Latent indications of remorse suggest there is more to the role of some in paving the way for the invasion of Iraq than at first meets the eye, writes Abdallah El-Ashaal* In the second week of August, Mohamed El-Baradei announced that he regreted his silence over the US invasion of Iraq. Although it is perhaps odd that the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should make such an admission at this time, it will be useful to register a couple of observations on this quite serious matter for future reference. First, El-Baradei along with at least all of the permanent members of the Security Council knew that Washington was determined to invade Iraq and that it was searching for any evidence or circumstances to support this resolve. The practical beginning for the invasion plan was Security Council Resolution 1441 of 2002 calling for inspections of Iraq for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That same year, just as the Arab Peace Initiative was announced from Beirut, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon set about quashing the second Palestinian Intifada. Also in that year, in October, US Congress passed a bill that effectively obliged the US administration to recognise Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel. So everyone knew what was in Washington's mind at the time and that it saw the passage of the inspections resolution as the first step towards the acquisition of international cover for its plans. Nothing could underscore this point more than the remark by then French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin in the Security Council that the resolution did not give Washington licence to invade Iraq. In spite of the fact -- or perhaps because of the fact -- that the Bush administration was so clearly chomping at the bit to launch an invasion and grasping for the said resolution, in accordance with which the UN inspections team would be authorised to inspect every inch of Iraqi territory, and would sniff out the evidence it needed, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan affirmed that the resolution would give a new impetus to the quest for a peaceful solution to the Iraqi question in an increasingly perilous world. At the time that the resolution was still under debate, he said that the resolution offered a model of the type of multilateral diplomacy that served the cause of peace and security, he stressed and he urged the Iraqi leadership to seize the opportunity to end the isolation and suffering of the Iraqi people. He simultaneously cautioned Iraq against the folly of not cooperating with the plea to disarm peacefully and warned that if Iraq continued in its defiance the Security Council would have to assume its enforcing responsibilities. At this point, the French foreign minister insisted the resolution be worded in such a way as not to sanction the immediate recourse to force. Indeed, it was reformulated so as to require a second resolution that could, if need be, authorise the use of force based on the findings submitted to the Security Council by the inspections team. China and Russia, for their part, insisted that the issuance of a second resolution on Iraq must be contingent upon proof of Iraqi violations as explicitly stated in the findings submitted by the UN inspections team. At this point, US Secretary of State General Colin Powell, who would subsequently express deep remorse over the part he played in this drama, opened the door to his country circumventing UN restrictions. He said that the resolution could not prevent any member from acting in self-defence against Iraq or to compel Iraq to implement UN resolutions intended to protect international peace and security. Powell thus stated that while the Security Council resolution may not give anyone a licence to use force it could not prevent anyone from using force. Perhaps it was such brazenness that prompted Kofi Annan to give voice to his conscience and publicly declare, after the invasion, yet despite of Washington's threat to expose the part his son played in the Oil-for-Food programme, that the US had used illegal force against Iraq. The foregoing account has but one implication: everyone colluded in the invasion of Iraq. It was as though this invasion was the prerequisite for the prevalence of world peace. Meanwhile, the Arabs colluded by silence, which stemmed from the failure to draw the line between, on the one hand, their exasperation with the Saddam regime and frustration at their inability to restrain it and bring it back to its senses and, on the other, the future and wellbeing of a great people. This silence too helped clear the way for disaster. My second observation is that by 5 February 2003, when the Security Council was discussing the report submitted by UNMOVIC, the UN inspections team, the US had already amassed its forces to the accompaniment of intensive diplomatic manoeuvres and a massive propaganda campaign. After the Security Council concluded its session that day with the finding that the inspection team had so far found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, Mohamed El-Baradei reiterated the belief of his predecessor -- and the chief of UNMOVIC -- that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction and that the assumption that such weapons existed in that country was groundless. Shortly after Resolution 1441 was passed in 2002, El-Baradei published an article in Al-Hayat stating that Iraq had to abide by the provisions of the resolution because this would deprive Washington of the pretext for invading it. The article meshed with an international and Arab campaign that attempted to drive home the same message. Two days later, an article of mine appeared in Al-Hayat beneath the headline "After the inspections what comes next?" Contrary to the general tide, I held that the inspections resolution was part of the process of preparing the groundwork for the invasion and that to promote it was to collude in the act of invasion. Why, after that famous Security Council session of 5 February, did El-Baradei threaten to resign if Washington went ahead and invaded Iraq? He had just submitted a report refuting the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and thus had acted totally within his jurisdiction and in accordance with his duties. But to resign? After all, it was obvious that his presence or absence as IAEA chief would have no impact on a decision that had been taken years earlier. The threat could only have meant one thing: El-Baradei had given something of crucial importance to making the invasion possible. Subsequent reports indicated that El-Baradei's report had reassured Washington that the invasion would be safe. Some went so far as to state that El-Baradei's team had placed identifying marks on strategic targets and helped recruit agents on the ground to facilitate the invasion. Between that day in 2003 when he threatened to resign and his proclamation of remorse in 2009 is a minefield. It is not enough for El-Baradei to apologise for his role, over which speculation and conjecture are now more rife than ever. He must clear his conscience and record for history exactly what part he played in the invasion and destruction of a great nation and the tragedy of a people who still have no clear sight of a brighter future. As he is summoning up his reminiscences, we would also hope that El-Baradei would clarify the circumstances surrounding how he and the IAEA were jointly awarded a special Nobel Peace Prize, given the modest and, indeed, negative record of that agency in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While he is at it, could he also please explain why the US nominated him as IAEA chief over the Egyptian nominee for that post at the time? * The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
