With the assassination of Al-Hariri shifting the regional balance of power, Iran may soon have to choose between Hizbullah and nuclear ambition as means of asserting regional influence, writes Mustafa El-Labbad The world has witnessed innumerable political assassinations but few have had earthshaking consequences. Of those that have, perhaps the most notorious was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in 1914, which triggered WW I and the reshaping of the entire map of Europe. Last month's assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri may prove as momentous. The repercussions of this tragic act have reverberated beyond Syria, precipitating a major upheaval in the regional balance of power. One victim of the shrapnel of the explosion that rocked downtown Beirut was Iran's regional influence, which had been ideologically, politically and strategically linked to the Lebanese Hizbullah. It was Hizbullah, currently targeted for disarmament by the international community, which through enormous sacrifices forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, scoring the first Arab victory in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That victory helped enable Iran -- Hizbullah's prime supporter and restrainer -- to establish its presence in the Middle Eastern arena, marketing the organisation's historic achievement as its own. Just as the Syrian presence in Lebanon was an ace in Damascus's negotiating hand, so did Hizbullah, from the time it was founded until Al-Hariri's death, offer living proof of Tehran's influence not only on negotiations but on the course of regional events. Tehran had long been attempting to strengthen its hand as a regional power. Al-Sayed Ali Khamenei, the spiritual guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is the spiritual authority guiding Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and Khamenei regards the latter as his legitimate representative in Lebanon. This ideological convergence elevated Hizbullah's place in Iran's strategic priorities. Moreover, this ideological and denominational hierarchical link placed the relationship between the two on a far deeper and more permanent footing than an ordinary political alliance for the purposes of mutual benefit, typified, for example, in the relationship between Syria and Iran. Because of this link, Hizbullah's attitude towards Iran has remained constant regardless of shifts in regional balances. But following Al-Hariri's assassination it is open to question whether the reverse will necessarily hold true. The dynamics of events in Lebanon and the wider region, and escalating international pressures on both Iran and Hizbullah, threaten to erode the power of Iran's strategic assets. In other words, decision-makers in Iran may soon have to choose between a nuclear option, over which Tehran is facing increasingly heavy international pressure, and their strategic ally in Lebanon. Although Hizbullah recently demonstrated its popularity in an enormous mass rally staged to counter that of the Lebanese opposition a week earlier, it is embroiled in a domestic battle from which it is likely to emerge the loser. This probability may give indication of which way Tehran will turn as it enters negotiations, secret or otherwise, with the world's sole superpower. It will not be an easy choice to make -- between Hizbullah and a nuclear deterrent. Hizbullah, on the one hand, is an organisation that mounted an effective resistance to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and to American designs in the region. It represents the largest religious denomination in Lebanon and thus constitutes an important extension of Tehran's ideological reach. The development of a nuclear deterrent, on the other hand, has long been and remains Iran's mainstay for bolstering its regional role and shielding itself against American pressure. The cases of India, Pakistan and most recently North Korea have demonstrated the superior efficacy of the nuclear card over all others as a negotiating asset. In addition, this asset is easier for Iran to defend, rallying to its defence various provisions of international law together with the principle that nations have the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. And should matters reach such a point, Iran could defend its nuclear facilities through the intensive mobilisation of millions of Iranian conscripts. While Iranian public opinion is debating the nuclear issue in terms of "national esteem and dignity", to Iranian policy- makers it is a first order question of national security. In contrast, the question of protecting Hizbullah, despite its popularity both inside Lebanon and in the region, rarely imposes itself upon Iranian ruling elites at more than an ideological or propagandistic level. If there is anything that unites Iranian political leaders across the political spectrum it is the nuclear issue. Indeed, over this issue the labels "reformist" and "conservative" lose their meaning. With the issue so firmly identified with national development and self-assertion, both within the relatively narrow elite decision-making circles and at the broader level of the street, and because of the dynamics of the interplay between these two levels in Iran, the chances are high that Tehran will give priority to nuclear ambitions over Hizbullah. History offers considerable testimony to the acumen of Iranian policy-makers in identifying the dividing line between ideological commitments and strategic interests and the dexterity with which they have rendered the former a means for the advancement of the latter, so long as the two could be brought into harmony. However, in the event of a clash, ideological commitments will decline in priority, which appears to be the case today as US pressure mounts and balances of power in the region shift. It is impossible to say for sure whether Iran possesses a nuclear weapon already, as certain political circles in Israel and America claim. Nor can we readily believe that Iran is not striving towards nuclear capabilities, as Iran's official media asserts. Perhaps there is a middle ground between these two contentions. There is reason to believe that Iran is at a mid-way stage, like Japan, Brazil and South Africa, which do not possess nuclear weapons but which do possess the technology for producing one in the near future. We can also assume with some confidence that Iran's strategic aim at this phase is to attain the status of a "hypothetical nuclear power". Moreover, it is unlikely that this priority would alter in the event of regime change: As noted, support for the acquisition of nuclear capacity extends across the political spectrum. The US administration is dangerously at odds with itself over its handling of Iran, with moderates advocating limited cooperation with Tehran over Afghanistan and Iraq and more radical camps advocating regime change through means ranging from subversion to military intervention. This disparity in opinion is a clear indicator of the bankruptcy of the "liberal-imperialist" strategy, which makes it all the more crucial for Iranian decision-makers to resolve their dilemma in favour of retaining (or attaining) nuclear capacities as a last line of defence against unpredictable odds. It thus appears that Hizbullah, with its million supporters, stands alone, left with few choices. It cannot join an opposition that has latched on to the international catchword of disarming it, nor does it desire to continue to lend its support to an authority -- the Syrians -- whose popularity at home and abroad is bankrupt and that lacks both vision and initiative. Perhaps for Hizbullah the road lies beyond such dichotomies as victory or martyrdom, opposition or loyalty. Certainly there are possibilities that may be worth exploring, such as merging its military wing with the Lebanese army and assimilating into the domestic political process under new rules of engagement that do not necessarily include recourse to force. Certainly, too, if Hizbullah does not take the initiative, the decisions will be made for it and it will find itself disarmed, alone in the field bereft of its former allies and without regional support, finding succor only in the legend of its spiritual forefather who died in Karbala over 13 centuries ago.
