As it prepares itself for the departure of the Israeli occupation forces, Gaza has paradoxically sunk into turmoil, writes Mohamed Sid-Ahmed When Sharon first announced his plan to withdraw from Gaza, sceptics accused him of playing to the gallery of international public opinion and dismissed the announcement as nothing more than a publicity ploy. Now, however, even they admit that he fully intends to push ahead with the plan, not in response to external pressures but because he believes it is in Israel's best interest to end its occupation of Gaza. Thus speculation is no longer focussed on the sincerity or otherwise of Sharon's intentions but has shifted to how Gaza will be administered following the departure of the Israeli occupation forces. Their departure will create a new reality on the ground; once again, the ball is in the Israeli court: Israel acts and the Arabs scramble to react. One of the reasons Sharon's decision to withdraw from Gaza and dismantle the Jewish settlements there was not taken seriously at first is that he has long been a champion of Israel's settler movement and instrumental in increasing the number of settlements in the occupied territories. But Sharon finally realised that Gaza was putting too great a strain on Israel's resources and that a tactical retreat was in order. After all, Gaza represents no more than 5.8 per cent of the total area of the occupied territories. 1.2 million Palestinians are crammed in 60 to 70 per cent of its land area, while 23 settlements housing 7500 Jewish settlers are spread over the remaining area. The obvious discrepancy between the two communities makes Gaza a time bomb that could explode at any time. Sharon realised that the problem of growing friction between Palestinians and Israelis in Gaza needed a radical solution. Hence his decision to totally separate the two communities by ending the Israeli military presence and dismantling the Jewish settlements in Gaza. His approach to the same problem in the West Bank has been to build a concrete barrier separating it from Israel proper. The International Court of Justice has ruled the wall illegal and called for its removal. By 180 votes against six and 10 abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution demanding that Israel comply with the ICJ ruling. But neither the ICJ ruling nor the UN resolution are binding and the US can use its veto to render both ineffective. Sharon's announcement of a unilateral Israeli pullout from Gaza has provoked a power struggle in the Palestinian Authority. The restoration of even a tiny bit of their occupied territories opened new horizons and provided an opportunity to settle scores and call various parties to account for their behaviour over the past period. It was at first believed that if a power struggle were to break out in the ranks of the Palestinians it was more likely to occur between the Palestinian Authority on the one hand and Hamas on the other, between Palestinians who have been trying to reach peace agreements with Israel and those who pursued the arms struggle. But the most intense struggle is being played out within the ranks of Fatah and the PA itself, between Arafat and some of his lieutenants, particularly those responsible for security who are regarded by many Palestinians as highly corrupt. Actually, Sharon's decision to pull out of Gaza should not be seen only as a defensive measure dictated solely by demographic and security considerations. It should also be seen as an offensive measure, a step in the direction of restructuring the region in the light of present global developments. While the decision seemed to open a window of opportunity, the dangerous struggle that broke out within the Palestinian security apparatus and has now spilled out into the Palestinian street casts a different light on the prospective Israeli evacuation. It also raises an important question: what or who prompted Sharon's decision to withdraw from Gaza? Why did a man who devoted his life to building settlements suddenly decide to dismantle them for no apparent reason? Palestinian militants who pursued the path of armed resistance to the Israeli occupation credit themselves with forcing the Israelis to withdraw, and are now ready to take on those who did not resist and who benefited from the sacrifices of others to enrich themselves and spread corruption. That is the root cause of the deep crisis which reached a peak in the recent days. The crisis appeared to have been defused when Arafat agreed to relinquish some of his prerogatives. It is not clear what finally persuaded him to make this move. In addition to mounting internal pressure, the Palestinian leader was facing pressure from external forces, including the European Union, whose high commissioner for foreign and security policies, Javier Solana, hinted that the EU would "reconsider" its financial support to the Palestinian Authority if prime minister, Ahmed Qurei was ousted. Colin Powell and Tony Blair also stepped into the fray, calling on Arafat to transfer control of the security forces to Qurei as a condition for activating the roadmap. Although Arafat has responded to most of Qurei's demands, the power struggle is far from over and promises to become even more intense after the disengagement plan is put into effect. Following the Israeli pullout, an altogether new entity will come into being, one that is neither a Palestinian state nor part of the occupied territories. In a bid to avoid the negative repercussions a security vacuum in the Gaza Strip would have on Israel, Sharon is trying to convince Egypt that it has a common interest in securing the border area between the two states, in other words, that it has an interest in reverting to the pre-1967 situation. Sharon would like to see Egypt become a shield to protect Israel from Palestinian "terrorism" instead of a shield to protect the Palestinians from Israeli oppression, as well as a shield to ensure that Israel would not be seen as the defeated party as it withdraws. Thus instead of embarking on a path towards an overall settlement, Sharon would have Egypt side with the stronger party, Israel, against the weaker, Palestine, in implementing Israel's plans for the future. Sharon is trying to impose a fait accompli which would transform the two-state slogan into something concrete, albeit the very opposite of what was meant by the slogan. His unilateral disengagement plan, to be implemented, as the name suggests, without any coordination with the Palestinians, while apparently based on the total separation between the two sides, is actually based on the total subordination of one by the other. Moreover, his insistence on identifying Palestinian resistance with terrorism justifies his systematic campaigns against the Palestinians, in preparation for their collective expulsion in what is euphemistically called "the transfer". Sharon has said that the security fence, "as it has been constructed can be dissembled, and this, in the final analysis, will depend on the conduct of the Palestinians". But as it can be disassembled so too can it be reinforced and expanded. It is a flexible structure that can be moved to either widen or limit the area returned to the Palestinians and to fix the Palestinian borders according to Sharon's wishes. We thus move from a no-state situation to a state covering an area smaller than Gaza and less than that envisaged in the Oslo accord, and, moreover, one that is physically separated from East Jerusalem. Even if we assume that these would not be the final borders, a situation will have been created that will make future negotiations to implement the two-state solution futile. Then comes the issue of how to accommodate the American version of the Palestinian state to the Israeli version of that state. The Bush administration has not committed itself to any physical link to Jerusalem, or to any specific configuration of its borders. Therefore there is nothing in principle to oppose the Israeli version of that state. Moreover, precedents established in the Iraqi case, such as assuming that sovereignty is not violated by the presence of foreign troops on national soil, can help overcome some of the difficulties standing in the way of an Israeli solution to the Palestinian problem.
