supreme guide is also the sole authority empowered to sign the council's decisions into action. The SNSC, which has far greater constitutional powers than the Iranian parliament, votes on the most crucial decisions affecting the state and, thus, can be said to be the legislature's upper house. This is the set of individuals who, since 2003, have been handling most of the details of the Iranian nuclear file in accordance with directives handed down by the supreme guide. Otherwise put, the Office of the Supreme Guide outlines the general strategy and the SNSC devises and implements the plan of action. Yet while this has so far remained constant, decision- making mechanisms within the council have altered in response to changes in the negotiating climate and in regional and international circumstances. SNSC MEMBERS: Head of the executive President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Head of the legislature Majlis Speaker Gholamali Haddad-Adel. Head of the judiciary Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces (SCCAF) Major General Ataollah Salehi. Vice-President and head of the Management and Planning Organisation (formerly the Plan and Budget Organisation -- PBO) Farhad Rahbar. First Vice-President Parviz Davudi. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and Representative of the Supreme Guide Saeed Jalili. Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuchehr Motaki. Minister of Interior Mustafa Pur-Mohamedi. Minister of Information (Intelligence and Security) Qolam Hussein Mohseni-Ejei. Chief of the Army Brigadier General Mohamed- Hussein Dadress. Chief of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Yehia Rahim Safavi. Head of the Guardian Council Hashemi Rafsanjani. Minister of Defence Rear Admiral Mustafa Mohamed Najar. Vice-President for Atomic Energy Qolam Reza Aqazadeh-Khoi. Minister of Science, Research and Technology Mohamed Mehdi Zahedi. Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah. Permanent Representative to the UN Mahmoud Khazai. THE KHATEMI/ROHANI PHASE: To analyse Iran's negotiating strategy and its decision-making mechanisms on the nuclear question during the Khatemi/Rohani phase one must turn to the various statements issued by these officials at the time and, more importantly, to two position papers by Hassan Rohani: "Behind the Challenges facing Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency over the Nuclear Question," appearing in September 2005 in Rahbord, a journal published by the National Research Centre which is attached to the National Expediency Council, and "Peaceful Nuclear Activity and Our Constructive Interaction with the World," in the National Interest quarterly, winter 2005. According to Rohani's subsequent revelations, in the first meeting of the SNSC following the transfer to it of the nuclear portfolio in mid-2003, a four- tiered decision-making process was adopted to review, discuss and make decisions about the issue. The first level, headed by a Foreign Ministry executive, was charged with addressing the technical aspects of the nuclear programme and the negotiations. The second, headed by the SNSC Secretariat, focussed on technical discussions with political and security implications. A coordinating committee consisting of representatives of the relevant ministries and the SNSC constituted the third level. Finally, at the top was the final decision- making body, consisting of key officials receiving instructions directly from the Office of the Supreme Guide. The task of supervising and coordinating the activities of the four departments was handed to Rohani, who headed the SNSC since 1999. Clearly, the new decision-making mechanism, which was tailored to meet the needs of negotiations with the Europeans, was now more complex than its predecessor, which consisted solely of the Foreign Ministry and the AEOI. In addition, these two agencies now functioned in this process as little more than subcommittees with their powers restricted to an advisory capacity, as opposed to the decision-making authority they formerly possessed. Rohani also revealed that one of the SNSC's first decisions was to prolong negotiations with the Europeans in the hope of delaying as long as possible the referral of the Iranian nuclear question to the UN Security Council. The strategy implies, firstly, that Tehran believed that referral to the Security Council was ultimately inevitable and, secondly, that Tehran was keen to gain time in order to augment as much as possible its nuclear technology towards the goal of mastering the fuel cycle. Negotiations with Europe were thus part of a larger strategy of playing four international powers against one another. Although Europe, the US, Russia and China all shared the belief that Iran should be prevented from possessing the independent capacity to reproduce the nuclear fuel cycle, their handling of this concern was governed by different aims and interests. The US was eager to turn Iran over to the Security Council in order to debilitate the regime in Tehran, an aim that did not necessarily coincide with Europe's, which was guided primarily by the prospect of the flow of natural gas from Iran and a gateway to Iranian and Asian markets. The Europeans, therefore, offered to smooth Iran's entrance into the World Trade Organisation and open channels for the flow of European investments into Iran if Iran, in exchange, would halt its uranium enrichment programme. Iran's rejection of this offer was motivated by two considerations. First, it felt that it would take too long before the benefits would accrue, particularly in view of the lengthy negotiations that would be involved, and, second, it was eager to press forward with its uranium enrichment programme in order strengthen its negotiating position. Rohani felt that Russia's opposition to Iran's possession of nuclear technology rested on similar economic factors: Russia was interested in selling fuel to Tehran and in access to the Iranian market. However, it was