By way of two executions of Iranian opposition figures, ostensibly a signal to domestic and foreign protagonists, Iran has lost the advantage of years of shrewd diplomacy and regional manoeuvring, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* Iran has thrust itself back into the international spotlight after a brief respite when the media was focussed on the tragic earthquake in Haiti and the international conference on Afghanistan. It is perhaps only natural that Iran should return to centre stage after other events faded from the headlines. If it is not enough that the Islamic republic has long dominated world news since the aftermath of the presidential elections in June, the approaching end of the February deadline for Iran to accept the West's offer of a uranium exchange deal would definitely rivet world attention once again. If Tehran does not comply with the last ultimatum set by the six powers it has been negotiating with over its nuclear enrichment activities and agree to have its uranium enriched abroad in exchange for nuclear fuel rods, it will face the prospect of harsher sanctions, most likely focussing on gasoline imports, upon which it relies heavily to meet domestic needs. This brings us to the very concrete reason why tensions surrounding Iran are certain to mount. Two previous rounds of negotiations -- first in Geneva and then in Vienna -- failed because of Tehran's refusal to agree to send its low-grade uranium abroad for enrichment in exchange for uranium rods enriched to a higher level but suitable for medical purposes only. As the purpose of the West's offer is to ensure that Iran does not accumulate a stockpile of enriched uranium large enough to enable it to produce a single nuclear warhead, Iran's acceptance of this offer would be tantamount to abandoning its nuclear and regional ambitions. That consequence would hit home quite forcefully since Iran would find the rewards it received for agreeing to the uranium exchange deal disappointing. From its point of view, its negotiations with the West are based on an equation that juxtaposes the progress it has made in nuclear technology and its extensive regional influence against the prospect of international recognition as a regional power, the normalisation of relations between itself and Washington, and international treatment of it on this basis. To pay in advance for this prospect flies in the face of Iran's well-known negotiating prowess, which it has demonstrated amply throughout the various stages of the Iranian uranium question, from its talks with the European troika (Germany, France and Britain) in 2003 to negotiations with the five Security Council members plus Germany in 2009. Therefore, in the absence of a last minute chance to bridge the gap, a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear question has narrowed itself to two possibilities: either the US accepts a nuclear Iran or Iran agrees to abandon its nuclear programme. As the first possibility is highly unlikely, and as there is good reason to doubt that Iran will cave in to Western pressures, the resultant standoff raises the very real spectre of military action targeting Iran's nuclear facilities. A quick glance at the balance of military power between the two sides tells us that while the US has a long technological lead over Iran, it would encounter various disadvantages in land operations. Nevertheless, US forces not only have overwhelming air superiority, they have fully equipped and staffed military bases throughout the area surrounding Iran, so theoretically at least they could subject Iranian nuclear facilities to intensive aerial barrages. On the other hand, Iran has a handful of deterrents that would make Washington think twice before taking this step. For one, Tehran could shut down the Straits of Hormuz, the most important maritime gateway for the international oil trade. All that it would take is to sink a ship or two at the narrower point in the Straits, using mines, some carefully targeted missiles fired from its nearby land bases, or even a rapid strike by a rubber dingy piloted by a suicide bomber. Then, through its connections in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran could target US forces in those countries. Or it could call its Hizbullah ally into play, ignite another confrontation with Israel and wreak considerable psychological and material damage on that front. Such scenarios greatly complicate the military solution -- not because of any risk of an Iranian military victory, but also because of the likelihood that Iran could inflict unsustainable damage on US forces, on America's alliances or on the international economy (since, in the event of a closure of the Straits of Hormuz, oil prices would soar to $200 a barrel). Applying the logic of crisis management, Iran would not deploy its deterrents very quickly, if at all, since the threat of deployment is stronger than the deterrent itself. Certainly it would not squander them by using them offensively, which in all events would only court a second wave of US strikes. Therefore, in a run up to military action, we can expect Iran to increase the frequency and severity of its threats to deploy its deterrents. As for Israel, which has long been eager to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, it is doubtful whether it has the technical ability to do so. Not only are the facilities spread out across a vast territorial area and located some 2,000 kilometres away from Israeli bases, but Israel would not have access to the intermediate airspace. Even supposing that Israel could overcome such geographical or technical obstacles, an Israeli strike or threat to strike could not keep Tehran from sinking a ship to block the Straits of Hormuz, or from taking retaliatory action against US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. It thus appears that the military solution stands theoretically only in the event of an American operation. But even here the Obama administration would encounter numerous domestic, regional and international restraints. At home the administration is struggling on several fronts, most notably in its drive to fulfil Obama's campaign promise of a universal healthcare bill, in its negotiations with major banks to induce them to contribute more effectively to overcoming the economic crisis, and in the legislature following the loss of the late Senator Kennedy's seat and, hence, the majority needed to pass bills without having to reach compromises with the Republicans. The Obama administration has also encountered a setback in Afghanistan and is now trying to bring other countries onboard to assume some of the human, economic