Has the Sharm El-Sheikh summit introduced fundamental changes to the Middle East equation or are the protagonists still unable to throw off the shackles of the past, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed The main purpose of last Tuesday's Sharm El-Sheikh summit was to test the balance of power between the Israelis and the Palestinians after four years of the second Intifada with a view to translating their respective negotiating positions into mutual obligations that can regulate the relationship between them. The question is whether Sharon has emerged as the only winner or whether the outcome reflects the aspirations of both parties. The fact that the summit was held despite the unprecedented degree of hostility between Palestinians and Israelis carries an implicit message that the two sides are moving towards a minimum degree of mutual confidence which is reflected in their renewed attempt to reach a contractual agreement. The clear inference to be drawn from the Sharm El-Sheikh summit is that both sides have come to realise the importance of placing their relationship within some sort of contractual framework; in other words, they consider that reaching an agreement, even with the concessions this necessarily involves, to be a lesser evil than leaving their relationship at the mercy of random developments. The participation of President Mubarak and King Abdullah at the first summit between Abu Mazen and Sharon can give the wrong impression that it is similar to the one held, also in Sharm El-Sheikh, in June 2003. That meeting, which was attended by Bush but not by Sharon, was aimed at officially consecrating the US-sponsored roadmap for peace, which provided for the creation of a Palestinian state side by side with Israel. Bush's absence from the summit this time around made it closer to bilateral Israeli-Palestinian talks than to a multilateral summit. The idea of holding the summit came up during a recent meeting between the head of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, and Sharon, at a time unofficial talks were underway between the Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz and the former Gaza security chief Mohamed Dahlan, a rising star in the Palestinian political firmament. Sharon's decision to meet with Abu Mazen seemed to signal a shift from the position that led him to construct a security barrier around the Palestinian territories. The barrier is designed to ensure the complete physical separation between the occupying power, Israel, and the people resisting that occupation, the Palestinians, in ways that threaten the security of their Israeli overlords. Perhaps Sharon now sees that the complete isolation of the Palestinians might not be the ideal solution and that some form of give and take is unavoidable. Categorising an entire people as terrorists and dismissing their legitimate aspirations for a homeland of their own as nothing more than a security threat might make Israel safer in the short term, but a more comprehensive approach is required to ensure their security in the long term. The demands of the two sides are centred on a number of issues. Israel's main demand, of course, is an immediate and complete ceasefire by Palestinian factions. Once that demand is met, Israel will withdraw from Jericho then from four other West Bank towns, including Ramallah, Bethlehem and Tulkarm, with at least a fortnight separating one withdrawal from the next. The Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors will be returning to Tel-Aviv if the summit proves to be successful. But in order to meet Israel's demand for a cessation of violence, the Palestinians will have to renounce what the UN Charter recognises as their legitimate right to engage in resistance against occupation forces illegally occupying their territory. Moreover, this does not mean that in counterpart the Israeli side will renounce its "right" to resort to violence any time it deems the Palestinians to be in breach of their commitments. The Palestinians are pressing for the release of Palestinian detainees held in Israeli jails. But after intense negotiations, Israel has agreed to release only 900 of the 8000 prisoners it holds. Like its planned withdrawals from the West Bank, Israel will release the prisoners in a phased process, 500 in the next few days and 400 at a later date that has not been decided yet. Although Abu Mazen expressed the "hope" that prisoners who have served the longest prison terms would be released first, his hope did not materialise. Clearly the Palestinian side has no say when it come to determining the identity of the prisoners to be set free or the timing of their release. The most prominent Palestinian in Israeli custody is of course, Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five consecutive life sentences on charges of inciting terrorism. Abu Mazen owes a great deal to Barghouti who, after presenting himself as a candidate in the Palestinian elections, decided to withdraw his candidacy for fear that it would cause deep divisions within the PLO. Abu Mazen should repay his debt to Barghouti by insisting that the question of his release is addressed in the negotiations between the two sides. The Israelis were adamant on excluding such vital issues as Jerusalem, the Palestinian right of return, the security fence (still under construction) and the roadmap from the discussions in Sharm El-Sheikh. As no genuine peace can be envisaged in the absence of a serious discussion of these highly sensitive issues, the fact that they were sidelined only confirms that the entire process is aimed more at testing the Palestinians than at reviving a peace process. As to the Palestinians, their main demand was a complete Israeli withdrawal from, and the complete dismantling of, all Jewish settlements in the Gaza strip. In response to Abu Mazen's declaration that the Palestinian announcement of a ceasefire should be met by a similar announcement on Israel's part, Israeli Vice-Prime Minister Shimon Peres issued a statement expressing his hope that the Palestinian ceasefire would bring an end to violence altogether. Does this mean that he has received no assurance from Sharon that Israel intends to observe the ceasefire? The Sharm El-Sheikh summit was the highest level round of talks between the two sides since Sharon came to power. Bush welcomed the beginning of reforms and democracy in Palestinian territories and committed himself to supporting both parties in their effort to advance peace. He announced that he had asked Congress for 350 million dollars to strengthen the political, economic and security reforms in Palestinian territories. Sharon's participation in the summit marks his first visit to Egypt since he took power in February 2001. The White House described Sharon's invitation as an "encouraging step". This cautious endorsement seemed to indicate that Washington supported the summit but held out no great hopes for its success. It probably also explains why Condoleezza Rice did not attend the summit even though she was already in the region at the time. Or was it that Bush deliberately downplayed the importance of the summit to blunt the edge of Israel's internal opposition, especially on the far right led by Netanyahu against Sharon? Alternatively, was Condoleezza Rice absent from the summit because Sharon prefers to hold talks directly with Mubarak rather than through Washington? Moreover, what are the chances of success of an Israeli Palestinian summit at a time the situation in Iraq is still unstable and shrouded in confusion, despite President Bush's protestations to the contrary? There is, of course, the issue of promoting Israeli Palestinian cooperation officially, for the benefit of both parties, whatever the differences over the final form of Israel's withdrawal. Egypt also has a role to play in reducing the tensions between Palestinians and Israelis, taking into consideration that Palestinians have no outlet to the external world without passing through Israel. Sharon has warned against excessive optimism. Indeed, one act of violence is enough to bring down the whole edifice of peace- building. Sharon calls for small, gradual, measures, displaying a lack of confidence in the process; Abu Mazen is for a comprehensive package deal. Egypt is closer to the Palestinian approach. What should we expect?
