It is Israel, not Hamas, that should be pressured to moderate its position, writes Hassan Nafaa* The victory of Hamas in the recent legislative elections has pulled the Palestinian cause down a new path. Some people say that the Palestinian people could use some change, since the post-Oslo negotiations proved mostly fruitless. Others say the victory is damaging to the political process and gives Israel the chance to wriggle free from its commitments and press ahead with its unilateral plans. Israel has been hoping to carve off nearly one half of the West Bank through its actions. If realised, its plan would keep major settlements and security-sensitive areas under Israeli control. The rest of the West Bank would be transformed into disconnected cantons. The Palestinians would not be able to create a viable state. Let's start looking objectively at Israel's current strategy. Israel is apparently trying to use the Hamas victory for its own purposes. In cooperation with the US, Israel has launched a ferocious campaign to starve the Palestinians and isolate Hamas. Its aim is twofold. For one, Israel wants Hamas to recognise it as a legitimate entity and accept all the agreements reached with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority -- chiefly the Oslo Accords. Interestingly, Israel is not offering reciprocal concessions, even minors ones, still less meeting the Palestinians halfway. What the Israelis and Americans -- perhaps even some Arabs and Europeans -- want is for Hamas to make substantial strategic concessions on the form and content of any future solution, even before negotiations are resumed. Israel is evidently willing to negotiate with anyone who doesn't mind its building of settlements. In a sense, the Israelis are using negotiations to manage, rather than resolve, the conflict. Needless to say, Israel is making impossible conditions, ones that are tantamount to political suicide for Hamas. The Palestinians did not vote for Hamas until it became clear that Israel is not serious about negotiations. Israel besieged and liquidated Yasser Arafat, the man who espoused the peace process. Oslo, meanwhile, failed to provide the minimum of Palestinian national rights; namely a sovereign state on pre-1967 land and the return of the refugees. The Palestinians have not offered Hamas a blank check. They gave it a mandate to press on with resistance. They gave it a pledge to endure the sacrifices involved. Hamas knows that. It knows that submission to Israeli demands would undermine its popularity, let alone smash the hopes of an entire nation. Israel's second aim is to have Hamas blamed for future Palestinian suffering, for the collapse of the peace process, as well as for impending starvation and violence. Should Israel succeed in blaming Hamas, it would be in a better position to implement its current policy. In particular, it would be able to keep building the gigantic separation wall, annex large settlements, and create a situation where main roads and chunks of the West Bank remain under exclusive military control. Israel is hoping to create a new status quo. But first it has to undermine Hamas, both as a movement and legend. I expect Israel to press ahead with its unilateral agenda. This agenda includes Israel's own interpretation of "safe borders". I believe that the Israeli ruling elite, and not just the extremists, agree -- in light of what happened in the second Camp David talks in 2000 -- that what moderate Israelis are willing to offer stops way short of what moderate Palestinians are willing to accept. Israel is still fearful of the so- called Arab demographic bomb. That's why its elite is preparing for unilateral separation. That's why the elite has accepted Sharon's plans. And that's why Peres agreed to go into coalition with Sharon's allies. Israel was determined on this even before the Palestinian elections were held. The Hamas victory is not what worries Israel. Israel has become adept at turning unexpected developments to its advantage. Israel intends to blame Hamas for everything it has already decided to do. Israel did the same to Arafat in the past, blaming him for everything simply to have its way. Israel and the US want Hamas to look incapable. For this to happen, certain steps must be taken. First, international, regional and domestic pressure will doubtless be applied with a view to forcing Hamas to recognise Israel and endorse past agreements. Second, Palestinian factions, especially Fatah, will be encouraged to pick up fights with the new government. Once things get out of hand, the president will have reason to dissolve the parliament. Third, new elections will be planned, to allow the more moderate wing of Fatah to come back to power -- a prospect that can be realised once Hamas is portrayed as incapable. There are signs that Mahmoud Abbas is doing his best to not put the kind of pressure on Hamas the Americans and the Israelis -- perhaps even the Arabs -- want. His national sensibilities and Hamas's pragmatism have so far averted a crisis. But the situation remains precarious. Arab countries have resisted US and Israeli pressures concerning the discontinuation of funding to Hamas. But to avoid a head- on clash with the Americans, Arab countries have stopped short of promising Hamas enough money. As things stand, Iran seems more willing than the Arabs to help Hamas out. The outgoing Palestinian parliament has introduced a legislative amendment giving the president the right to appoint Constitutional Court judges without consulting legislators. This amendment casts doubt on the goodwill of some people within the Palestinian Authority. And it has tipped power in favour of the president in a manner that smacks of narrow-minded partisan interests. Abbas wants the letter of designation to Ismail Haniya to include the following phrase: "I call on you as prime minister of the future government to remain committed to the higher interests of the Palestinian people, protect their gains and build on them, and promote their national goals as enshrined in the document of the declaration of independence and as contained in the decisions of the national councils, the basic articles of law, and the decisions of Arab summits, as well as honour the commitments I mentioned in my recent speech at the Legislative Council on 18 February." The wording of the above statement is careful. It tries to strike a balance while giving Hamas a chance. And yet, it leaves the door open for any number of interpretations. The sharp turn the Palestinian cause has taken following the Hamas victory can lead to one of two things. Either a crisis results, involving a clash among Palestinian factions; an outcome that would allow Israel to liquidate the Palestinian cause once and for all, or various Palestinian factions would get close; an outcome that would pave the way for a true settlement. In light of these two possibilities, I entreat the Palestinians to keep the following facts in mind. First, co-existence between a president and a government from two different parties is not necessarily a bad thing. France has done it and it worked. Second, Palestine is not a state but an occupied homeland. Therefore, priority should be given to liberation as against domestic concerns. Third, there is no legal or political need for a Hamas government to recognise Israel or previous agreements. Abbas is the president of the Palestinian Authority and the head of the Executive Bureau of the PLO, the organisation that has recognised Israel and signed the Oslo Accords. Hence, there is no need -- political or legal -- for a new recognition of any state or previous agreement. Sharon himself rejected Oslo and violated it. When he became prime minister no one asked Sharon to offer any sort of commitment to past agreements. On the contrary, Sharon was allowed to act and talk as if no Palestinian partner existed. Fourth, Hamas is required to show political flexibility. But this flexibility should be about the willingness to negotiate, not about recognising Israel and previous agreements. For negotiations to become useful, the international community should present a coherent and binding formula for a settlement. Negotiations should be confined to discussing security arrangements and the building of peace following a settlement. Negotiations should not be about the conditions for reaching a settlement. The one recognition Hamas can be asked for is its future recognition of what the negotiations would produce in terms of a settlement that is acceptable to the Palestinian people. The recognition should be based on a free referendum that is held under UN supervision and in which the Palestinian people may have their say. Hamas does not need to recognise in advance an expansionist state with no known borders; a state that insists on occupying parts of what is supposed to become a future Palestinian state. It is high time all local, Arab and international parties understand that unreciprocated concessions have taken us nowhere. They have damaged the peace process and allowed Israel to act wilfully and with impunity. Anyone who is helping Israel in its current plans is harming the future of Palestine, not of Hamas. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
