Mohamed El-Baradei's positions on a whole range of issues are at best ambiguous, and often nebulous in the extreme. To be taken seriously as a politician he will need to be more consistent, and more forthcoming, writes Abdel-Monem Said While delivering a lecture at Sayed Darwish Theatre in Alexandria, colleagues and readers, as well as members of the public, inquired what I meant when I said that a "serious" talk -- about and with -- Mohamed El-Baradei was in order. Some took my words as a hint that people were not talking about El-Baradei seriously enough. Others wanted me to clarify my thoughts. People with academic training, such as me, believe that accurate definitions bring us closer to the truth. What I meant by seriousness was to start treating El-Baradei as one of us and to view him as a politician who has ventured into the Egyptian political scene and offered ideas that deserve discussion and contemplation. El-Baradei's approach should be assessed in accordance with both his liberal inclinations and the country's interests. Until now he has received "special" treatment. He is a Nobel laureate and a recipient of the Grand Collar of the Nile, honours that speak of a long history of achievement. El-Baradei, presented as a hero and a role model, arrived with a "halo" shining over him. Inevitably, he attracted extraordinary attention when he decided to enter Egypt's political arena, brandishing his banner of "change", a slogan that never fails to raise hopes. When he linked change with "full democracy", the allure was multiplied. El-Baradei became like Godot. But unlike the character in Samuel Beckett's play, who left everyone waiting, El-Baradei rode into town one bright morning. He demanded change from bottom to top, regardless of whether or not the inhabitants of the town desired it. To take El-Baradei seriously means to begin at the same point from which he is starting out. He said that he would run for president if the nation asked him to do so and carried out the constitutional changes that would allow him to run as an independent, without going through the procedures prescribed by the current constitution. There is something vague and more than a little contradictory in this kind of reasoning and I am not sure why El-Baradei's friends, and even his foes, have failed to point this out. What he is demanding is to change the constitution and amend basic articles through methods that are not allowed by the constitution. El-Baradei wants existing institutions, the very legislative bodies formed through the constitution, to introduce these changes. One cannot help but wonder whether El-Baradei wants to bring down the system or be part of it. The constitution he is talking about is not that of the Comoros Islands. It is the 1971 constitution, amended in 1980, 2005 and 2007. El-Baradei wants articles 76, 77, and 88 changed, to which he has added a list of other demands. But he doesn't seem to pay heed to existing institutions. Often, he talks as if he does not want to recognise the legitimacy of the existing laws, or as if the regime itself is not legitimate. But how can the constitution be changed by appealing to institutions that El-Baradei and his supporters brand as illegitimate? To be serious means we must examine such contradictions. When El-Baradei decided to step into Egyptian politics, he suggested that the Doctors' Syndicate should send 10,000 doctors to demand constitutional change, and that all other syndicates -- the lawyers, journalists, accountants, workers, and the peasants -- do the same. Once this happened, he suggested, the "regime" -- note that El-Baradei did not refer to existing institutions -- would be forced to respond. As it turned out, the thousands of petitions Egyptian syndicates were supposed to send never materialised. Later, El-Baradei moved to another tactic, calling on his supporters to collect five million signatures demanding constitutional amendments. The figure was then cut to two million. El-Baradei rightly insisted such pledges of support be signed with the individual's name and ID number, rather than sent on the Internet. As it turned out, the illusionary millions remained just that. His supporters managed 10,000 signatures, perhaps a few more, despite blanket media coverage. To be serious means telling El-Baradei, since he became one of us, a politician in our midst, that the core issue is not the legitimacy of existing Egyptian institutions but his own, the legitimacy of his message as well as his ability to rally people in support of change. Reform in Egypt can only ever be an institutional process. It is not the prerogative of any individual, or group of individuals, acting in isolation from those who can introduce the change. There is no sense in the country's institutions stopping what they are doing to follow the suggestions of a group that has yet to show that it represents the people. It is no use to say that millions didn't sign up for El-Baradei, or that syndicates didn't send cables, because they were afraid. It is no use, either, to brag that the masses have broken the barrier of fear. The plain fact is that the masses are protesting daily in front of the People's Assembly and the Council of Ministers. Ordinary Egyptians appear hourly on television screens opposing and bickering, cursing and denouncing, sometimes even assaulting ministers. El-Baradei's legitimacy is problematic. A liberal man such as El-Baradei must understand that things in Egypt cannot be resolved by signatures. What would happen if the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), or another fundamentalist group, launched a petition, attracting far more names than El-Baradei and his supporters can even