Calling for a referendum on the future of the Palestinian struggle is a mistake that can be rectified if key players act fast and in good faith, writes Hassan Nafaa* If the Palestinian factions are truly interested in unifying the Palestinian people around an effective strategy for managing the conflict with Israel, I doubt very much that they can accomplish this through a popular referendum on a document they themselves have yet to agree upon. In fact, putting such a controversial text to a referendum only threatens to further divide the very public the factions are ostensibly seeking to unite and to augment already severe tensions between the factions themselves. Nothing could be more disastrous for the beleaguered Palestinian people or more guaranteed to push the prospect of realising their legitimate rights further out of reach. To an impartial observer, such as myself who has no vested interest in any of the factions, the referendum is clearly another step in the drive to undermine Hamas. If anyone could convince me that the road to a just solution to the Palestinian cause -- even one that met the minimum requirements for a just settlement as outlined in the Arab initiative adopted in the Beirut summit in 2002 -- necessarily passed through a referendum aimed at discrediting Hamas and toppling the Hamas government, I would welcome it unwaveringly. Abbas is taking an enormous risk at a time when neither he nor any of the Arab regimes encouraging him has any substantial leverage to ensure the realisation of Palestinian rights. Abbas first came to power by virtue of pressures exerted on Arafat and the Palestinian Authority by Israel, the US and the EU. If those who had encouraged Abbas and a handful of his colleagues to revolt against Arafat had truly wanted to advance the prospects of a settlement based on the Arab initiative, the situation in Palestine and the rest of the Arab world would never have deteriorated so drastically. When Israel decided to eliminate Arafat, on the grounds that he was hampering Abbas's manoeuvrability, the Palestinian people did not hesitate to give Abbas their vote of confidence. Even Hamas, the foremost opposition faction at the time, willingly lent a hand, agreeing to a truce in order to preclude Israeli ruses and facilitate a climate conducive to a just settlement. But Israel, which greeted the now more than three years old Arab initiative with nothing but scorn, was not prepared to offer the Palestinians anything substantial and the international community was powerless to impose a solution that conformed with the provisions of international law. Had Abbas been given opportunity to make even minimal inroads towards the realisation of Palestinian rights, Hamas would never be where it is today. The Hamas electoral victory was not so much a reflection of the Palestinian people's support for that faction as it was an expression of their frustration with Fatah, Arab regimes, and the international community. I had hoped Abbas would take advantage of circumstances and transform Hamas's victory into a trump card against Israel and the international community. At least he may have been able to obtain international recognition for the Arab peace initiative and a pledge of commitment to the implementation of this initiative within an agreed upon timeframe. To place himself on surer negotiating footing in order to reach this end, he would have had to move a little closer to Hamas, without necessarily subscribing entirely to the Hamas platform, so as to create a single negotiating team strong enough to toss the ball into the opposite court and to intercept return volleys. Sadly, I was deeply disappointed in Abbas. With blatant encouragement not only from Israel and the US but also, regrettably, from a number of Arab governments, he started to act as though Hamas, as opposed to Israel, was the number one enemy into whose court the ball had to be tossed. I could have understood Abbas insisting Hamas recognise Israel and the Arab peace initiative if he had been equally adamant on obtaining a reciprocal commitment from Israel to withdraw to pre-1967 borders and recognise the Palestinian refugees' right of return, furnishing a simultaneous pledge from the international community to impose a settlement on the basis of the Arab peace initiative. But for Abbas to focus his energies exclusively on Hamas with nothing but vague promises to offer the Palestinian people is, in my opinion, nothing short of pure folly. The only possible interpretation one can put on Abbas's insistence upon a referendum on the so-called Prisoners' Document -- his decision to announce a date for it despite objections voiced by several factions and regardless of questions surrounding the constitutionality of this action -- is that it is a ploy to force Hamas into a corner; into making concessions that will benefit no one but Israel. More ominously in the short run, this determination to put this divisive subject to a referendum courts domestic disaster. Even supposing that all the Palestinian factions are now mature enough to restrain themselves sufficiently to keep factional tensions from spilling over into civil war, let us consider what might happen in the event that the factions do not reach an agreement over the Prisoners' Document and the referendum goes ahead on 26 July. Let us assume, firstly, that the majority of those polled come out in favour of the document. In view of Hamas' opposition, or more precisely reservations on the document's wording, this outcome could only be interpreted