The bigger test for Egyptian democracy lies in the People's Assembly elections in November. It is unlikely that the ruling party will cede power easily, writes Khalil El-Anani* Just where is Egypt heading on its "path towards democracy"? This question poses itself to those observing preparations for the parliamentary elections scheduled to begin on 8 November. The question can be attributed to the fact that the upcoming elections might well be the real test of maturity for Egypt's democratic experience, due to the scale of parliamentary representation, the increased competition between all parties, and the complete judicial supervision of all stages of the electoral process. Since the holding of Egypt's first presidential elections on 7 September, the country has witnessed growing debate over the future of the democratic process. People are questioning whether these elections will be akin to a Trojan horse in rationalising the political equation between the ruling regime and the opposition, or whether they represent the end of the road. Perhaps the most significant consequences of the presidential elections were that they struck at the Egyptian political body previously believed to be comatose. They awakened all of its nerve endings, enabling it to move in its entirety (the ruling regime and opposition). They also played a role in transporting political debate from the kitchens of the ruling authority and opposition to every Egyptian home. And thus the equation of change, regardless of its extent, grew closer to being realised rather than being relegated as a mere daydream. The real dilemma facing all parties now, and particularly the ruling authority, is how to build on these elections to set the country free on a "real" democratic journey. Halting at these elections as a "final scene" and "historical event" in an unfolding logic of satisfaction would destroy any hope of change in the future. Without generalising, what happened was simply a test of the Egyptian regime's ability to work with the demands of the critical period the country is now passing through. The elections were nothing more than the visible peak of an iceberg. They were the final result of processes of transformation and interaction that have taken place within the regime over the last year, the product of a "new" experience in Egyptian rule. Perhaps the regime succeeded, through holding these elections, to draw on the state of suffocation the Egyptian street has felt over the last year, in particular due to the weakened performance of its government. Yet it certainly did not offer a full response to the demands of the street, not in refusal, but due to fear of the unknown in rushing towards change and the possible negative effects it might wreak on the entire experience. Yet this logic has lost its attractiveness, for the regime now feels more reassured than it did on the eve of 7 September, and this is evidence of vitality more than it is of weakness or confusion. Removing legitimacy from its traditional cloak and making it pass through ballot boxes (despite the electoral experience's flaws and significant popular abstention) has brought outstanding support for the regime. It will force it to keep the campaign promises it made in order to wear the title of representative of the "majority". This legitimacy will not be weakened by mere talk of political reform that can be overcome by bureaucratic obstacles. Rather, it brings with it a real change in the people's sense that the electoral experience has inaugurated something new. The significance of this "new" kind of legitimacy, the "legitimacy of ballot boxes", is that it provides new support for the winning candidate. It also forms a good indicator of the regime's ability to open up to others and deal with them as rivals preparing to take its place and not merely as mercenaries who will trace their steps back following election results. Therefore the street does not expect political "apostasy" after all that has been realised during the last months on political and security fronts. It does not expect the newly legitimised regime to harass the opposition, shake the throats of those who seek to continue the quest for change, or shrink from carrying out the substantial promises made by the winning candidate in his electoral platform. If we are on the verge of discovering the state of democracy in Egypt on the eve of the upcoming parliamentary elections, it is useful to understand the position of the political parties and currents preceding the last parliamentary elections in 2000. It is beneficial to determine the extent of change anticipated and whether the recent presidential elections made a real change in the political life of Egypt or not. The 2000 parliamentary elections saw a clear setback for the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) in the face of the "appearance" of independent candidates. NDP supporters only won 172 of parliament's 444 elected seats (another 10 are appointed to make a total of 454), or a mere 38.7 per cent. The only thing that saved the NDP from this critical situation was bringing the 216 winning independents into the fold of the NDP following the elections. This was a strong indicator of the NDP's weakness, particularly among the grassroots, and it alerted the NDP leadership to the necessity of immediately commencing the process of developing the party's infrastructure and agenda. The competition in the 2000 parliamentary elections was essentially limited to the NDP and independents. The opposition parties only won 17 seats, or 3.7 per cent of parliament. The Wafd Party, one of the country's largest, won seven seats, the Tagammu Party won six, the Nasserist Party won three, and the Ahrar Party won only one seat. The remaining 11 opposition parties at the time did not win any seats at all. This greatly limited the democratic experience and forewarned of the possibility of this being repeated in the upcoming elections. The situation may seem different for the 2005 parliamentary elections, particularly as concerns the form of political competition, although it may not in fact differ much in terms of the expected parliamentary makeup. The NDP, despite the mistakes of the 2000 elections, is now attempting to strengthen its "grassroots" forces by amending its bylaws to allow for the selection of its parliamentary candidates through an "electoral assembly" as proof of the party's internal democracy. It also is attempting to benefit from the "intermarriage" between the party and state institutions to entice votes for party candidates. This method may grant it a winning percentage of between 70-80 per cent of parliament's seats if it allies with the independents. The case is not much different for the main opposition parties (Wafd, Tagammu and Nasserist), for despite their agreement to form an opposition coalition to run in the parliamentary elections, including the Egyptian Movement for Change "Kifaya", there is no indication that they can turn voters' preferences towards the opposition candidates' platforms. Proof of this was provided by the presidential elections, in which the Wafd Party -- one of Egypt's most important political movements -- embarrassingly lost its confrontation with the NDP candidate and came in third place after the nascent Ghad Party's candidate Ayman Nour. It will also be difficult for the opposition coalition to put forth a list of candidates that covers all 222 electoral districts. Hussein Abdel-Razeq, secretary-general of the Tagammu Party, confirmed this when he announced the coalition's intent to field 150 parliamentary candidates. The Ghad Party, a new arrival to Egypt's political scene, does not have a real chance at competing with the NDP as much as it can resort to illegal methods such as purchasing votes or playing on the thread of dissatisfaction with the ruling party. There are also bureaucratic and procedural obstacles in the way of altering the political equation in parliament to the benefit of the opposition as happened in the 1987 elections when the opposition coalition won 100 seats. The most significant of these obstacles is the use of individual election methods rather than party lists. In practice this reduces the chances of party candidates and gives more opportunity to independents. Also significant are the mistakes that flaw electoral lists, and which appear on the eve of every election Egypt holds. The possible outcomes of the upcoming parliamentary elections can thus be summarised as follows. First, it is not expected that the political map will change in the future parliament. While NDP representation may decrease, it will not, in any case, lose its accustomed majority. More seats may be given to the opposition, but only as long as they do not threaten the NDP's strong position within parliament. Second, representation by the (banned) Muslim Brotherhood will increase, on the condition that the regime does not renege on opening up to, and flexibly dealing with, Brotherhood members. It has been customary for Brotherhood activists and candidates to be rounded up before elections. Third, the number of independents will increase, but they may be brought into the NDP after winning seats, as happened in the last parliamentary elections. The regime will not allow a bloc of opposition members and independents within parliament that exceeds 100 seats. This is to ward off any independent candidate from challenging the ruling party's nominee in the 2011 presidential elections. The amendment to Article 76 of the constitution stipulates that any independent candidate wishing to run for president must obtain 250 signatures from the members of local and popular councils, including 100 signatures from members of the People's Assembly. Perhaps it appears to some that there is currently a change of political mood taking place in the Egyptian street, although it doesn't go beyond a change on the surface. It is a change in the degree of activity among all players, but it has not yet reached the extent of changing the political products of state and society in Egypt. * The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
