The ICC warrant is the Western gun in Al-Bashir's back pushing him to cede the south, says Asmaa El-Husseini Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir would have loved to be present in Libya during the African-European summit that was held a few days ago. He wasn't there. Because of the arrest warrant served on him by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Al-Bashir doesn't get to travel much these days. He said he was going to the Central African Republic, then he cancelled his plans, most probably because the ICC reminded CAR officials of his precarious legal situation. He was supposed to go to Kenya to attend the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development summit, but his presence would have caused a problem to his hosts, who had the event moved to Addis Ababa instead. He wanted to attend an African summit in Kampala, but the Ugandans asked him not to. And he really wanted to go to Cairo for a French-African summit, until the Egyptians got the event moved to Paris to avoid the embarrassment. It isn't clear whether Tripoli actually told Al-Bashir to stay at home. But it is ironic that Libya, a country once held in international contempt for its alleged support of terror, is now in the clear while Sudan is more isolated than ever, let alone about to fall apart. The ICC arrest warrant on Al-Bashir is taking its toll on Sudan on more than one level. It has blocked rounds of negotiations aimed to restore peace to the country, and now it may accelerate Sudan's partitioning. The ICC warrant on Al-Bashir is not just upsetting his travelling plans; it has put the entire country in a state of suspended animation. The country that was once one of the top three Arab countries in terms of attracting foreign investment is now economically stranded and politically adrift. The ICC warrant has impeded a possible solution of the Darfur crisis, for the Darfur insurgents are in no mood to negotiate with a president who's been indicted as a war criminal. Even before the warrant was issued, Khartoum was having trouble reaching a deal on Darfur. Now the prospects are indeed dire. As for the self-determination referendum, slated for 9 January 2011, no happy ending is likely to develop. Incensed by the warrant, Al-Bashir's government may try to disrupt the referendum. Why? Because if they allowed the south to secede, the international community may be emboldened and press harder for the implementation of ICC rulings, or try to coerce the Sudanese government into resolving the problems in Darfur, Nubia, and the Blue Nile. The hardliners with Al-Bashir's party, the National Congress, believe that the secession of the south would be the thin end of the wedge. Or at least, this is what the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Al-Bashir's partner in power, keeps telling everyone. Similar concerns have been voiced by international officials, who have recently escalated their pressures on Khartoum to hold the referendum on time. There has been attempts to placate Khartoum, but these have been met with Sudanese ridicule. Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, who took part recently in discussions concerning Sudan's future in New York, says that the ICC warrant on Al-Bashir should be rescinded. He also calls for sanctions to be removed and Sudanese debts to be written off. The international community has so far declined to make such sweeping concessions, but it has offered smaller gestures. For example, the ban on the export of some machinery to Sudan has been lifted. And Sudan was told that it may be removed from the terror list within months. But, for now at least, there doesn't seem to be much hope for the ICC warrant to be cancelled. There is always the possibility that Sudan may offer concessions on the south in the hope of getting the warrant removed. According to Article 16 of the ICC statutes, the warrant can be suspended for a period of a year, which could be a start if Sudan gets the kind of deal it is holding out for. What makes the warrant such a delicate issue is not just that Al-Bashir's future is at stake. Two other Sudanese have been indicted by the court: Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed leader Ali Abdel-Rahman. But here is the rub. Many other Sudanese officials fear that they would be next. If they allow Al-Bashir to fall, the chances are more heads are going to roll. Sudanese presidential advisor Ghazi Salaheddin is dismissive of what the international community has so far offered Sudan. "The balance sheet of the Sudanese- American dialogue over the past few months, as expressed in official reports and detailed in US press, can be summed up in the following offer that seems to be formulated by a feeble- minded people," Salaheddin said. Sudan is being asked to hold the elections on time without much regard to the referendum's crucial repercussions or the fact that it may lead to secession and war simultaneously, he added. In return (for helping with the referendum), Sudan was promised "six export licences for American companies working in agriculture and health," Salaheddin noted. Then, once the country is divided, the president will still have to turn himself in to the ICC. Not exactly the arrangement Sudan was hoping for. The offer, Salaheddin said, reminded him of an incident that happened in the early days of Islam, when Qoreish (the clan of Prophet Mohamed) elders asked Prophet Mohamed's uncle, Abdel-Mottaleb, to turn his nephew in. They wanted to kill the prophet, in return they promised to give Abdel-Mottaleb a handsome young man to raise in his home. The prophet's uncle scoffed at the idea. "You want me to raise your boy and take my boy to kill?" he told the elders off. Salaheddin said that such offers debase the referendum, for they turn it from a matter of principle into a business proposition or worse, a bargaining chip in US foreign policy. National Congress complain that their local interlocutors have become unyielding since the warrant was issued. In the Doha talks, Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement used to emerge from the negotiating room to tell television reporters that Al-Bashir should surrender himself to the ICC. He even promised that his fighters would help arrest the president. Before and after any talks with the government, Abdel-Wahed Mohamed Nour, leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), would say the ICC warrant must be carried out. As for the SPLM, which is a partner in government with Congress, it is still calling on Al-Bashir and his party to cooperate with the ICC. When a UN Security Council delegation visited Juba, southern demonstrators marched to call for Al-Bashir's arrest. The demonstrations angered Khartoum and soured relations between the National Congress and the SPLM. Hassan Al-Turabi, leader of the Islamic Movement and Al-Bashir's partner in the 1989 coup, also says that Al-Bashir should turn himself in. Former prime minister Sadeg Al-Mahdi says that a solution should be found to bring about justice while maintaining stability and peace in Sudan. Sudanese writer Tharwat Qassem maintains that the abrogation of the warrant on Al-Bashir is the sole concern for Sudan's National Congress. Removing Sudan from the terror list doesn't mean much. And the lifting of sanctions for Khartoum is beside the point. Also, allowing Khartoum to import agricultural equipment and computers, as Washington did recently, is a joke. The cancellation of the warrant is the "only carrot the National Congress craves," Qassem said. But the price for revoking the warrant would be high. For starters, Khartoum will have to promise to facilitate the birth of a new state in south Sudan. Al-Bashir may be willing to do just that, according to Qassem. "The statements in which Al-Bashir says that the loss of the south is not the end of the world is a step in this direction." It is true that the loss of the south may not be the end of the world. But it may mean that Al-Bashir would tighten his hold on power indefinitely. This is something that many lobbyists in the West, including human rights groups, don't want to see happen. African Americans, the Jewish lobby, and the American far-right are also taking a firm stand on Al-Bashir. And they have the power to block a deal with Al-Bashir.
