Mohamed Sid-Ahmed examines the Middle East situation after the Sharm El-Sheikh and Aqaba summit meetings The Sharm El-Sheikh and Aqaba summits have introduced a new dynamic to the Palestinian problem, not to say a whole new political game played by altogether different rules. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of this new game is that the direct protagonists in the conflict have become four. Two of them, Sharon and Abu Mazen, have accepted the conditions put forward by US President Bush, and have made statements which were assessed as "appropriate" to resume negotiations. The other two protagonists, namely, the Israeli settlers on the one hand, and Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade on the other, are threatening to scuttle the roadmap by all possible means, including violence, a threat that has already materialised with last Sunday's coordinated attack on an Israeli checkpoint by militants from all three Palestinian organisations. The hands-on approach Bush has suddenly decided to adopt towards the Palestinian problem seems to be part of a new strategy going beyond the Middle East proper. The Sharm and Aqaba summits were just two of a series of high-level back-to-back international meetings in which the US president played a central role. Capitalising on his "victories" in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush is now seeking international recognition of America's status as custodian of world order. The message behind his recent flurry of activities is that the time has come to take stock of the situation, to evaluate where we stand and where we go from here and to endorse America's right to determine the course of events in future. Significantly, his bid to legitimise his country's unilateralist approach to global issues was made not through the institutions of international legitimacy like the United Nations and the Security Council, but through institutions of questionable legitimacy, such as the G-8 summit in Evian, whose authority derives from the economic and political clout of its members and their ability to impose their will on the rest of the world. Indeed, the Bush administration seems intent on sidelining the United Nations, first with Iraq and now with the roadmap. Initially put forward by the Quartet, it was hijacked by the US, which has replaced the United Nations as the guarantor of its implementation. Although the Palestinian problem stands at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was never before addressed in isolation from the other elements of the conflict, but always in the context of an approach aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including, in particular, the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese- Israeli tracks. Abandoning this holistic approach, the roadmap concentrates only on the Palestinian problem and totally ignores Syria and Lebanon. Fearing a repeat performance of the Iraq scenario if the standoff between the two countries and Israel is allowed to fester, France has come forward with the idea of another roadmap for Syria and Lebanon. Failure to reach a negotiated settlement of these two thorny elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict raises the spectre of another military conflagration in the region. In the name of his war on terror, Bush has already invaded Afghanistan, to root out the Al-Qa'eda network, and Iraq, to dismantle its alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Although America scored a military victory in both wars (even if it failed to achieve the objectives for which it had gone to war in the first place), Bush is aware that two consecutive military offensives against two Islamic countries could make Muslims around the world perceive his war against terrorism and WMD's as a war against Islam and pan-Arabism. To diffuse a looming crisis, he came up with the idea of announcing the creation of an independent Palestinian state existing side by side with Israel. The Aqaba summit was held to set the process in motion, after replacing Arafat by Abu Mazen as the effective head of the Palestinian Authority and coercing Sharon into announcing his acceptance of the roadmap. However, the Israeli acceptance of the roadmap is closer to a ticking timebomb than it is to a wholehearted endorsement. Not only was it conditioned by 14 reservations, but by a number of other obstacles hindering the map's implementation. The most important of these obstacles is an issue related to the relationship between the two states. Sharon insists that mutual recognition between them be based not on the Palestinian's recognising Israel in exchange for the recognition of the Palestinian state, but on a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in exchange for recognition of the Palestinian state. This addition is designed to prevent Israel from becoming the state of all its citizens, including its non-Jewish citizens. Moreover, Israel should not only be a Jewish state, but also the state of all Jews in the world, because, according to Israeli law, every Jew who sets foot on Israeli soil automatically acquires Israeli nationality. And this is a right that no non-Jew should be allowed to enjoy. The prominent Israeli-Arab Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, has spearheaded a vigorous campaign calling for the equal treatment of Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens, but to no avail -- the Israeli authorities continue to treat Israel's Arabs as second-class citizens. A few days ago, Sharon issued a statement for the first time describing Israel's presence in Gaza and the West Bank as an occupation and admitting that Israel could not indefinitely continue to occupy Palestinian cities like Ramallah, Bethlehem and Nablus. But he quickly pulled back under pressure from the ultra-right-wing members of his Likud-led coalition government. The statement may have been a test balloon launched by Sharon to gauge the reaction of the various parties and to assess how far he could go to accommodate the Bush administration's demands concerning the roadmap, but what is certain is that he went back to his traditional stand that the Palestinian occupied territories are actually contested territories, and that Palestinian claims to the contrary are not binding on Israel. In the aftermath of the Aqaba summit, Bush declared that basic changes are underway in the Middle East, beginning with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and continuing with the appointment of Abu Mazen as prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. Bush has appointed a monitoring committee which, under the direction of an American, will supervise changes on the ground. The committee will be accountable to Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, as personal representatives of the US president. The Israeli and Palestinian sides are far from being on an equal footing when it comes to the obligations each is required to perform under the roadmap. The Palestinians are committed to ending the military Intifada and to pursuing their struggle only by peaceful means until their state comes into being. The future Palestinian state is required to adopt a democratic line, to build institutions, and to undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt and restrain individuals and groups inciting to violence against Israelis anywhere. The Arab parties are required to commit themselves to peace with Israel along the lines defined by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, unanimously adopted by the Beirut Arab summit in 2002. All these requests, however, have been completely rejected by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which have declared that they will not lay down their arms until the very last inch of Palestinian territory has been liberated. Israel has been required to agree in principle to the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and to express its readiness to have normal relations with its neighbours. Israel is also required to immediately remove the settlements established during Sharon's tenure. But the latter has only agreed to remove what he calls "unauthorised outposts", which amount to no more than 20 trailer encampments. As Arafat correctly pointed out, Sharon's stand remains fundamentally unchanged. Despite his minimal concessions, more than 10 thousand settlers demonstrated in Jerusalem, chanting slogans accusing Sharon of "surrendering shamefully to Palestinian terrorism". It is Abu Mazen, not Sharon who, as highlighted by the British media, is facing a real challenge that could end his political career before it begins, especially now that he has announced his determination to end the Intifada and uproot terrorism. Sharon is running no such risk, because he has in no way exposed Israel's security to any danger or so-called "painful" decision. Then there is Arafat, who was not invited to the two summits but who has not lost his hold on many Palestinian activists. He still enjoys wide popularity beyond the borders of Palestine. Even ministers in the Abu Mazen government believe that Arafat's approval is essential for the successful implementation of any agreement reached with the Israelis. The question is whether Arafat has any incentive to approve deals struck by the man appointed to replace him. On the other hand, should the disagreement between Abu Mazen and Arafat be allowed to determine the course of events in the region?
