In Focus: Look beyond Rafah Hamas needs to set its sights on the good of the Palestinian people, not simply its own self-interest, writes Galal Nassar Once again, Palestinian factional leaders come to Cairo in search of elusive reconciliation. The deal they once signed in Mecca looked good, but it didn't stick for long. Is anyone keeping track of all the rounds of talks that have been held? Dozens, hundreds perhaps! Some may recall that Fatah and Hamas started talking in the early 1990s in Sudan. Well, they've been talking ever since, in various venues around the region. A few years back, the positions of the two sides were far apart. Hamas posed as a resistance movement that was not going to compromise, that didn't care about power, that was not about to sell out. And it was fond of portraying Fatah, or the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), as a sell-out. Now, these claims are hard to maintain. Hamas is in government, self-proclaimed and all. It is worried about its own survival, Jerusalem and refugee rights put on the backburner for the moment. And yet Hamas and Fatah are still at loggerheads. Instead of working out their grievances, the list keeps getting longer as time goes by. Fatah is mad at Hamas's so-called coup. Hamas, for its part, is sure that Fatah is going to manipulate Palestinian presidential and legislative elections. More out of embarrassment than obligation, Arab states, especially Egypt, are once again tackling Palestinian divisions. No matter that inter-Palestinian divisions were fuelled in part by the Arabs, the Palestinians seem pleased to see Arab mediation resumed. Having wagered for decades on the support of the Arab and Islamic masses, Hamas has resigned itself to seek the help of Arab regimes, the Egyptian included, with good ties to Israel and Washington. This change of heart somewhat vindicates Arab regimes, often accused of letting down the Palestinians. When talking about reconciliation, clarity and frankness are at a premium, as the Saudi foreign minister said. We need to distinguish between dialogue and reconciliation on the one hand and the search for a peaceful settlement on the other. A dialogue that doesn't lead to national reconciliation is meaningless -- just as meaningless as the years of endless negotiations with Israel, of endless talks that did more harm than good to the Palestinians. Under the current auspices, Palestinian reconciliation is bound to head in a certain direction. Arab countries, most of which having normalised their ties with Israel or intending to do so, cannot possibly suggest a national reconciliation deal that contradicts the terms set by Israel and the US. So let's recognise this for a fact and stop wasting time in blaming Egypt and the Arabs for what comes next. A reconciliation plan that restores harmony onto the Palestinian scene and keeps bridges open with the outside world has to abide by the terms of the Quartet. And it may need a boost, in the shape of Arab or foreign forces, to keep everyone in line. A few scenarios of reconciliation come to mind. The Palestinians may agree on national guidelines commensurate with the Oslo Accords, leading to a unified government for both the West Bank and Gaza. Such government has no chance for success unless it plays by the rules of the Quartet -- Arab countries wouldn't have it otherwise. The problem in Palestine is not that Hamas has staged a coup, or that the security services are divided, or that presidential and legislative elections are up in the air. These are only symptoms underlying a deeper malaise; namely, the lack of agreement on what constitutes the feasible terms for reconciliation. Hamas formed a government following the last legislative elections, and the result was a blockade on Gaza followed by domestic animosity. Then, after the Mecca agreement, a national reconciliation government was formed under Hamas. This too failed because the government wouldn't deign to play by the Quartet's rules. We know what hasn't worked in the past. Yet there is no indication that Hamas is willing to accept the Quartet's terms. And there is no sign that the Palestinians are going to get a better deal than the Oslo Accords anytime soon. Accepting the Quartet's terms seems to be a prerequisite for successful reconciliation. Reconciliation, once it takes place, must lead to a national accord government, one that recognises the weight of Hamas in the recent legislative elections. Such a government would be best run by a non- partisan prime minister, its political programme a document of national reconciliation that spells out those matters left vaguely worded in the past. National reconciliation requires a strong Arab presence and guarantees, so as to avoid acts of retaliation and the settling of accounts, especially in Gaza. The new government should rebuild security services and create the right circumstances for presidential and legislative elections in January 2009. But Hamas may not be willing to accept such reconciliation. Perhaps it prefers to hold on to Gaza while demanding a share in the central government. The Palestinians may agree on a new political system, one that transcends the conundrums of negotiations and the militancy of resistance factions. Such reconciliation would require both sides to recognise what they have in common. Perhaps Fatah and Hamas would find a way of revising their negotiating tactics without compromising their independent decision-making. But such reconciliation may lead to a confrontation with Israel, and may even require reconsideration of the very existence of the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Arabs are unlikely to endorse such a course of action. And the web of institutions, relations and interests that the PA has spawned over the years may get in the way. Alternatively, a national reconciliation maintaining the status quo may evolve. In which case, two separate Palestinian political arrangements may continue to exist until such time when domestic and regional circumstances improve, but with hostility and rivalry replaced by accommodation and cooperation. Hamas and Fatah may recognise their respective control over Gaza and the West Bank and all Palestinian factions may be given freedom of political activity in both Gaza and the West Bank. This scenario may involve a restructuring of the PLO or the creation of a new political umbrella encompassing all political factions, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad included. The problem of the presidency must be resolved in a way that ensures that the Palestinian people have one president. All Palestinian groups are to support Hamas's request for open borders with Egypt. Meanwhile, Hamas is to desist from obstructing the efforts of the Ramallah government to pursue negotiations over the West Bank, Jerusalem and final status issues. The Arabs may fail to find a consensual formula for reconciliation. If proposals for reconciliation fail to obtain Arab backing, or are rejected by Hamas, Egypt may decide to lift the siege on Gaza, albeit gradually and conditionally. Such a move is likely to perpetuate the divisions between Hamas and Fatah rather than resolve them. Egypt, meanwhile, would justify its position on humanitarian grounds. Hamas is more interested in ending the political blockade and being recognised as a legitimate authority than in terminating the economic and humanitarian siege. The opening of Gaza's borders would satisfy Hamas and some other parties, but would undermine efforts to bring about Palestinian reconciliation. Of all the above, the most realistic course for reconciliation is the first one. Success in the first scenario would give the Palestinians a chance to move on to the second scenario should Israel block progress towards a solution. The only way for the Palestinians to cope with the requirements of peace, deal with Israeli practices, and resist international pressures is to have a government of national unity. A Palestinian state will not spring into life overnight, not even if Hamas agrees instantly to the Quartet's terms. The Palestinians have to remain united in the face of the occupation and tough peace talks ahead. Their unity is their only defence against those who want to derail negotiations and forget about a final settlement. Their unity would give legitimacy to all forms of resistance within the pre-1967 borders. Hamas may be thinking of scoring points as a political party and an Islamist movement, but that's all short-term. Hamas should start thinking beyond Rafah. It should start thinking in terms of what's good for the whole nation.
