A question that Mohamed Sid-Ahmed believes stands at the heart of the Palestinian problem: is Israel the state of all its citizens or that of its Jewish community only? Bush's endorsement of Sharon's negation of any right of return of Palestinian refugees to their original homes in what is now Israel represents a significant shift in US policy towards the issue. Before, Israel's position in refusing to grant Palestinian refugees the right to return to their original homes was tolerated not as a question of principle -- or of right -- but merely as an issue of practical convenience. Israel, because of its limited territory, could not accommodate the generations of Palestinians who have been expelled, displaced, or who have emigrated from Palestine since 1949. Following the Bush-Sharon summit meeting on 15 April, the negation of the Palestinian right of return has now become an Israeli right, on the grounds that Israel is a Jewish state -- moreover, the state of all the Jews in the world. This is a total reappraisal of the Palestinian problem, a tremendous shift in the American position that is no less dramatic than the 1917 Balfour Declaration promising a national home to the Jews in Palestine. What is at stake here is not only that the joint Bush-Sharon vision goes against numerous UN resolutions on the problem of Palestine, nor that it fails to address the fact that any withdrawal from Gaza should include guarantees to all concerned that evacuation will not be at the expense of a final settlement, in particular when it comes to borders and the right of return. More fundamentally, it raises questions about a notion that has for long been shrouded in ambiguity, namely, the notion of a "Jewish state". To call Israel a "Jewish" state is a misnomer as long as its population continues to be made up of two distinct communities: a Jewish community that claims to represent all Jews, not only those in Israel but throughout the world, and a Palestinian community whose members, or their parents, refused to emigrate and abandon the land to which they have always belonged. Israel can only claim this title if it succeeds in eliminating its Palestinian community altogether. Thus the relationship between the Jewish and any eventual Palestinian state will be based on mutual exclusion. That is the very opposite of the Middle East peace process which calls for the peaceful coexistence of both these states. A number of ideas has been put forward to overcome this stumbling block, notably avoiding mutual exclusion through the establishment of a binational Palestinian-Israeli state. However, after decades of peace efforts, starting with Kissinger's step-by-step approach in 1974, hostility between the two sides has risen to unprecedented heights. The situation today is worse than it has ever been. Exemplifying the depths to which the relationship between the protagonists has sunk is the security fence being constructed by Israel in the West Bank, along the lines of the Berlin Wall, to totally isolate the two communities from one another. The main obstacle in the way of breaking out of the impasse is Israel's insistence on clinging to the notion of a Jewish state. This point was clearly underscored by the prominent Arab Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, one of the first and most articulate proponents of a binational state. His proposal should be thoroughly examined before any steps are taken to implement the Bush- Sharon vision, which proceeds from the premise that Israel can be a racially "pure" Jewish state in a hostile Arab environment and that mutual exclusion can be reconciled with the promotion of a spirit of peace and mutual understanding. The problem is that in the current situation these goals can only be reached through the use of deterrence and force, not through negotiations between equal partners. Israel's construction of a barrier to separate itself from the Palestinians is a clear expression of racism. Israel was furious when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution equating Zionism with racism, and fought successfully to have it rescinded. Israel's actions have consistently belied its denial of the racist nature of its formative ideology but never more so than today when, with the blessing of the Bush administration, it is insisting on granting Jews exceptional privileges on the basis of ethnicity, deepening contradictions between Jews and non-Jews still further. In the final analysis, it is hard to see how the Bush administration can reconcile its Greater Middle East Initiative, which is being presented as a commitment to better the lot of peoples throughout the region and promote democracy and freedom for all, with its wholehearted support for a highly controversial political plan put forward by one of the protagonists in an acute conflict situation and roundly denounced by all the others. There is a clear contradiction here that severely tarnishes America's image as an honest broker in the search for a viable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the most glaring contradiction is between the way Bush treated Mubarak and the way he treated Sharon only 48 hours later. True, Mubarak was granted the "honour" of a trip to the presidential ranch in Texas, but the cordiality was more formal than real. After assuring his Egyptian guest that America remained committed to the roadmap, where the issue of refugees was to be kept for final status negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, Bush made a complete about face following his meeting with Sharon. Bush made no mention to Mubarak of his decision to limit the return of the Palestinian refugees to the Palestinian state (if and when it is created), and totally deny them the right of return -- despite UN Resolution 194 -- to what is now Israel. Mubarak openly admitted that the disclosure of this important shift in US policy towards the Palestinian problem came as a complete shock, as he had heard nothing to prepare him during his talks with Bush only two days earlier at their meeting in Texas. Egypt wanted to be sure that the pullout from Gaza would not be the last step but the first in a phased withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian territories. It is worth noting that the letters exchanged between Bush and Sharon -- which were redrafted several times to satisfy Sharon's demands -- did not contain a request from Bush that Israel withdraw its troops to the 1948 lines. The maximum Bush offered Mubarak was a promise not to abandon the roadmap and give a cautious acceptance to the withdrawal plan. In other words, the Bush-Mubarak negotiations did not provide any guarantees to the Palestinians that Israel's pullout from a number of settlements in Gaza will not be the last Israeli withdrawal, but one step in a continuous process along the lines fixed in the roadmap. This means that things will remain undecided as far as the roadmap is concerned. Two other issues dominated the talks between the two leaders, the Iraqi crisis and the Bush administration's call for the spread of democracy in the Middle East. In a way, the two are linked. A successful outcome in Iraq could produce the first fully democratic government in the Arab world, a development with far-reaching repercussions for the whole region. According to the BBC, there was some tough talking behind the scenes on the question of democratising the region. But both leaders were keen to present a united front on this issue. Describing Egypt as "a strategic partner", Bush said "Just as (it) has shown the way towards peace in the Middle East, it will set the standard in the region fro democracy by strengthening democratic institutions and political participation." President Mubarak responded with comments about Egypt's political reform programme, referring to the Alexandria Declaration as an important step forward. But he also expressed his apprehensions that turmoil in Gaza, especially after the assassination of Abdul-Aziz Al-Rantisi following that of Sheikh Yassin, could be a further source of instability in the region as a whole. America's refusal to condemn either killing and its adoption of the Sharon line without any reservations has severely compromised its role as a credible mediator in any future negotiations aimed at reaching a final settlement. International Response to the Bush Declaration on the Palestinian Right to Return
