Tensions are mounting again between Tehran and Washington following a brief respite in the slide towards disaster, reports Mustafa El-Labbad Both the Bush administration and the Ahmadinejad government are feeling intense heat at home these days -- the one buckling under a steady decline in popularity as a Democratic congress acts to restrict its foreign policy maneuverability. His nemesis in Iran is contending with similar problems, and both have adopted the same tactic to buttress their positions: a vigorous campaign in the Middle East to rally support for their respective positions against each other. Bush dispatched his second-in-command on a whistle stop tour of the region to drum up hostility towards Tehran, in keeping with a policy that ironically profiles Iran's growing regional status. The first highlight of this tour was the scene of Dick Cheney on the deck of the John C Stennis aircraft carrier in the Gulf, metaphorically shaking his fist at the Iranian coastline and warning Tehran of the folly of trying to close the Straits of Hormuz where 40 per cent of the world's oil floats past each day and proclaiming his government's resolve to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons and dominating the region. To give weight to Cheney's threats, US military bases in Central Asia staged extraordinary military maneuvers over the past week. Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, embarked on a tour of his own which was no less impressive, if more restrained in style. His first stop was Oman, on the other side of these vital Straits of Hormuz, which in the event of a US-Israeli attack he threatens to close, disrupting the global economy. He then flew to the UAE, one of Iran's main trading partners, making the first visit by an Iranian head of state to Abu Dhabi since the Iranian revolution over a quarter of a century ago. In view of the large volume of exports to Iran from the UAE, especially Dubai, and the high volume of Iranian investments in the Emirates, good relations here are crucial to Iran's ability to withstand economic sanctions, which will probably be notched up in the forthcoming Security Council meeting focussing on compelling Tehran to abandon uranium enrichment. Iran has not softened its position over the past few weeks. If anything, the signals it gave out were rather alarming, at least if we are to judge by the North Korean foreign minister's recent visit to Tehran during which the two governments pledged to work together against "the forces of global arrogance". If the purpose of Kim Yong-il visit was to obtain economic assistance and increase trade to boost North Korea's ailing economy, Tehran was looking for a beast of a different order: North Korean missile technology, which forms the backbone of Iran's ballistics arsenal. One might understand how Tehran would be tempted to sacrifice some of its political capital in the interest of acquiring nuclear technology that would enable it to negotiate on a more equal footing and to offset the pressures of the drive to isolate it regionally and internationally. However, hosting the North Korean foreign minister not only jettisoned some political capital, but it helped entrench the very stereotype of the Iranian regime that Washington has been working so hard to disseminate. Nor did this move come at a good time for the Ahmadinejad administration at home. Domestic politics in Iran are currently in the grips of a power struggle between the hardliners led by the Iranian president and the conservative pragmatists championed by Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the former are losing. The results of three recent elections are indicative of Ahmadinejad's deteriorating popularity in Iran. The first was the defeat of the candidate he favoured for the governor of Tehran, former international wrestling champion Rasoul Khadem, who was defeated by Mohamed Baqer Qalibaf in the Tehran local elections. Aggravating the sting is the fact that Qalibaf was one of Ahmadinejad's rivals in the last presidential elections. The second was the defeat of the Ahmadinejad list in Tehran's municipal elections in favour of candidates representing the Rafsanjani camp and the more liberal shade of the political spectrum headed by former president Mohamed Khatami. Just prior to this, the Ahmadinejad camp lost out yet again to the Rafsanjani camp in the elections of the Council of Experts which is responsible for selecting the supreme guide of the republic. In addition, Ahmadinejad was forced to release a Rafsanjani associate, former Iranian negotiator with the West Hussein Mousavian, who had been arrested over a week ago on the charge of espionage. In addition to suffering erosion of his popularity, the Iranian president, like his American counterpart, seems to be up against an attempt to restrict his foreign policy manoeuvrability. This has taken the form of the appointment of another Rafsanjani associate, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, as vice- president. When we add to this the growing influence of Ali Larjani, who heads the Iranian nuclear programme and who was another of Ahmadinejad's presidential rivals, we begin to fathom the extent of the growing domestic siege surrounding the Iranian version of the neo-conservatives. The foreign policies of both the American and Iranian radical leaders address their domestic tensions rather than serve the foreign policy interests of their respective countries in our increasingly complex, highly interconnected world. That these policies, moreover, are characterised by a good-versus-evil rhetoric with fiery religious overtones can only enflame religious animosities between East and West and oversimplify the real interests of two nations, which requires restraint and subtlety. Bush's and Ahmadinejad's fiery rhetoric has more to do with their media images -- they are playing to the crowds around the world. What goes on behind the scene is much more complex but since that surface ultimately reveals what is going on behind the scenes, we can expect to have our senses assaulted by increasingly shrill language and fast-paced action, the more the pressures mount against these two ideologically-fixated regimes.