on China that Tehran pinned its greatest hopes, for through China it believed it could drive a breach into the Security Council where its nuclear case would eventually land. Tehran thus concluded a number of advantageous economic and political deals and protocols with Beijing in order to induce Beijing into using its veto against a Security Council resolution invoking the possibility of military action. At the same time, Rohani felt there were other countries Iran should turn to in order to break out of its diplomatic isolation. In particular, he recommended collaboration with Brazil and South Africa, both of which were developing their own fuel cycle capacities and both of which would therefore have an interest in Iran not being subjected to sanctions. Enhancing the likelihood of such collaboration was the fact that those countries were geographically remote and, hence, would not feel directly threatened by Iran's nuclear development programme. During the Khatemi/Rohani phase, Iran agreed to a temporary freeze of its enrichment activities in exchange for a European pledge to keep negotiations open until they reached an adequate solution that would guarantee Tehran various economic and technological benefits. The Europeans did offer an enticing package, but it was linked to the condition that Iran would have to keep its nuclear facilities open to a strict inspection process to ascertain that it maintained its technology below the level required to reproduce the full nuclear fuel process. Even so, Iran did make the gesture of freezing its nuclear activities, albeit only in those areas in which it had achieved significant technical progress. In areas where it still had to surmount various technical difficulties it kept operations going. In fact, the Isfahan reactor was constructed and put into operation even as negotiations were in progress, furnishing a prime illustration of Tehran's ability to gain time and capitalise on that gain. But this is far from the only example. Further concrete proof of this deduction can be found in the increasing number of centrifuges in Iran's possession. When Tehran entered into negotiations with the EU3 it possessed 164 centrifuges. By the end of 2004 it had 500 working at full capacity. When Rohani stepped down from his post in mid-2005, the figure rose to 1,000 and, today, in 2007, there are 3,000 centrifuges working at full capacity. Rohani admitted that Iran had no choice but to allow international inspectors inside its nuclear facilities; it was the only way it could prove the peaceful intent of its nuclear programme, which was a condition for negotiations to continue. In the SNSC, he said, a decision was taken "to present a complete picture of our past nuclear activities without being sent to the UN Security Council... We never lied. In all cases, we have told them the truth. But in some cases, we may not have disclosed information in a timely manner." Throughout 2003-2005, Iran repeatedly emphasised that its halting of uranium enrichment activities was temporary and contingent upon the success of negotiations. If negotiations reached a dead-end or failed to recognise Iran's right to possess nuclear fuel cycle technology enrichment activities would resume, which, indeed, occurred soon after Ahmadinejad became president. Iran had suspended activities at a point where, if it resumed them, it had the technology to enrich uranium to 3.5 per cent within a matter of months. This was a major goal. As Rohani explained, "A country that can enrich uranium to about 3.5 per cent will also have the capability to enrich it to about 90 per cent." Here, precisely, resides the crux of the negotiating strategy during the Khatemi/Rohani phase. Once Iran mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, the world would see that it had no choice and Iran's situation would be different. "The world did not want Pakistan to have an atomic bomb or Brazil to have the fuel cycle, but Pakistan built its bomb and Brazil has its fuel cycle, and the world started to work with them," he said. As subsequent events bore out, Iranian negotiators were very accurate in their assessment of the international situation and through their handling of the negotiating process, and the discrepancies between the various parties, they succeeded, before suspension, in taking their enrichment process to a level just below that needed to reproduce the full nuclear cycle. THE AHMADINEJAD/LARIJANI PHASE: The changes that occurred in Iran's tactics and priorities in this phase were a natural product of its improved negotiating position, which often took its cue from various regional and international developments. An entirely new temperament took the place of the smile and invitation to civilisational dialogue that Khatemi had extended to his European negotiating partners. It was heated, angry and addressed to a region teetering under violence and injustice, one of the most salient cases of which was the plight of the Palestinian people. And it helped create cover for Iran's expanding influence from Khaniqin, on the other side of its border with Iraq, to Gaza in the West, which, in turn, it brought to the service of its management of the nuclear issue. The toughening stance reflected the Iranian leadership's awareness that its resumption of uranium enrichment activities would jettison its case before the Security Council while its determination to possess the full nuclear cycle was firm. They were conscious that while many nations used nuclear energy, only a handful could duplicate the nuclear cycle and thus produce their own nuclear fuel. They reasoned that even if they lost the Europeans as negotiating partners and had to face increasingly harsh economic sanctions, they could still negotiate with the IAEA on the stronger footing of possessing the full nuclear fuel cycle. By combining this with appropriate management of Iran's regional presence they would be able to diffuse the mounting campaign against Iran spearheaded by the