Not all dissidents are pro-Baradei. Amira Howeidy speaks to some of Egypt's independent intellectuals uncomfortable with the hype surrounding the former head of the international nuclear watchdog "History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce." Ex-judge Tarek El-Beshri drew attention to Karl Marx's famous adage when describing the commotion around former International Atomic Energy Agency chief and possible presidential candidate Mohamed El-Baradei. El-Beshri, a prominent scholar, historian and intellectual, has long inspired Egypt's movements for change and dissent. In a general assembly meting in 2006, pro-reform judges hailed El-Bishri as "the godfather of the Egyptian judiciary". His reputation for independence impeded his promotion to president of the State Council while his nationalist views made him Kifaya's preferred choice for presidential candidate, a proposal he turned down in 2005. In a full page article published on 26 February in the independent newspaper El-Shorouk, El-Beshri stressed that Egypt's basic problem lies in US hegemony. "It is true," he wrote, "that the starting point for real political reform must begin with internal factors pertaining to the regime" but "putting an end to US hegemony" should not be absent from our quest for genuine reform. "The issue isn't finding the right presidential candidate" El-Beshri argued in reference to El-Baradei. "That wasn't Egypt problem." "A Call for Civil Disobedience", the daring commentary El-Beshri published in October 2004, has long served as a political manifesto, not least for the anti-Mubarak opposition movement Kifaya (Enough), which was formed a month after the article appeared. Today many of Kifaya's best known faces, along with others who led or were part of Egypt's all too brief "spring of democracy" are rallying behind El-Baradei. During a one-week stay in Cairo last month, the ex-IAEA chief announced the formation of the National Assembly for Change, which seeks to amend articles 76, 77 and 88 of the constitution, amongst other demands. But things are not that simple, insists El-Beshri. The political momentum that saw so many people take to the streets in 2005 soon ebbed, he wrote. By failing to join forces with protests driven by economic, rather than political, demands, the vanguard he argues, missed an opportunity to create a large, popular movement capable of pressuring the regime. "As a result the elite became atomized and momentum was diminished, reduced to a media phenomena Regime change doesn't happen in response to the media." In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly El-Beshri elucidated his position. El-Baradei's reform initiative, he says, skirts "nationalist demands with regards to Israel and US hegemony". In doing so, he argues, the initiative is reduced to "superficial democratic reform." El-Beshri's concern over El-Baradei's seemingly ambivalent position towards US hegemony is shared by Soheir Morsy, a former professor of anthropology at the American University in Cairo and the author of a UNICEF report on the impact of sanctions on Iraqi children. Morsy takes issue with El-Baradei's performance as IAEA chief during the run up to the 2003 invasion. "The blood of the Iraqis is on his hands," she told the Weekly, alluding to the constant dispatch of UN inspectors - including Baradei himself - to Iraq, which served only to prolong sanctions. Even if, at the time, El-Baradei was constrained by the IAEA's statutes "he could have declared his disapproval and resigned". "Silence," says Morsy, "is complicity." The cruelty of the decade-long sanctions on pre-war Iraq provoked several high-level resignations within the UN. Denis Halliday, the Irish UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, resigned over sanctions, which he described as "genocide". His successor, the German Hans von Sponeck, who headed all UN operations in Iraq, resigned in 2000, together with Jutta Burghardt, head of the UN World Food Programme in Iraq. "El-Baradei served for three terms at the helm of the IAEA and was rewarded, receiving a Nobel prize in 2005," says Morsy. She points to El-Baradei's shifting stands over Iran's nuclear activity as typical of his manoeuvring. In October 2004, following months of inspections, El-Baradei declared that "Iran has no nuclear weapons programme". His second term as IAEA head was due to end in 2005, and Washington was displeased with his position. On 3 September 2005, El-Baradei submitted a report that pointed to areas in which Iran had not cooperated with the IAEA and questioned Iran's "transparency measures". His third term was renewed a few weeks later. So why did so many, and so varied, political groups rally behind El-Baradei the moment he announced his willingness - from Austria - to contest the presidential elections should the constitution be amended? It is a question that is increasingly perplexing sceptics. "On what grounds do El-Baradei's supporters assume he is the superman who is capable of doing everything?" asks political activist Mohamed Waked from the Centre for Socialist Studies. "It is because he has US backing," Waked told the Weekly, "something his supporters actually have the audacity to boast about, when they recount his "international connections" and "good relations" with the "west." On 24 February, the pro-Baradei independent daily El-Destour published a chart comparing him to Gamal Mubarak, president Mubarak's son and head of the ruling National Democratic Paty's Politics Secretariat, who is viewed as the heir-in-waiting. El-Destour reasoned that El-Baradei's characteristics are superior, citing, amongst other advantages, El-Baradei's "relations with the US." With no political background in Egypt prior to his one-week stay in Cairo last month, little is known about El-Baradei. In his many media appearances, he has spoken of the need for change, often citing World Bank figures on poverty, illiteracy and economic growth in Egypt. Although he has largely avoided addressing regional issues, he was asked in an interview published in Al-Masry Al-Youm on 19 February about the steel wall Egypt is constructing along its borders with Gaza to prevent underground tunnels operating between Egypt and the blockaded strip. El-Baradei didn't object to the wall, insisting its construction was Egypt's sovereign right, and referring to Hamas as an "extremist group". Such stands, and the ambiguity surrounding his take on the Arab-Israeli conflict and US imperialism, confuse those who might otherwise support El-Baradei. On 3 March columnist Fahmy Howeidy published a piece in El-Shorouk expressing reservations over El-Baradie's views but also voicing concern at how these might be "used by the hypocrites and those who profit from the status quo". An advocate of regime change, Howeidy took issue with the statement issued by El-Baradei on 2 March - viewed by many as his political manifesto - because it made no mention of "national independence, the cardinal knot in our foreign policy which has dwarfed Egypt's role and aligned it with US policy". It is a compelling issue for many dissidents who are increasingly alarmed by El-Baradei's priorities. Ashraf El-Bayoumi, an Egyptian professor of chemistry and head of the World Food Programme Observation Unit in Iraq during the period of sanctions, argues that "The emphasis on the issue of rotation of power to the neglect of the basic issue of national sovereignty is being used by the forces of Western hegemony." A respected heavy weight in Egyptian politics like El-Beshri, he points out, will never be quoted in the New York Times or Time Magazine or Forbes, "but you will certainly find El-Baradei."