in one way: a vote of no confidence in Hamas. The Hamas government would obviously have to resign. The problem, however, would not end there. Hamas still controls the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian Legislative Council. No government can remain in power without sustaining the confidence of this assembly. As it is highly unlikely in this fraught climate that Hamas would participate in a national unity government espousing the principles laid out in a document it did not approve of, Abbas would have no other choice but to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. No doubt this is precisely what Abbas is seeking. Perhaps he was encouraged in this direction by recent opinion polls showing that the majority of Palestinians support the Prisoners' Document. Not only do these polls suggest that the referendum would come out in his favour, but that Fatah would stand a strong chance of winning early parliamentary elections if held immediately on the heels of the referendum. Let us now assume the opposite, namely that the referendum comes out strongly against the Prisoners' Document. The outcome would obviously have to be interpreted as a popular vote of no confidence in Abbas, and it would be he, in such an instance, who would have to tender his resignation. This would mean, of course, that new presidential elections would have to be held, which would bring the situation to a new critical point. Israel and the US, the international community, and even quite a few Arab governments, would wring their hands at the prospect of yet another Hamas victory and would either act to forestall the elections or facilitate significant tampering at the polls. In both cases, the result would be chaos. On the other hand, supposing for the sake of argument that Israel agreed to free, fair and properly supervised elections and that a Hamas candidate, or an independent who Hamas approved of, ran and won, this victory might solve the problem of a two-headed Palestinian Authority but an uglier problem would now rear its head for Israel and the international community. There would now be a unified Palestinian government that refused to recognise Israel, which Israel would take as pretext to press ahead with any number of measures, such as officially declaring the separation wall as its functional or even permanent borders. On the other hand, if Abbas or another more popular candidate from Fatah -- such as Marwan Al-Barghouti -- fielded himself in the presidential elections and won, this might put the minds of Israel and the foreign community at rest temporarily, but the Palestinian people themselves would be back at square one. Following presidential elections, legislative elections would have to be held again, and so on. The third scenario is if Hamas and some other factions boycotted the elections, thereby opening an avenue for all to refute their results. Regardless of which of the foregoing scenarios is the most likely, none offer a solution to the crisis. Indeed, any one of them would push it closer to a perilous brink. At best, the crisis would appear to be one of legitimacy, at a time when efforts should be focused on how to advance demands for national liberation. When a country is under foreign occupation, legitimacy should be reckoned on the basis of the efforts devoted to the cause of liberation, not by the number of votes one receives in elections held under occupation. For this reason, I believe the factions have no choice but to work together in the framework of a national unity government and in accordance with a unified agenda that combines tactics of resistance with tactics of negotiation. The text that was produced in the name of Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons, and which only a handful had an active hand in drafting and which some prisoners refused to sign, is not holy writ. It was widely recognised as a reasonable basis for a comprehensive national dialogue, not as an instrument with which to hammer one's factional adversaries. I hope, therefore, that dialogue continues and that all possible scope is given for it to succeed so that it can yield a consensus over every detail concerning the Palestinian's collective principles, the programmes for putting these into action and the mechanisms for allocating responsibility and ensuring accountability. After all, what is the point of agreeing to a text that will only be added to the many other texts that are open to rival interpretations and are forever pawn to prevailing balances of power? As wrong as Abbas was to force a referendum over the Prisoners' Document, I nevertheless believe that it is not too late for participants of the Palestinian dialogue to reach a consensus over a modified version. Perhaps it would have been wiser to move the dialogue to another location, such as Cairo, where successful inter-Palestinian dialogues have been held before, or Sanaa, which had offered to host the dialogue. In fact, it might be worthwhile for a collection of Arab governments, say Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria, to pool their efforts to promote the success of the inter-Palestinian dialogue, perhaps by collectively hosting a conference in Riyadh, for example. Then, perhaps together, the Palestinians and the Arabs could pre-empt the referendum and the slippery descent that would inevitably come in its wake. Or do the Palestinian factions and Arab capitals yearn for yet more Arab disasters before they come to their senses? * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