dream of? What would happen if, based on these signatures, the MB demanded that Muslim jurists rule the country? What if another of the Salafi programmes, of which there is no shortage, got such a support? I am not saying that El-Baradei has no right to express his opinions. I happen to agree with some of what he says and to disagree on other points. But what I am saying is that the safest road to change is to work through institutions, even if this means the change takes longer to bring about. El-Baradei is entitled to take any road he thinks suitable to achieving his aims, whether the goal is changing the constitution or becoming a president. But in travelling this road he should remain committed to the liberal and democratic principles he propagates. He should not encourage a group that has no more than a few dozen members to demonstrate in Tahrir Square. There is no barrier to demonstrations in Egypt. In recent years, Egypt has seen protests increase in number, from 202 in 2004 to 690 in 2009, all of them covered in full on television and the radio. But when a group linked with El-Baradei insists on calling a protest in Tahrir Square, it means only that the group wants to paralyse the capital, clash with the police, disturb public order and obstruct the movement of citizens. I am under the impression that clashing with the police is central to the aims of this group. That is not the road to change but to chaos. I don't think that this is what El-Baradei wants to happen. His main problem is that he views democracy as limited to a series of electoral procedures. Democracy, though, is something that should be woven deep into the fabric of society. Recently, Iraq went through fair and democratic elections but ended up in a state of political and economic paralysis, with levels of violence bordering on civil war. Before that, Mauritania had fair presidential elections, only to be followed by a military coup. This doesn't mean that El-Baradei shouldn't try to make things better. Many before him, inside and outside the National Democratic Party and in other civil parties, have tried to do just that. They tried to amend the constitution, end the state of emergency, even to write a new constitution. What El-Baradei has to do is to pursue the same goals while surveying Egypt through a political eye, not the lens of the media. The difference between the two is the difference between voicing an ideal and engaging in politics. In the former case, it is enough to state either agreement or disagreement in any given matter. In the second case one explores measures for change and starts a motion that may take us from one state to another. In politics, this should happen through consensus and inclusion, not through disagreement and exclusion. The required change must be a continuation of ongoing events. Frankly, and with all due respect to El-Baradei, Egypt was not born the moment he returned. For two centuries Egypt hasn't stopped changing and developing through various means. In recent decades, Egyptian development has been based on five-year plans of which the public is kept fully appraised. Alongside these are well-publicised government policies discussed in the press and within the relevant institutions. El-Baradei must do better than eject everything that already exists. When he spoke of corruption, he repeated arguments mentioned by Egyptians and foreigners but which are not based on facts. Admittedly, the situation in Egypt is not as good as one would hope. To move ahead, we need ideas in education, health, development patterns, and technological progress that exceed what we have now. We don't need people to keep dwelling on old arguments. Take El-Baradei's comments on corruption. A politician must look at the issue from a practical angle, assess existing laws and institutions in charge of fighting the phenomenon, find the loopholes though which corrupt practices slip and suggest remedies. One has to find out more about the nature of corruption, not just read through international reports citing the "impressions" of businessmen. A short while ago, one of the "independent" newspapers in this country published a report by the US Department of State about corruption in Egypt. The newspaper ran an exceedingly long headline outlining the spread of corruption in the country, but the text of the report, which it excerpted, was much milder. According to the report, corruption in Egypt existed among small officials, but was no obstacle to US investment in Egypt. I can give you more examples that constitute serious questions that should be posed to El-Baradei. Does anyone know, for example, El-Baradei's position on legislation submitted to the People's Assembly and the Shura Council since he returned to Egypt? Do he and his supporters have a specific opinion on the real estate tax, the pensions scheme, the roads linking South Egypt with the Red Sea, or even the screening of an Israeli film at a cinema festival organised by the French Cultural Centre? Democracy and liberalism, things El-Baradei knows so well, are commendable, but they remain a means to an end. The political system as a whole depends on an intricate web of foreign and domestic policies. My fear is that El-Baradei is avoiding comment on public policy either because he is inadequately informed or because he doesn't want to divide his supporters. We cannot allow ideological movements to turn into political militias and move on to stop public transport. We cannot allow measures that pave the way for theological groups to demand a religious state. Iranian liberals once did just that and their reward was death at the hand of the mullahs. I do not think this is what our Nobel laureate has in mind.
