So far, Iran's conservatives have maintained the upper hand, but foreign pressure might tip the balance in the reformers' favour, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Iran is entering a qualitatively new phase in its modern history. The shift, moreover, is occurring at several levels simultaneously due to the interplay between the changes in the domestic political map with the swing back to the conservatives and outside pressure escalating over the nuclear issue. The intensification of foreign pressure could not have come at a more delicate time for Iran whose conservative wing, if it is to consolidate itself in power, must "purge" the judicial and executive decision-making centres of reformists. It is precisely here that Iran shows one of its weak points in the face of foreign pressure. The power struggle over the shape of the government has so far come out overwhelmingly in favour of the conservatives. However, the façade of democratic openness that the regime tries to project at home and abroad is beginning to crack. Indicative of this are the actions of Iran's Vice-President Mohammed Ali Abtahi and former prime minister Mir Hussein Mousawi. Abtahi resigned in protest against the mounting conservative pressures against reformists and Mousawi decided not to run in the forthcoming presidential elections in May on a reformist ticket because he feels the pace of change is too slow. As Iran's "conservative versus reformist" battle continues to unfold, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has declared that it has given Iran until the next IAEA meeting in November to prove that it does not possess nuclear technology. If Iran fails to meet this deadline it will turn the Iranian nuclear case over to the UN Security Council. Regardless of this contorted logic that has Iran guilty before proven innocent, the fulfillment of this ultimatum would have grave legal ramifications for Tehran. By merely coming under UN Security Council scrutiny over its nuclear capabilities, Iran effectively loses its sovereign status. Iran would become subject to internationally stipulated deadlines, conditions and inspection demands, as was the case with Iraq from the end of the second Gulf war until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The IAEA decision marks the first concrete step in this direction as it constitutes the first time that Iran has been given a deadline to prove that it does not possess nuclear technology for military purposes. During this time it has also been instructed to stop all uranium enrichment processes. Such is the nature of nuclear technology that it will be very difficult for Iran to prove that it is on the right side of that fine hairline's difference between peaceful and military nuclear technology. More difficult yet is to prove lack of the intent to develop nuclear technology for military purposes since the possession of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes renders the possible transition to military usage so much easier. The decision to ban Iran from possessing this technology is a political one par excellence. The last thing Washington and Israel want is a nuclear power in the region altering the balance of power and capable of thwarting their own political and strategic ambitions. This is the substance of the Iranian nuclear issue; all other technical and legal demands on Iran are merely variations on the theme. Iran peers out at a barren and brutal international landscape. It has no major allies to speak of now that the countries of the G8, following their latest meeting, have ranged themselves against it. Even France, which has traditionally maintained a strong and special relationship with Iran, has cautioned Tehran to stop refining uranium and to forget about possessing nuclear technology because "time is growing short." Perhaps France had learned from its experience in opposing the war to occupy Iraq. There was nothing to be gained from standing in the path of America's ambitions and facilitating these ambitions would guarantee it a place on the victors' table. Nevertheless, the Iranians have often proved themselves skillful negotiators, tacticians and hagglers in the global political bazaar. They are good at the calculated offensive when circumstances permit, but they also know when to bow out gracefully when a storm threatens. Perhaps, therefore, Iran will manage to bargain on a willingness to abandon its nuclear programme. This could be in exchange for guarantees of non-interference with its political system and for participating as an internationally recognised power in the formulation of the regional policies and designs. In other words, perhaps it will be able to obtain the strategic advantages of possessing nuclear technology without actually possessing it. Europe is currently using the carrot-and-stick approach towards Iran, offering it economic and political privileges if Iran abandons its possession of nuclear technology. The US, on the other hand, has succeeded in tightening the legal and diplomatic siege on Iran preparatory to homing in its sights following the US presidential elections. It should be stressed that the imminent confrontation between the US and Tehran is not one between "good" and "evil" or "Christianity" and "Islam". It is a conflict between a regional power that possesses all the qualifications for this role and has so far succeeded in preserving a level of political independence, and the world's sole superpower whose leadership has thrown international law to the wind and is thrusting itself upon the world like a bull in a china shop. The storm clouds are gathering over Iran and the wind is howling. But, even if this particular storm blows over, there is no doubt that the meeting of the IAEA in November will mark a turning point in the history of Iran and the Middle East as a whole.