and political costs of the occupation and the political process. Meanwhile, US forces are unable to forestall continuing Iranian encroachment at several levels in Iraq, where Tehran's allies far outnumber Washington's. Through its alliances with the Shia parties, in particular, Iran is in a position to call the shots in Iraq to the extent of eliminating some 500 nominees for political positions on the grounds that they were former Baath Party members. As this implicitly excludes Arab Sunnis from the political process, it has paved the way for widespread Arab Sunni militia operations in protest against their increased political marginalisation over the past few years. Iran knows that the more unstable the situation is in Iraq the more the US risks politically due to the failure of the political process it has sponsored there. In short, Tehran is gambling that as long as Washington is mired in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it cannot start a third war against Iran. At the international level, the anti-Iranian front is far from as unified and harmonious as it appears before the television cameras. In particular, the strategic and economic interests of both Russia and China would keep them for voting in favour of a Security Council resolution authorising military action against Iran. Therefore, any US strike would have to proceed without the cover of international law. That places an enormous constraint on the Obama administration in view of the image it wants to project to the world. Even assuming Washington's determination to go ahead with a military operation in spite of all these obstacles and constraints, it would first have to neutralise Iran's deterrent cards. It would therefore have to attack Iranian naval forces and missile launching systems in the Gulf, and Iranian military bases along Iran's borders with Iraq and Afghanistan. It would also have to counteract Hizbullah's missile power in Lebanon. So formidable are these tasks that it is hard to imagine anyone from preventing a rapid "surgical operation" from escalating into a fully-fledged war that would spill over into the rest of the region. This consideration helps explain Washington's reluctance to consider a military offensive against Iran. It is not balking at the prospect of defeat, but rather at the spectre of an uncontrollable domino effect that would arise from the complex and incalculable interplay between the various domestic, regional and international levels of the Iranian crisis. However, if the gap between Washington and Tehran's positions cannot be bridged, and if a war scenario is too risky, does the US have another option? Some have suggested the possibility of regime change. A sign that the thinking in some significant quarters in Washington has turned in this direction is to be found in two articles by Richard Haass: "Enough is enough," appearing in Newsweek of 22 January 2010, and more explicitly, "A different regime change in Iran," appearing in The Financial Times on 13 October 2009. Haass was one of the architects of the war against Iraq and, in 2003, had written another article with the title "Enough is enough," urging the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad. As the president of that highly influential think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, his is a voice that is heard in US decision- making circles. That the papers this think tank has produced on Iran have been relatively reserved and balanced so far gives his sudden call for regime change extra weight. His articles, therefore, reflect the extent to which the climate in Washington has changed on the Iranian question since Ahmadinejad won a second term as president in June 2009 (see my article "Commentary: Obama and Tehran" in Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 959). Against this backdrop, Iran's execution of two men who had taken part in the recent demonstrations during the commemoration of Ashura and who were accused of involvement in an armed anti-government group was clearly intended to send a message to the Iranian opposition and to the West that Iran is aware of the shift in the currents of thought influencing the American approach to solving the Iranian nuclear question. These executions and the bloodstained message they have delivered lie on the road that Iranian leaders have chosen since the re-election of Ahmadinejad. The escalation in the tenor of violence was inevitable. The higher echelons in Tehran, topped by Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, could not yield to the demand of Karrubi and Mousavi to dismiss Ahmadinejad without handing the reformist opposition a victory. But nor could they bring themselves to stop the escalation in the means of repression against demonstrations which they believe offers the West the opening to turn the "Green Movement" into a spearhead not only for ousting Ahmadinejad but also for overturning the entire regime. The irony is that the regime's rigidity and repressive tactics helped to make such a prospect possible, for the forces that had protested the results of the presidential elections have indeed come to form a domestically based opposition to the regime, instead of a wing within the regime as was the case before June 2009 (see my article, "The Iranian triangle," Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 981). Granted the opposition movement is at a considerable disadvantage under the current circumstances and balances of power in Iran. However, the regime's handling of the demonstrations has turned the elections from an opportunity to strengthen the Iranian system and improve its image abroad to a potential threat to the post-revolutionary order. In other words, on the election issue Iran has departed radically from its long record of deftly turning potential threats into real opportunities, to which testify the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where Iran has acquired powerful negotiating leverage against the US. The upshot is that Iran now finds itself in a more defensive position than ever before. The executions, regardless of the validity of the charges brought against the defendants, have tarnished Iran's image both at home and abroad, rendering it more vulnerable to international pressures that are certain to intensify dramatically in the next few weeks. Unless it changes its tune, Iran will find itself in a tightening vice, starting with proposals for new Security Council sanctions that would hit Iran economically and further isolate it politically and proceeding to the even grimmer scenarios of a military strike or regime change. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
