Mustafa El-Labbad reviews the shift in the French position on Iran signalled in statements made this week by France's Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war." French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner's remarks about Iran, later softened, made ahead of a visit to Moscow on Monday, signalled a qualitative shift not only in the French but the European position towards Iran. They cannot be dismissed as empty rhetoric or grandstanding. Kouchner, after all, is in a better position than most to know what is happening behind the scenes in international politics from Iran to Gaza. He has a reputation as an astute reader of indicators, as a politician sensitive to nuance. Kouchner is also pressing for a range of European sanctions to be imposed against Iran outside of the context of the United Nations. Such a move would herald a new phase in Iranian- European relations on the one hand, and American-European relations on the other. Attitudes towards Iran have long served as a litmus test of the difference in the ways Europe and the US pursue their interests. Germany and France, in particular, have until recently been keen to distance themselves from Washington when it comes to resolving the issues associated with Tehran's nuclear ambitions. European countries may agree with the US that Iran must be prevented from acquiring the technology to develop nuclear weapons but Europe, unlike America, has hitherto been happy for Iran to import nuclear fuel for the generation of energy provided such fuel is returned to its source. Indeed, the EU devised a package of economic and technological incentives to tempt Tehran down such a path which is seen in Europe's capitals as a solution to the problems associated with Iran continuing its own uranium enrichment programme. Washington has long been opposed to allowing Iran to import nuclear fuel. The current US administration has adopted a policy of applying diplomatic and international pressure on Tehran in an attempt to force it to abandon its uranium enrichment programme without offering any incentives. Since 2002, Washington has backed up this policy by regularly insinuating that Iran could be the target of military strikes. The hints may come in many guises -- all options are on the table, the military solution cannot be dismissed, diplomacy cannot run its course forever -- but their message is clear to all. The shift in the French position is part of the ongoing rapprochement between Paris and Washington that followed the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French president. Under Sarkozy, France has indicated a willingness to cooperate, rather than clash, with Washington over foreign policy. A line was being drawn under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, during which France was a vociferous opponent of Washington over the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The price paid for such opposition was heavy. Countries that opposed Washington over Iraq have been repeatedly denied economic access to the occupied, oil rich country. The costs of opposing Washington are clearly something that Sarkozy has taken on board, which goes part way to explaining why the French foreign minister, a man with a left of centre background and longstanding sympathy with the Middle East, rushed to make statements of which even the most hawkish of US neo-conservatives would approve. Iran's negotiating strategy throughout the standoff over its nuclear programme has been based on two assumptions. The first is that a margin of difference exists between Europe and the US that allows Tehran a certain amount of room for manoeuvre. This assumption became most apparent during Tehran's 2003 negotiations with the European troika (Germany, France, and England). With Kouchner's statements, that assumption must now be called into question: it is no longer the case that Europe automatically views the replacement of the current regime in Iran with one loyal to Washington as detrimental to its own interests. France has clearly retreated from the position where it would defend its oil and trade interests in Iran even under the current regime. Tehran's second assumption has been that the Chinese thirst for oil -- China, after all, heads the league table of oil-importing countries -- means that Beijing will resolutely oppose any attempts by Washington to impose a military solution to its quarrels with Iran. Iran's strategy has been to cement its ties with Beijing, to which end it concluded what was hailed by the international media as the "deal of the century", an oil exploration and extraction agreement with China worth $100 billion. In doing so Iran assumed that it had guaranteed that China would use its veto in the Security Council against any aggressive moves towards it on the part of the US. In the light of Paris's seeming defection to the Washington camp Iranian negotiators are likely to be less sanguine over the assumption that China will support them come what may. Securing national interests has always been the goal of international politics. In the international arena the world has been accustomed, at least since the age of Charles de Gaulle, to a France bent on pursuing an independent foreign policy even in the teeth of American opposition. In the past French diplomacy has been that rare thing, an example of a country seeking to secure its national interests without compromising the principles of justice and equality. It is an age, though, that appears to be coming to an end. Newly elected, President Sarkozy clearly has a different view on how best to secure French interests than his predecessor Chirac. The world should, perhaps, prepare itself to bid farewell to its long held assumptions about France. Certainly Tehran needs to review its own assumptions on how best to manage the nuclear crisis. So what, in the end, should we make of Kouchner's statements? While they need not be read as a declaration of war against Iran they do suggest that a military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is now a serious proposition, viewed as such no longer exclusively in Washington but also in Europe's corridors of power.
