Though Iran's regional star is in the ascendant, it is still locked in the jaws of a far greater geostrategic struggle -- that between Russia and the United States, writes Mustafa El-Labbad* With help from supporters and police, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has succeeded in quelling the protests that followed his re-election. He has also won full official backing for the outcome of the 10th presidential elections that saw him trounce his opponent Mir- Hussein Mousavi. But Ahmadinejad's success was purely domestic. Abroad, Iran's image has deteriorated in a manner that could harm the prospects for future US-Iranian dialogue. Considering the drastic shift in public opinion, President Obama may have to abandon the idea of negotiations with Iran. It is true that Iran's supreme guide and the National Security Council are the ones that fashion foreign policy, and not just the president, but the outcome of the elections has made life easier for Iran's foes. Israel's lobbyists have once again found their voice on the US scene. For a while, when Obama seemed intent on talking to the Iranians, they had little to say. Now it's a different story. The election of the reformist Mousavi would have put a lot of pressure on Israel, preventing it from ostracising Iran and ultimately lending a hand to Obama's reconciliatory approach. Clearly, the US openness to Tehran would have come at a price. To Israel's chagrin, Washington would have had to acknowledge Iran's regional role. This is exactly why Israel is exuberant now. Israel is not interested in whether Iran goes reformist or conservative, only that it remains weak. Ahmadinejad's supporters portrayed the campaign against him as part of a "global war" to discredit the "poor man's candidate". Still, Ahmadinejad's victory has given much ammunition to Israel. For the first time since Obama took office, Israel has a chance to influence US policy on Iran. As the mood shifted in Washington and the West, a lot was said about possible sanctions and military strikes. What we know for sure, however, is that the White House is now reassessing its policies towards Iran. There is a chance that Obama may reach a deal with the Russians that would allow him to put more pressure on Tehran. Washington certainly knows that the last thing the Iranians want is a US-Russian united front against them. This may explain why Obama was keen to reach a deal on Iran during his recent talks with Russian leaders. The Iranians see Moscow as their major ally in the confrontation with Washington. For one thing, the Russians provide the Iranians with training and spare parts for the Bushehr reactor. And Moscow has routinely opposed US proposals for sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council. The Russians have been using this issue as a way of forcing the Americans to make concessions on other matters. Also, Russia threatens periodically to sell Iran sophisticated military technology, including the S-300 missile defence system, which would make an aerial attack on Iran much harder. But Russia has not given Iran that defence system. For now, it is using this possibility to entice Washington to negotiate on other issues. One assumes that Russia would ditch Iran for the right price. For example, Russia doesn't want Poland to turn into a bridgehead in the confrontation between Washington and Moscow. And Russia wants the Americans to stop interfering in areas that used to be under Soviet influence. Poland is essential to Moscow, for it is its gateway to Europe. Poland is actually the main bargaining chip in the current global order. For the moment, Iran is allying itself with Russia in central Asia and the Caucasus. For all intents and purposes, Iran has given up its historic alliances in the region in return for Russian protection in the confrontation with the West. The military defeats of the 19th century may never be forgotten in Tehran. Iran lost immense land in the Caucasus to Russia, by virtue of the 1813 and 1928 treaties. But Tehran is in a pragmatic mood these days. The Russians, for their part, feel safe as long as the Iranians and the Americans are at odds. Back in the time of the deposed Shah, when Tehran and Washington were close friends, the Russians were denied access to warm seas. Moscow doesn't want this to happen again, and it fears that Iran may start acting differently if the Americans appease it and recognise it as a regional power. The Iranians know that they can give everyone in the region a hard time by maintaining an alliance with Moscow. But they cannot be regional leaders with Russian help alone. For now, both Moscow and Tehran are using each other as bargaining chips and assets for negotiating with the West. And each doubts the intentions of the other. Russia doesn't want Iran to suffer a military strike, for this would undermine Moscow's strategic and economic interests. Likewise, it doesn't want Iran to make a deal with Washington at its expense. What Russia wants, therefore, is for the status quo to continue. The Russians want to see tensions continue between Washington and Tehran. Tehran can go on challenging Washington as long as it has Russia on its side. It can go on supporting Hizbullah, maintaining close ties with Syria, and holding on to its nuclear programme. And yet, Tehran doesn't want to give the Russians excessive leverage over its foreign policy. This is why it has refused to join a natural gas cartel that Moscow suggested as a way of controlling the global market. Tehran has also refrained from giving Russia oil exploration rights in its land, knowing that such a step may make US negotiators less intent on giving Tehran the concessions it needs. Iran knows how to negotiate for bargains while maintaining close links with Moscow. And Russia is doing the same. In the recent talks with the Americans, the Russians allowed Washington to ship hardware to Afghanistan across its borders. Moscow and Washington also agreed to a mutual reduction of their nuclear warheads. But the missile shield system in Poland, Russian influence in the former Eastern bloc, and the Iranian nuclear programme issue proved too tricky for American and Russian negotiators. Obama linked the missile defence system with the Iranian nuclear dossier, saying that Washington wouldn't want the missile defence system if Iran were to shut down its nuclear programme. The statement seems to suggest that one bargain was possible: the one in which Russia abandons Iran. In his talks with Obama, Russian Prime Minister Putin made it clear that Poland was essential to Russian strategic interests and that Moscow wished to see an end to the missile shield system. The two issues are likely to pop up again during the visit by Secretary of State Clinton to Russia in September. During the G8 summit, the French and Americans took a tough stand on Iran. No condemnation or ultimatum ensued in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition. But Obama and Sarkozy promised to discuss Iran again at the UN General Assembly session in September. Iran is a major power by regional standards, but not by Russian and American standards. Consequently, Iran may hold the key to several crucial regional issues, but it cannot block a US-Russian deal. So until September, Tehran will have reason to worry. * The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
