Justice for Palestinians, including resolution of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees, can best be achieved after self-determination on the basis of the two-state solution, write Ezzedine Choukri Fishere and Omar Dajani In 2001, Israelis and Palestinians turned away from negotiations. Their differences seemed insurmountable and the alternatives to talks seemed beguiling: many Israelis advocated "letting the IDF win", while many Palestinians hoped a deeper crisis would prompt the international community to intervene to rescue them. Following seven years in which the situation has grown worse in every respect imaginable, the parties find themselves again having virtually the same conversations about the same issues. And faced again with a fractured Israeli coalition and with contentious arguments about the future of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees, voices on each side are calling upon the parties to quit -- to turn away from negotiations. By most accounts, Sisyphus's cycle seems poised to continue. But it need not. It is our hope that the Israeli government will at last make a proposal worthy of serious consideration by the Palestinians. Even if it does not, however, the Palestinians cannot resign themselves merely to rejecting the offers placed before them. Instead, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) must muster the courage to articulate a bold vision of its own for a two-state solution, one that is both clear and capable of realisation. Moreover, it must use every available tool to ensure that the implementation of that vision begins now, not in some hypothetical future. For, if past is prologue, we fear that by that point Palestinians and Israelis will find themselves in a corner from which they cannot both emerge unscathed. Obviously, a comprehensive peace agreement remains the preferable option. But if it is not possible to reach agreement on the thorny issues of Jerusalem and refugee return in the current circumstances, what are the options available to the Palestinian leadership? The first option -- and, in the short run, perhaps the easiest -- is to insist on a comprehensive agreement, signing nothing with the current Israeli coalition government and waiting for it to fall. The general elections that follow will yield one of two results. In the best-case scenario, the new government that forms next summer will be a centrist coalition amenable to resuming talks. If that happens, we will have wasted a year, with further deterioration of the situation on the ground and the attendant suffering, before returning to the place where we find ourselves now. What is more likely, according to opinion polls, is the electoral triumph of a right- wing coalition led by Netanyahu. Such an outcome will spell the end of even the halting peace negotiations we have witnessed over the last year. If a new US administration is determined to push for a new deal, Netanyahu will dedicate himself to bickering with the Americans about minutiae while settlements continue to expand and even greater pressure is placed on the Arab character of Jerusalem. And then, in the very best of scenarios, we return to negotiations yet again, but in circumstances that make achieving the two-state solution even more difficult than it is now. A second alternative, much discussed these days, is abandoning the two-state solution altogether in favour of a struggle for a single, bi-national state. We will take up the efficacy of that strategy at greater length another time, but a few points bear emphasising now: first, it is reckless to advocate such an option merely to scare Israelis into a better deal. The questions it raises should be carefully and soberly considered. For example, is the abandonment of the goal of Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip more likely to hasten Palestinians' return to Jaffa, Haifa, and West Jerusalem, or Israeli Jews' further settlement of Hebron, "Shechem" and East Jerusalem? Second, while we agree that the establishment of a single democratic state in mandate Palestine is ultimately a worthy goal, we believe that it is most likely to be achieved if both peoples feel equally self- confident and strong. In our view, that obliges the establishment of an independent Palestinian state first. Creating circumstances in which the parties are left with no alternative other than a one state solution will pose a challenge not only to Zionism, but also to Palestinian self-determination. Moreover, it seems naïve to presume either that Israelis will be persuaded, in the context of civil strife, to embrace a solution that they have long regarded as a prelude to genocide or that attempting to convince the international community to impose it on them will be more successful now than during the decades when it was the PLO's stated objective. Under any of the scenarios we have just described, the long wait for a political settlement seems likely to increase the burdens on the Palestinian Authority. When it collapses, as it surely will, there will be space for the ascendance of the only other coherent political force on the Palestinian scene, Hamas. And whether the Palestinians then opt for armed resistance or a mediated tahdia, or ceasefire, what seems likely to follow is some unsteady form of cohabitation based on the twin visions of Israel's unilateral disengagement and Hamas' hudna, or truce. None of these outcomes is cheerful. And, more importantly, none does much to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people or to halt the steady assault upon their patrimony. But it is possible to avoid them if we cease to regard failure in negotiation as our unavoidable fate. The Arab world managed briefly to transcend its torpor and aversion to risk by advancing a peace offensive in 2006/2007 based on its peace initiative of 2002. That prompted a return to negotiation after years when the Palestinian cause was merely a sideshow in the war against terrorism. The Palestinians can also take the initiative at this critical juncture. In our view, this initiative should have three related premises: first, a clear and decisive conviction that the two-state solution is vital to the Palestinian people and their future; second, an acceptance of the principle that what cannot be fully achieved need not be fully abandoned, with the qualification that concessions should not be made if they would prejudice the fundamental rights of Palestinians; and, third, the need to jolt both sides back onto a genuine course of peace-building. We are not advocating a retreat from the Palestinians' longstanding substantive positions on any of the issues in contention in the peace talks. We do believe, however, that the issues that seem least amenable to resolution right now -- Jerusalem and refugee return to Israel -- may be deferred without prejudicing Palestinian fundamental rights. With respect to Jerusalem, an agreement allocating sovereignty and control over the Holy City may be postponed so long as Israel is prepared to commit to the following: 1. The continuation of negotiations, with participation of members of the UN Security Council and representatives of Arab states and the Vatican, and a defined timeframe for completion; 2. The suspension, pending a negotiated agreement, of policies regarding residency and housing construction that have the aim or consequence of altering the ethnic balance of the city; 3. Facilitation of Palestinian access to the city, including guaranteed access to holy sites, and; 4. The establishment of an international mechanism charged with verifying compliance with each of these commitments. Similarly, without abandoning the refugees' recognised rights, the parties can begin facilitating the resettlement of refugees who choose to live within the territory of the Palestinian state or in a willing third state. In addition, the parties can begin work on the institutional arrangements required to deliver compensation for all refugees. An agreement regarding the fate of refugees who seek to return to homes in what is now Israel could then be pursued in tandem with agreement regarding Jerusalem. Lest we appear naïve ourselves, we should add that we entertain no illusions about Israel's likely response to these proposals. But a proactive stance of this kind by the PLO would give all those genuinely committed to a two-state solution something to embrace: it would return the initiative to the Palestinian and Arab side and offer the world a balanced, reasonable position that would be difficult to dismiss. At the same time, it has the potential to avoid prejudicing the established rights of the Palestinian people while enabling them finally to realise the most consequential among them -- the right of self-determination on their own sovereign territory. Ezzedine Choukri Fishere is an Egyptian writer and professor of international relations at the American University in Cairo. Omar Dajani is a professor of law at the University of the Pacific and former legal advisor to the PLO's Negotiation Unit.
