Ballot boxes alone don't make a country democratic. It is the political culture that needs to be democratised, writes Khalil El-Anani* It is difficult to wager that Egypt is morphing towards democracy on the basis of the general elections now taking place. And yet it is useful to pause before some of the features of the undertaking the country is now experiencing, as a starting point to understanding what may take place in coming years. It is misguided to reduce the democratic experience in Egypt to the mere holding of general elections that some see as fair in comparison to their precedents. Reducing democratic activity to simply employing the right to vote is a true setback to the practical application of the concept of democracy, of which voting is but a final seal. And yet these elections have revealed, with their heated atmosphere and so many bets placed on them, the extent of the tribulations democracy is undergoing in Egypt on all levels -- among the elite and the masses alike. The features of these tribulations can be read through observing the positions of actors in the current election battle and their views regarding the "opening up" Egypt is now undergoing. Let us begin with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), some of whose leaders view reform as a means of survival more than a tool for firmly establishing democracy as one of the party's primary principles. The NDP entered the elections reliant on the support of its popularity "of millions" and covetous of achieving a comfortable majority in the upcoming parliament that would guarantee it the post of president in 2011. It did so in the belief that the annual conventions that have been held for the last three years have brought about the desired change and erased many of the entrenched negative impressions held towards the distasteful actions of some of its members, particularly among its base. The NDP planned to convene fair elections in comparison to previous polls and this was expected to bring several gains. The first and most important of these was to bridle the foreign pressure laying in wait for the regime's lapses. This pressure does not seek democracy as much as it is a manoeuvre between two players, each of whose interest is to weaken the other. Secondly, some among the new influential personalities in the NDP wished to direct a decisive kick in the face to well-known figures and do away with them in a legitimate manner via ballot boxes. This goal was partially realised in the first and second rounds of the elections. Thirdly, there was a desire to consecrate a "sophisticated" legitimacy for the "new" regime that would be able to gradually replace the worn out legitimacy of the July 1952 Revolution. This would provide safeguards for those rising within the party, most of whom are from the younger generation, who did not live through the revolution and therefore cannot easily cloak themselves in it. The NDP also sought to abort the real demands for change that had begun to spread, like an oil spill, by leaping above them. And finally, it sought a new shade of political opposition within parliament to be cut and stitched in a design that would not form a threat to the fundamental structure of the regime. At the same time, these new trimmings would suggest vitality and send the message home and abroad that real change was taking place in Egypt. The elections scenario took place on the basis of these interests. Without going into details of the results of rounds one and two, which revealed the extent of the split between the NDP and its base of "millions," the acts of violence and thuggery that took place and which resembled incidents in a banana republic, proved that there were shortcomings in both the vision and application of the concept of integrity and the impartial provision of security. It appears as though the NDP cannot shoulder the democratic ceiling it placed just before the elections when statements were issued by its highest leadership about a desire for a strong opposition within the upcoming parliament. With the first threat to the NDP's legitimacy, particularly following the shock of the Muslim Brotherhood garnering at least 20 per cent of seats by lowest estimates in the first round, some NDP supporters resorted to organised violence as a means to halt the Brotherhood wave, especially in the northern governorates. This prompted the remaining candidates, including those from the Muslim Brotherhood, to resort to the same crude tactics in response to NDP candidates. There was, of course, nothing surprising about the "shock" advancement of Muslim Brotherhood candidates. Their rise was logical as long as there was a certain degree of fairness and impartiality. Rather, the surprise was in the extent of losses the ruling party's candidates suffered after it wagered on remaining in the political scene without real competition or the sharing of power. Opposition parties represent the second aspect of the tribulations of democracy in Egypt. They are the real losers in the present stage, for they did not adequately prepare to enter the elections and likely did not expect for them to take place with such a reasonable degree of impartiality and integrity. And yet the problem as a whole is not in the weakness of the opposition's performance in itself as much as it is in the nature of the party system in Egypt. This system does not give opportunities to any party other than the NDP to underline its existence. Perhaps the opposition parties fell into mistakes that weakened the scope of their presence on the Egyptian street. But they were also subject to manoeuvres to purposely distance them, employed by a ruling party that has completely dominated the political scene for the last two decades. It is sufficient to note that a year ago they were not strong enough to organise "peaceful" demonstrations to clearly declare their positions, or to demand their constitutional rights, such as rights of assembly and freedom of expression amid a state-owned