US. Henceforth, Iran's conduct of its nuclear policy became intrinsically and systematically linked to regional developments. After Ahmadinejad took office as president and became a member of the SNSC, Tehran announced that it had resumed its uranium enrichment activities. Soon afterwards, it trumpeted the breakthrough it had been working for, the ability to enrich uranium up to 3.5 per cent. While this took place against the US deepening quagmire in Iraq, which Tehran deftly worked to its advantage, one could point to two consecutive moments as indicative of the new peak Iran had reached in its drive to become a regional power: Hizbullah's heroic resistance against the Israeli invasion in the summer of 2006, and Ahmadinejad's proclamation that Iran had just joined the nuclear club. THE ENTRANCE OF JALILI: One imagines that the decision-making mechanisms have changed once again with the sudden replacement of Larijani by Said Jalili and in light of the advantages gained by having crossed that threshold in nuclear technology and by Iran's increasingly robust regional presence. Since these developments are also accompanied by escalating pressures from abroad, it follows that while the new mechanisms will build on the accomplishments of the previous phase, they will tune themselves more closely to the pace of regional events. On this basis, one can predict a modification of the decision-making system along the following lines, beginning with the lowest tier: the nuclear and negotiations technical committee -- consisting of Foreign Minister Manuchehr Motaki, Vice-President for Atomic Energy Qolam Reza Aqazadeh-Khoi, SNSC Coordinator Jawad Waidi, Assistant Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Arakji, Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Mahmoud Khazai, the head of the Iranian delegation to the IAEA, and Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah. The security and political ramifications committee -- consisting of SNSC Secretary Said Jalili, Chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Ataollah Salehi, Interior Minister Mustafa Pur-Mohamedi, Commander of the Army Mohamed Hussein Dadress, Minister of Defence Mustafa Mohamed Najar and Director of the Security Bureau of the Supreme Guide Asghar Hejazi. The coordination and follow-up committee -- headed by Jalili, the tasks of which include coordinating with relevant ministries (Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and Science and Technology). The steering committee -- consisting of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vice-President Parviz Davudi and Chairman of the Budgetary Committee Farhad Rahbar. During the Larijani period, this last committee had been purely marginal and, indeed, often sidelined and overshadowed by Ahmadinejad's policy of escalation. It was most likely for this reason that Jalili was brought in to replace Larijani, thereby strengthening the president's role in the nuclear decision-making process. Jalili is a close associate of Ahmadinejad. The same reasoning applied to the replacement of Mohamed Jawad Zarif by Mahmoud Khazai as permanent representative to the UN. Perhaps, too, a closer associate of Ahmadinejad will be brought in to replace the current foreign minister in order to strengthen the president's position. The committee for regional affairs -- consisting of the chief of intelligence of the Revolutionary Guards, the commander of the Quds (Jerusalem) Phalanx of the Revolutionary Guards, the assistant minister for Arab and African affairs (who heads the Foreign Ministry's Iraq Department) and a team of experts on Iranian-Arab relations and Iran's ambassadors to Arab countries. Focusing in particular on developments in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, the task of this committee is to advise on the appropriate pace and tenor to assume in the course of negotiations in light of regional developments. The final decision-making committee -- consisting of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, Director of the Office of the Supreme Guide Mohamedi Ghoulbaikani, Director of the Security Bureau of the Supreme Guide Asghar Hijazi, Minister of Intelligence Mohseni Ejei, Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Mohamed Ali Jaafari, Speaker of Parliament Ghalam Riza Haddad-Adel, head of the Judiciary Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, Secretary of the SNSC Saeed Jalili and head of the Guardian Council and Expediency Council Hashemi Rafsanjani. LOOKING AHEAD: The difference between Rohani and Larijani goes beyond their respective perceptions of negotiating strategy to the very nature of the negotiating phases they were involved in. The first phase laid the technical foundations of Iran's strategy and the negotiating conditions; the second took the appropriate moment to move to the offensive, resume uranium enrichment activities and set into motion a chain of "successes" intended to push certain buttons in the international arena. In attaining the interim goal of realising the technology to reproduce the nuclear fuel cycle, Tehran alerted international powers that they too had a time factor to deal with, because the distance between possessing the nuclear fuel cycle and the theoretical possibility of possessing a nuclear bomb needed only to be bridged by a political decision. The challenge to the US was clear: the time for using negotiations to prevent Iran from enriching uranium was over. In contrast to the cautious calculations of the Khatemi/Rohani phase, the calculations of the Ahmadinejad/Larijani phase and the beginning of the Ahmadinejad/Jalili phase appear to be founded on a risky gamble, which is that the next negotiations between Tehran and the IAEA will lead to the recognition of Iran's right to possess the full nuclear fuel cycle. A significant element of the risk is that the wager rests on the belief that Washington is too bogged down in Iraq to take on Iran in a military confrontation. Time will tell if the gamble is wise.
