Rivalry between Fatah and Hamas is perfectly natural. But when it threatens to destroy both factions, as well as the national aspirations of the Palestinians, it is time to worry, writes Hassan Nafaa As long as we are objective we can be critical of both Hamas and Fatah just to portray Fatah as a clique so addicted to and corrupted by power that it has become a tool in the hands of the enemy. While some Fatah members may believe they should now have a monopoly on power fairness demands that we also recognise that it was Fatah that early led the armed struggle for liberation and a great many of its members to remain committed to the cause. Likewise, it is not true that Hamas is motivated more by ideological and doctrinal beliefs than patriotic allegiance and rational consideration. Hamas is not part of some global programme over which it has no control, is not tool in the hands of others. True, Hamas does belong to a wider Islamic movement that may or may not have broader ideological vision. This does not detract from its being a major tributary to the national struggle, a Palestinian faction shaped by the Israeli occupation. Hamas's record of exercising political power and handling international relations may be less impressive than that of Fatah or some other factions. Yet it has also demonstrated political maturity in its political discourse, especially since forming the Palestinian government in March. In judging Hamas and Fatah we must view their relationship in the proper context. We should realise that Hamas's position on the recognition of Israel and the Arab initiative is a ploy to cover up the failure to form a negotiating position that stands a better chance of securing Palestinian rights. By extension, we should acknowledge Hamas's position is not the real cause of the conflict between the two factions. Recent signals issued by Israel suggest it has nothing to offer as a basis for a settlement acceptable to either Fatah or Hamas. It is also clear that Israel is keen to aggravate the conflict between the two factions so that it can point to them both as the cause for the collapse of the Palestinian resistance and the failure to create a Palestinian state. Moshe Sharon, professor of Islamic history at the Hebrew University and Arab affairs advisor to former prime minister Menachem Begin, in an article in the Jerusalem Post of 10 October writes beneath the headline "Negotiating in the bazaar" that "in the Mid-Eastern bazaar diplomatic agreements are kept not because they are signed but because they are imposed." In Sharon's bazaar, moreover, Arabs and Israelis are not negotiating over the same merchandise. Whereas the Israelis wish for peace based on Arab-Muslim acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state, "the Arabs' objective is to annihilate the Jewish state, replace it by an Arab one and get rid of the Jews." Yet to accomplish their aims the Arabs have adopted "bazaar diplomacy" according to the rules of which, if the vendor knows you want a certain item he will push up its price. In this case, "the merchandise in question is 'peace' and the Arabs give the impression that they possess this merchandise and inflate its price." Sharon then offers his government the following advice: "never suggest anything to the other side. Let the other side present its suggestions first... Always, reject; disagree. Use the phrase doesn't meet our minimum demands, and walk away, even 100 times. Don't be hasty to come up with counter-offers. There will always be time for that. Let the other side make amendments under pressure of your total disappointment... "Have your own plan ready in full, as detailed as possible, with the red lines defined. Weigh the other side's suggestions against this plan. "Always bear in mind that the other side will try to outsmart you by portraying major issues as unimportant details. Treat every detail as vitally important... Beware of popular beliefs about the Arabs -- eg Arab honour, never do or say anything because somebody told you it is the custom. If the Arab side finds you are playing the anthropologist it will take advantage. "Remember that the goal of all negotiations is to make a profit and aim at making the biggest profit in real terms. Remember that every gain is a future asset because there is always likely to be 'another round'." The article is significant inasmuch as it reflects the prevailing mood in Israel, which has hardened out of a belief that the Arabs are responsible for the failure of the negotiating process and are not really interested in peace. The Palestinians and Arabs should therefore expect to encounter a tougher and more inflexible negotiating position (should the Israelis agree to come to the negotiating table) than anything so far experienced. They must also anticipate disastrous consequences if they enter negotiations without a unified strategy. Since the end of the war against LebanonWashington has signalled its willingness to revive the peace process with "moderate forces" on the condition "extremist forces" are sidelined. This is a part of an American-Israeli strategy to divide and rule, to set Palestinian against Palestinian, Arab against Arab and Sunni Muslims and Christians against Shias. But the differences that exist between the various factions and parties revolve around means not aims. It makes little sense to draw an imaginary line dividing moderates and extremists. Everyone, including Hamas, is prepared to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 1967 borders, the creation of a fully sovereign Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem and the resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with UN Resolution 194 of 1949. Israeli propaganda pushes the idea that Hamas's position is a projection of a deep-seated Arab desire to drive the Jews into the sea, conveniently overlooking the fact that Israel has yet to respond to the Arab peace initiative and absolutely refuses to entertain the idea of withdrawing to its 1967 borders. Some Arab governments have yet to realise that negotiations depend on building a strong and effective negotiating position. This demands that a diversity of views and ideas be expertly brought into play through the division of labour between moderates and hardliners. It requires that cards be played close to one's chest, that you begin with the most hardline proposals in order to give yourself room for manoeuvre. Decision-makers must resist the temptation to meddle with the basic negotiating position to avoid offering concessions free-of-charge and undermining the work of negotiators. All relevant institutions and public opinion must be brought on board to better steer negotiations in the national interests. It is difficult to understand why the Palestinian leadership has been so reluctant to engage the Hamas government in the process of building up a negotiating position that serves Palestinian national aims. In purely legal terms, the PLO is the authority responsible for negotiating with Israel and the Palestinian factions have no business in this process even if they are members in the government. Look at Israel. How often has it been that political parties opposed to Camp David and the peace agreement with Egypt or opposed to Oslo and subsequent agreements formed part of an Israeli cabinet without having to offer a recognition of any of these agreements? There are no legal or political impediments to restructuring the PLO so it reflects Palestinian forces more accurately. This would better enable it to promote the unity so desperately needed and draw up a unified negotiating strategy. The strategy would probably also be a more forceful, bearing in mind that the moderation the Palestinians have displayed since 1988 has not only failed to secure their rights but put them in greater jeopardy. Would not the wise thing be to use Hamas's position in order to salvage can be salvaged? Hamas's position towards the settlement process has not been tested yet for a simple reason: there hasn't been a settlement process to test it against. In order to test the Hamas position the Palestinians have to prove that there exists a process that offers a possibility to achieve Palestinian rights. There is nothing to prevent Mahmoud Abbas from entering into negotiations that adhere to Palestinian minimum demands that lead to an acceptable settlement. Should a Hamas government refuse that settlement it would in all likelihood be overthrown. As for schemes to hold early elections, funded by the US, with the purpose of ousting Hamas and bringing in Fatah it is difficult to imagine how this could bring the type of settlement the Palestinians are looking for. The ploy is more likely to strengthen Hamas rather than to weaken it. It could well precipitate civil war, the clouds of which are gathering on the horizon.