media. The shortcoming, then, was in the party system that did not produce leaderships attractive to the masses that would allow them to enter the political arena or present practical solutions to society's chronic problems. If the picture was reversed and the NDP were placed in the shoes of any other party it would have reached the same state of weakness the rest of the parties are in, particularly among their popular bases. It is strange that some reduce the opposition parties to the three major ones, the Wafd, Tagammu, and the Nasserists, as though there were not 15 other parties in Egypt. No one asked about some of the "shadow" parties that filled the world with clamour during the presidential elections held in September. As for the third side to the current tribulations of democracy, it is the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite its major victory in the elections, the present experience has proved its inability to shoulder the responsibility of a country the size of Egypt. It has reduced its dreams to merely gaining legitimacy through the existence of a political party that can represent its interests in parliament. It did not enter the elections in hope of bringing change -- particularly as it did not present anything new or different from that presented by candidates from other political forces, including the NDP -- as much as it did so out of a wish to present a challenge and prove its existence. It was a case of nearsightedness in that some of the Brotherhood's leadership believed that their parliamentary gains would form a source of power for them. In actuality, these gains present real challenges to be translated into a work programme based on a political foundation and not just the embodiment of the organisation's missionary goals. Democratic concepts such as freedom, pluralism and citizenship continue to be subject to discrepancies and distortions by the Brotherhood's leadership. Some have a skewed understanding of the meaning of a "secular state", and these dilemmas do not serve the interest of democratic transformation. It would be naïve for the Brotherhood to believe that its unprecedented gain of parliamentary seats is an indication of the extent of its support on the Egyptian street. Those who voted in the first round of elections did not exceed a quarter of the electoral body, and most were either members of the Muslim Brotherhood or those who rallied around its banner. Having dug trenches around themselves for the past 75 years, the Brotherhood needed to make extra efforts to unseat doubts and mistrust that other political players harbour towards its intentions. Such an outcome remains conditional on the Brotherhood's leadership being able to crystallise a real civil project distanced from slogans of Islamisation and the tickling of the emotions of citizens. The Brotherhood, currently subject to an organised smear campaign that may subsequently serve its interests, is now on the threshold of an important stage in its long history. It is being challenged by fate-determining choices between remaining underground, or surfacing to organised activity. Yet nothing will benefit it other than reaching a realistic middle ground that realises the scope of what has taken place and prepares it for what is coming. The fourth and final aspect to the tribulations of democracy in Egypt is represented by the weakness of political imagination among the Egyptian electoral body. This situation has been created by numerous factors; some historical, others religious. Egyptian society is incapable of adhering to a modicum of democratic values, the most important of which is the "civil security" of candidates and voters. This implies that there is a deep flaw in society's understanding of democracy and that the behaviour and actions of political powers in their continual battling has contributed to this. This weakness has also been caused by sharpening polarisations resulting in political competition falling foul to all kinds of political chaos and mockery. This situation is difficult to imagine in a country that practiced democracy under harsh circumstances at the beginning of the last century and did not experience the same tensions and states of congestion to the point of battling over parliamentary seats. It is a situation created as much by the extent of ignorance that has struck the Egyptian political street as it reflects the political "drought" suffered by so many in Egypt. The incidents of violence that have taken place are not in themselves the problem. Rather, it lies in the culture of dogfights over votes for the sake of power as a source of strength and immunity and not for the sake of democracy as a source of legitimacy. Most of those who voted did not do so due to their resolve to participate and enjoy their constitutional rights, nor through a belief in voting as a means of bringing change, but rather in response to other factors; some of them religious, as was the case with supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, and others material and interest-oriented, as happened with the remaining candidates. Perhaps the best outcome of the current elections is that they have annulled the saying so pivotal to political activity in Egypt that "reform must come from the top." What has taken place recently indicates that reform is not in the hands of a particular player or party but rather reliant on strong political will for change. The benefit of fully evaluating the current situation in Egypt might not stop at merely understanding the political map of the upcoming parliament. Rather, what is taking place today indicates that there is a deep flaw in the understanding of the concept of democracy among all players. Progress necessitates effort, so that the wheel of real change may begin turning. Better this than resting content with a noisy clamour that brings no results. * The writer is a political analyst for Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya magazine published by Al-Ahram.
