Hamas, if it chooses to take the difficult path towards negotiations, will find it has more cards to play with than Fatah ever had, writes Zeyad A Moussa* On the heels of the brilliant success that Hamas managed to achieve in the Palestinian legislative elections 25 January, regional and international political actors were taken by surprise. Actually, it would be fair to say that those most optimistic in Hamas's leadership were equally shocked by the powerful political position Hamas was thrust into. Shortly after the election results were published, and while the leadership in Hamas was caught up in receiving congratulations as well as threats, a dilemma in domestic Palestinian politics started to crystallise. Several intellectuals concluded that the victory of Hamas did nothing but corner the movement between bitter political choices. Hamas in power is certainly different from Hamas in opposition. The choices that Hamas is cornered between are two: proving political flexibility at the cost of altering the discourse that drove the movement to the tip of the triangle, and hence risking internal dismay and accusations of treason; or demonstrating failure to realise political realities risking imprisoning the movement in a matrix of its own dogma. But a close look at the conduct of Hamas since 1987 would prove that the movement is capable of avoiding such a trap. In fact, Hamas can secure several political gains as a result of this very dilemma. Ever since Hamas achieved major political success in the first Palestinian uprising in December 1987, the movement has been able to display a tangible amount of political flexibility, a solid awareness of political opportunities and a lively sense of prevailing socio-economic conditions. These reasons are the crux of Hamas's resilience, regardless of what the Israeli-Palestinian political reality dictates upon the movement as an entity, its leadership and its ideology. This political awareness and the acknowledgement of the definite need of political manoeuvre have been repeatedly proven by Hamas's strategies of co-existence that the movement adopted with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and later on the Palestinian Authority (PA). In the days that followed the signing of the Oslo Accords, Hamas realised its growing weakness in the face of a PLO political victory that instilled a minimum sense of independence in the Palestinian psyche. If the movement were a prisoner of its own dogma, it would have refrained totally from the political process, leading itself into socio-political isolation that would have eventually driven the movement to its demise. Something quite different occurred. While the movement denied the right of the PA to fully represent the Palestinian people, it did not rule out the possibility of forging a political alliance with the PA provided it was a "jihadist" coalition based on the principles of Islamic resistance. Similarly, the charter of Hamas does not acknowledge an Israeli state or even recognise a legitimate Israeli political entity; but while the movement rejected a final peace settlement with Israel, it left the door opened for a truce. If these instances convey any messages, they demonstrate that Hamas practices political flexibility through a balanced process of decision-making. The movement possesses the ability to differentiate between long term visionary goals and short term or immediate needs that are closely tied to political opportunities and conflicts where tensions are unending and victory is never complete. Signs of such flexible intentions have been displayed in the past few days by some leading figures in Hamas. Khaled Meshaal, head of Hamas's political bureau -- a man who is thought to be among the radicals of Hamas, compared to more moderate faces in the movement like Sheikh Hassan Youssef in the West Bank and Ismail Haneya in Gaza -- has given some interesting statements in the past few days. Concerning the recognition of Israel, Meshaal stated that Hamas shall not alter its charter, but he also stated that Hamas believes in gradualism and in actions that consider the circumstances imposed by reality. He stated that, "being against occupation does not mean I can cancel Israel in moments." Meshaal also stated that Hamas would not impose its religious and intellectual ideology on anyone; the movement shall rather display tolerance. These remarks show that the question is not whether Hamas will succeed or fail in displaying political flexibility and deviating from the principles in their charter, the question is: how well will they justify it? Hamas might be cornered between bitter political choices, but this cornering could be used for the benefit of the movement and the voters who drove it to power. Hamas is faced with hardcore challenges that need to be met wisely and quickly. The movement must chart a course of action regarding the empty Palestinian treasury, and what compromises will be made to pay the salaries of thousands of employees. Hamas has to be able to win the war waged upon it in the global media and circles of international opinion. The movement has to remind the international community that religious political movements demonstrate a change in behaviour when they are granted access to the governing process, as has been the case in Turkey. The quality by which Hamas will justify its actions when they deviate from their laid down principles is a crucial challenge to the movement. This particular point has two dimensions. First, the movement must be aware of its need to adjust to a new social and political environment; and second, its leadership must possess considerable ability to justify its deviation from official doctrine. Finally, Hamas must inject balance into its decision-making process. Hamas was very well prepared to act as a powerful opposition front, but what the election results entailed took the movement by surprise and caused something of a temporary halt in the regular sense of balance in Hamas's decision-making procedure. If Hamas succeeds in co-existing with Israel the same way it succeeded to co-exist with the PLO, and later the PA, provided that they realise that the dimensions of co-existence are now different; Hamas will then put the Arab world on the doorstep of a new and crucial phase. This line of thinking gives Hamas more than one card to play with. The movement could imprison itself into its beliefs and continue to live in the dream world where the total destruction of Israel is the ultimate aspiration. In this case Hamas must ask itself if it has the necessary political and economic tools to handle such a choice. Does the movement possess the sufficient economic resources, logistic means, military capabilities and international political support to be at war with Israel? These are questions that the Hamas leadership must answer before seriously considering an aggressive confrontational attitude. The second card in Hamas's hands is turning a blind eye to the principles in the movement's covenant and acquiring a new ideological perspective. This card is a pricy and a risky one. The third card in Hamas's deck is co-existence and coping; strategies that the movement has some experience in applying. Israel today needs Hamas to compromise. In other words, the Palestinians today have something that Israel wants. This situation creates balance in any future peace negotiations. If Hamas puts itself at the negotiations table, it would realise that it has more cards to play with than Fatah ever had. Hamas could engage in a give and take process with Israel that would eventually benefit the Palestinian people. Therefore, the matter becomes a question of Hamas knowing the cards it possesses and using them at the right time. * The writer is a researcher at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
