As partition approached, Sudan -- especially the north -- faces problems that could further tear it apart, writes Asmaa El-Husseini When I met with one senior Sudanese official hastily at a social event in Khartoum before I headed to Juba to cover the referendum on self-determination, I asked him if it was over and if partition was unavoidable. He responded, yes and we must understand that this has been the desire of the people of South Sudan for a long time, and that it was not the fault of the north and that both could live in peace as two neighbouring states. I asked if he believed all will be well, and he answered that if peace were not reached between the anticipated states it would be catastrophic; we would have sacrificed the unity of the country and not secured the peace aspired for. This quid pro quo of partition in return for peace and ending bloodshed is the logic purported by the supporters of partition. Their optimistic promises worked magic in the hearts and minds of those who heard them amid a poisoned atmosphere during the interim period that lasted six and a half years beginning January 2005. This squandered the interim years, which were the last chance to build a united country. There are crises on several pending issues that were not resolved and must be addressed in the coming three months. The issues are many and critical, most prominently the situation in Abyei, borders, ethnicities, debts, oil, currency, the status of southern citizens in the north and northern nationals in the south. Some believed that the partition of the South would be the beginning of de-escalation between the two sides, but it appears that disputes and problems continue, most recently triggered by violent clashes in the contested Abyei region. There was also violence in the town of Malakal in the Upper Nile state. The government in the south accused its counterpart in the north and the National Congress Party (NCP) headed by President Omar Al-Bashir of supporting the attacks, as well as funding and arming southern militias such as George Attor, Qulwaqay, David Yaw Yaw, in an attempt to topple the southern government. The government in the South took two steps in response to these events, namely halting talks with Khartoum on pending issues that were already deadlocked, as well as the critical and unprecedented move to stop oil production mostly located in the south. Khartoum strongly condemned the two actions, asserting that only the south would suffer. It further argued that some southern parties are trying to cover up their failures by pointing accusatory fingers at the north. It also noted that what is taking place is an internal struggle in the south which does not involve the north, and that there are some in the south who want to continue pressuring Khartoum by supporting Darfur rebels or encouraging promoters of the new Sudan that would alter the status quo in North Sudan. The accusations by the NCP are supported by allegations by southern elements and political parties who criticise the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of going back on its promises before the referendum, and working on establishing a one-party state in the south. The accusations flying back and forth have some degree of truth to them, and all signs indicate that if the status quo continues it would lead to an unsolvable impasse. The unity of the country has been torn apart at a cheap price of an imagined peace that has yet to be realised, and which is strewn with suspicion, fear and lack of trust between the two sides. The government in the north is not standing on solid ground either as the winds of change blow across Arab states. Sudan is not isolated from these transformations, and in fact was the first Arab country to witness two people's uprisings, in 1964 and 1985, which toppled the regimes of former presidents Ibrahim Abood and Jaafar Al-Numeiri. The call for change is augmented today by tensions triggered by the ruling regime's NCP and its leader Bashir's insistence to continue sole leadership of the country after partition. The north's opposition, meanwhile, is demanding an interim government to lead a transition into true democracy. It holds Bashir's party responsible for the secession of the south, the division and fragmentation of Sudan, and continued tensions in Darfur. It also says that if the regime stays in power it could reignite war between the two north and south, and in Darfur, which would undermine Sudan's international standing further as it already faces UN sanctions as well as the pursuit of Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Today, Bashir's party ridicules the opposition shamelessly, sneers at the small numbers of protesters, flexing its muscles in confronting them, and mocks its leaders. Bashir and his party expressed joy over the revolutions sweeping the Arab world, especially in Egypt, and criticised the mistakes of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in dealing with the opposition. During the first visit by an Arab leader to Egypt since the 25 January Revolution, Bashir went to Cairo and asked to meet with the Egyptian opposition. Several turned down the invitation, including Mohamed El-Baradei, leader of the National Association for Change, and the chairman of the Tagammu Party, Rifaat Al-Said. During his two-day visit to Egypt, there were protests against him in Tahrir Square. On 8 March, there were demonstrations by female Sudanese activists in Khartoum as part of "The Campaign Against the Oppression of Women" in solidarity with a young female activist in the Qarafana movement called Safeya Ishak who claims to have been raped by security forces. The protesters, including prominent female figures, were arrested. The next day, at another demonstration more arrests were made, including Ali Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd, leader of the Communist Party. Hassan Al-Turabi, the leader of the opposition People's Congress Party, arrested three months ago, remains behind bars at Kobar Prison without being charged. It seems that the steps taken by Bashir are not enough to calm the disgruntled masses, however. He recently formed an agency to fight corruption and his family tried to deny rumours that they were involved in corruption cases. He also made contradictory statements about the identity of the coming state in the north and how it will incorporate the plurality of ethnicities, creeds, religions and cultures, despite the partition of the south. Conditions in Sudan are in dire need of revision to avoid the mistakes of neighbouring regimes that ignored or procrastinated in responding to the demands of the people, although they were stronger and sturdier than the regime in Khartoum. Time and experience have proven that the safeguards of a regime are the approval and consensus of the people, not police states and oppression. If Bashir's regime had not been dictatorial over the past years, and allowed others to participate in resolving problems, he would not have been in the crosshairs of the ICC and others.
