Egypt displays all the symptoms of a defective democracy, writes Khalil Al-Anani* From the beginning of the 1980s to the early 1990s, the number of democracies in the world rose to 120 out of 192 nations, or 62.2 per cent. This is way up from 1974 when the figures stood at 39 states out of the then 145 nations, or just under 40 per cent. Little wonder the phenomenon is referred to as the "third wave of democracy". In the 1990s the wave slacked off with only two more countries -- Ukraine and Niger -- joining the fold. Of the countries that remained, some retained totalitarian systems akin either to the Stalinist model of the former Soviet Union or the German Nazi model of the 1930s. Others have attained various degrees of democratisation depending on local circumstances, and a good many of these remain in that grey area between democracy and autocracy. The term "defective democracy" has arisen precisely to refer to such systems of government. Six major indices can be used in ranking countries as defective democracies: restricted political competition, lack of commitment to civil liberties, the personalisation of political office, the absence of institutionalised checks on the exercise of power, the "apoliticisation" of the public, and a prevailing ethos among ruling elites that they are the saviours of the people. In 2001, 72.5 per cent of the 40 newly democratic countries were classified as defective democracies, the bulk located in Eastern Europe, Latin America and East Asia. Only three countries slid back into autocratic systems: Peru (between 1997 and 2000), Pakistan and Byelorussia. The most insidious aspect of a defective democracy is that rather than forming an interim state on the way to full democracy it projects itself as a government with all the authentic characteristics of a democracy. Worse is that many of those involved, including the people themselves, are convinced that this is true, that their governments are model democracies, especially when compared with the despotism that prevailed beforehand. How does Egypt fare with respect to the above mentioned criteria? Certainly there is evidence of transition, with some keen to portray it as a move to real democracy Over the past two years there has been an injection of some life into the once stagnant political scene. This new vibrancy, restricted as it is, raised widespread expectations of that a real breakthrough was possible, strengthening of the rule of law and institutionalising civil and political freedoms. President Mubarak's call for the amendment of 34 articles of the Egyptian constitution may have settled the debate over the radical constitutional overhaul demanded by some opposition parties and intellectuals, versus the partial reform advocated by supporters of the ruling party, but it left many unanswered questions regarding the nature and the ultimate intent of the amendments. The 34 articles can be divided into three categories. The first consists of those that require amendment in order to make them consistent with current practice. Focusing primarily on the economic and social functions of the state, they are 11 in number (articles 1, 4, 12.1, 24, 30, 33, 37, 56.2, 59, 73, and 180.1). The second category (articles 94, 115, 118. 127. 133, 136.1, 194, 195 and 205) addresses the relationship between the executive and legislative authorities while the remaining 14 articles (5, 62, 94, 74, 76, 82, 84, 85, 88, 138, 141, 161, 173 and 179) appear to be being amended to strengthen the position of the ruling elite There has been no dialogue among the various political forces over the proposed amendments. Rather, they have been produced by a single player in the field, the ruling party, which voids the amendment process of any "democratic" substance. The proposed amendments do not appear to offer the prospect of a substantive change in the form of government. Indeed, the opposite seems to apply: they are geared to further entrench the current executive system. Turning over the powers of the president to the prime minister in the event the presidency falls vacant, strengthens the hand of the executive over other branches of government; the amendment reflects a disdain for the principle of checks and balances. In spite of the NDP's claim that the purpose of some of the amendments is to strengthen the political party system they will once again stymie political life. The provisions intended to restrict the rights of independents to participate in the political process is meant to prevent Muslim Brotherhood members from fielding themselves in future elections. Tampering with Article 88 undermines the role of the judiciary as an impartial buffer between the executive and legislative authorities and, if anything, betrays an intent to compromise the integrity in the electoral process. The amendment process kept fails to address the most critical articles, notably Article 77 which designates the length and number of presidential terms, Article 35 which delineates the powers of the presidency, and Article 93 regarding the dismissal of members of parliament. Nor did it touch on the host of laws governing the exercise of political rights, the formation or dissolution of political parties, the freedom of the press and the autonomy of the judiciary. The prevailing attitude that these amendments are a kind of "gift" bestowed upon the people by the ruler betrays the lack of any sincere desire for political reform. This attitude forestalls any impetus the amendment process might lend towards substantial democratisation and renders the changes mere window dressing. Egypt, at present, falls neatly into the category of "pre-liberal democracies" that intends to perpetuate itself as such. The constitutional amendments were carefully spun in order to set the mold for the domestic political order of the future. Towards this end there is a "deal" in the making, between some of the major opposition parties and the ruling party. One can also detect a notable shift in the position of some independent forces, which are attempting to capitalise on the growing tensions between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood by lashing out against the latter. President Mubarak's remarks to Al-Usbou' magazine indicate the motives. The only segment that has not yet caved in to government pressure is the judiciary. Other recent developments also conflict with the suggestion that Egypt is undergoing a democratic transition, not least the refusal to license 12 political parties, among them the New Centre Party, which has been fighting for recognition for more than a decade. Beyond the systematic campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoys quasi-legitimacy by virtue of the fact that its members occupy 20 per cent of the seats in the People's Assembly, there is the ongoing government fear of freedom of the press, as exemplified by the refusal to license newspapers, such as Al-Badil (The Alternative), headed by a group of distinguished leftwing oriented intellectuals, that voice opinions critical of the status quo. Egypt is caught between two camps. One, steered by the NDP, seeks to reshape government in order to perpetuate its hold over the state. The other, spearheaded primarily by the Muslim Brotherhood, seeks to break the monopoly of the traditional players, as represented by the ruling party and other timeworn parties, and change the rules of play in order to obtain for itself a piece of the government pie. The public is waiting to see which of these two camps gains the upper hand in order to determine which side it will take. * The writer is a political analyst with Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
