The outcry following a new poll conducted among Palestinian refugees leads Mohamed Sid-Ahmed to call for more openness The Middle East situation has deteriorated to the point where serious consideration must be given to any new idea, however controversial, that can break the vicious cycle of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Even the most unconventional approaches to the problem must not be rejected out of hand, no taboos must be allowed to stand in the way of exploring every avenue that can lead us out of the quagmire. There seemed to be cause for optimism in the meeting last week between Bush and Abu Mazen, which was followed on Tuesday by a meeting between the US president and Sharon, as well as in the meeting between Abu Mazen and Sharon last month. But the meetings have produced no significant changes so far, with both parties clinging to positions that are not very different from their traditional ones. Clearly then it is time to expand the search for a breakthrough by moving beyond these traditional positions and considering new ideas without being exposed to accusations of treason and capitulation. An idea should be accepted or rejected on its own merits, not because it emanates from this or that party. Moreover, to consider an idea is not necessarily to accept it; opening the door to arguments in favour and against its adoption makes for a broader perspective and stimulates a fresh approach to the problem under consideration. Advancing one idea in opposition to another is the best way to promote new ideas and to overcome their deficiencies and shortcomings. However, not everyone is hospitable to new ideas. The Committee to Promote National Unity in Defence of the Palestinian Right of Return (CPNUDPRR) criticised the results of a recent poll conducted by the Centre for Political and Demographic Studies (CPDS) headed by a well- known Palestinian analyst, Dr Khalil Shikaki. The CPNUDPRR is a committee under incorporation in Gaza which brings together prominent national and Islamist figures, as well as members of the National Council, the Legislative Council and a number of independent personalities. The committee attacked the poll as aiming to "propagate the American-Israeli position in the Camp David negotiations held in the summer of 2000 on the Palestinian refugee problem". In a recent statement, the CPNUDPRR concluded that Shikaki's centre was part of a vicious campaign seeking to wring concessions from the Palestinians on the refugee question. According to Shikaki's findings, while a sweeping majority of Palestinians insist that Israel must recognise the right of return in principle, the big surprise was that most refugees are prepared to accept "creative solutions" when it comes to implementing that right. In publishing his findings, Shikaki laid himself open to charges of treason and capitulation. The CPNUDPRR accused him of "basing his findings on a poll he conducted among Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan in the aim of falsifying the positions of the refugees, and leading them to waive their right of return, which, together with independence, is the cornerstone of their right to self-determination. The real purpose of his study is to affect public opinion, to describe the right of return as unrealistic and to deliver a message to the decision-making centres in the world that the Palestinian people are ready to give in on the refugee problem as a fait accompli..". Polls, of course, can be treacherous, and can, in the wrong hands, be used to manipulate public opinion by tailoring their findings to fit given agendas. In any case, my aim is not to defend Shikaki or contribute to the campaign he is now conducting in the United States to familiarise wide audiences with his findings. Neither is it my aim to confirm the findings and discuss to what extent they genuinely represent the opinions of the Palestinians. It is, rather, to argue that if -- hypothetically -- his findings are right, this could eventually open a door to a negotiating position which should be made available to the public at large, to accept or reject, and not to ignore or dismiss in an irresponsible manner. Shikaki's findings attracted the attention of Richard Murphy, the veteran American diplomat and senior fellow at the American Council on Foreign Relations, who supported Dr Shikaki in an article he wrote jointly in The New York Times with David Mack, vice-president of the Middle East Institute. In their view, the visits by Abu Mazen and Sharon to Washington, "plus the presence in Washington of a Palestinian researcher with some encouraging findings" provided an opportunity to revive the peace process by addressing the most contentious issues. "Of all the problems confronting the peace process," they maintain that "none have proved more paralysing than the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian position on the right of return of the 1948 refugees." The authors believe both problems can be resolved "through a judicious combination of money and diplomacy". For the problem of Israeli settlements, "An American pledge to underwrite the construction of houses for the resettlement of Israeli settlers within Israel can be a significant contribution to the problematic issue of settlements. Israeli polling has shown that 80 per cent of the settlers are 'economic settlers' who moved into the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 to enjoy better and highly subsidised housing. If fairly compensated with comparable housing, they could be brought to resettle." Moving on to the question of Palestinian right of return, they propose that the pledge "could be coupled with a challenge to other donors to help fund the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees either in the new state of Palestine or in third countries. Israel would also enhance its role as a good neighbour by leaving the housing and infrastructure of the settlements intact for refugees as it relocates its own citizens into secure housing in Israel." But there are good reasons to believe, as the CPNUDPRR does, that the Murphy-Mack proposal favours the Israelis over the Palestinians, if only because the final borders of the Palestinian state are not defined. As Abu Mazen showed Bush on the map, the proposed area of the Palestinian state is only 22 per cent of the historical land of Palestine. In the face of this reality, the Palestinians can adopt one of two courses towards Shikaki's findings: one is to reject them as misrepresenting the Palestinian position and to accuse him of playing the game of the Americans and the Israelis; the other is to take advantage of the surprise results of the poll and relate it to conditions that would reinforce their negotiating position. If they adopt the latter course, the Palestinians would be adopting a line of conduct often followed by their opponents, who avoid saying "no" whenever they can say "yes, but". The Palestinians should make their acceptance contingent on conditions that, if implemented, would reflect a total change in the balance of power between the protagonists. For instance, in negotiating the size of their state, the Palestinians should insist that it conform to the area envisaged in the initiative put forward by Saudi Prince Abdullah and later unanimously adopted by the Beirut Arab summit. At the time, all the parties concerned, including the Western parties, welcomed the Saudi initiative, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab land occupied in 1967, in exchange for all Arab countries normalising their relations with Israel. The initiative was based on a tradeoff: the normalisation by all Arab countries of their relations with Israel in exchange for the latter's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. The reason it was so well received in the West was because it called on all Arab countries to normalise their relations with Israel and certainly not because it also called for Israel's complete withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory in 1967. On the question of withdrawal, the West is usually silent, or at least equivocal. The Arab negotiating position will be greatly strengthened if Western countries clearly affirm their commitment to the Saudi initiative as a whole, including the provisions requiring Israel's total withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders. The Shikaki initiative could be a means to test the Western position on this vital issue, not in what concerns total normalisation of relations only but also total withdrawal. It could be argued that, according to the roadmap, the final borders of the Palestinian state are to be determined in the final stage of the negotiations process. But the roadmap is not designed to complicate this process. It is a catalyst aimed at helping the process move forward. The Murphy-Mack article proposed that the issue be raised in the present round of negotiations with President Bush, regardless of the roadmap. Any settlement presupposes the restructuring of contradictions between the protagonists. It replaces hostile relations by mutually beneficial ones and gives primacy to the interests the protagonists have in common over those on which they are in conflict. This means that a settlement presupposes a reshuffling of priorities. If Shikaki's findings are genuine, and a choice has to be made, it would mean -- in the light of the new rationale -- that priority in any settlement should be given to the restitution of all Arab territory occupied in 1967 over an implementation of the right of return. At the end of the day, however, only the Palestinians can decide how the right is to be implemented.
