International pressure on Hamas to recognise Israel lacks any justification, be it legal, ethical, or political, writes Hassan Nafaa* There are several reasons the pressure to force Hamas to recognise Israel lacks any legal justification. Firstly, acknowledgment can only take place between representative units. Secondly, acknowledging the state of Israel before the establishment of a clearly defined Palestinian state would seriously harm the rights of the Palestinian people. Thirdly, by its very nature recognition must be bilateral if it is not to turn into a contract of compliance the legitimacy of which can all too easily be questioned. The lack of resemblance between Israel and Hamas is obvious and requires no proof. Israel is an autonomous state recognised by the international community. It is a member of the United Nations and the specialised international agencies connected to it. Hamas, on the other hand, is a faction within the Palestine national liberation movement. As such it does not represent, nor does it claim to, the Palestinian people. It is part of a whole, and no part can represent the whole. International conventions discriminate between actors in international politics, categorising them into state and non-state actors, international governmental and non-governmental agencies and transnational corporations. National liberation movements are naturally categorised as non-state actors. While a political perspective on the classification of state actors focuses on what each possesses in the way of tools that influence international relations, a legal perspective focuses on the extent to which each actor is considered a legal entity. International law only grants states a full legal personality. It recognises international governmental organisations, but only in as much as it is necessary to allow them to perform their functions. As a consequence, international recognition concerns only states. There are no binding international laws or conventions regulating mutual recognition between international actors other than states. And while international law recognises the right of peoples to self-determination, it is natural and logical for it to also recognise the right of national liberation movements to resist foreign occupation by all means possible, including armed force. The international community, represented by the United Nations General Assembly, has recognised the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Since 1974, it has recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative and accepted it in this capacity as an observer member of the UN. Since the primary, perhaps only, mission of any national liberation movement is to strive to gain the rights of the people it represents, it is logical for the PLO to have become the party responsible for and qualified to defend Palestinian rights by all legitimate means, including negotiations, with any international or regional party, including Israel. The PLO, and not Fatah, signed the Oslo Accords. The post-Oslo Palestinian National Authority (PNA) did not cancel or replace the PLO. That the president of the PLO's executive committee is also the elected president of the PNA does not prevent the law from considering the PLO, regardless of who is its president, as the party responsible for running the affairs of the Palestinian people. Given this context there can be no legal justification to demands made for Hamas to recognise Israel. Many Israeli forces do not recognise the PLO yet have still participated in the Israeli government being asked to first recognise Oslo or the PLO. The recognition of a state has entirely different legal consequences from the recognition of a political faction or a liberation movement. Recognition of a state means recognition of its borders, people, and government. Yet Israel remains without clearly defined geographic borders, has appropriated all Palestinian territory and believes it has the right to colonise it. It has always refused to halt settlement activity, even after signing the Oslo Accords. Recognising the state of Israel, then, involves an implicit recognition of its right to settlement activity and to remain in any area it likes of the Palestinian territories. Because Israel is not asking for recognition as a typical state but as a Jewish state in which "others" do not have the right to enjoy citizenship. Such recognition would naturally lead not only to denying the right of return for Palestinian refugees, but also grant it authority to expel the 1948 Arabs, ie Palestinians still residing in what is now internationally recognisd as Israel. What is being proposed is unilateral, not mutual, recognition. Hamas is being asked to recognise Israel without Israel necessarily recognising Hamas. There is nothing in law called unilateral recognition; it is either mutual or does not exist. It is difficult to imagine mutual recognition between a state and a liberation movement except in the context of the settlement of an ongoing conflict or a midway solution accepted by both parties. If Hamas is being asked to recognise Israel as it is, as a state for Jews without clearly defined borders and seeking to expand, and if Israel is asked to recognise Hamas as it is, the only possible response from international legal experts would be a loud, sarcastic guffaw. The ethical justifications for the immense pressure placed on Hamas to recognise Israel focuses on the idea that Hamas is a terrorist organisation seeking to destroy Israel. The only way to prove its good intentions, goes the argument, is for Hamas to disavow violence, disarm, and recognise the state that it supposedly wants to destroy. I don't want to fall into the trap of defending Hamas, for any fair observer must acknowledge that Hamas' military wing, like the military wings of all the Palestinian factions, has committed acts considered, literally and legally, terrorist acts that have targeted innocent civilians. But while nothing justifies targeting unarmed civilians, this does not excuse Israel liability as a state that in turn practices terrorism. Terrorism, after all, is the use of armed force outside the law, targeting civilians in order to make political gains. Israel uses armed force outside international law more than any other country. Nor is there any political justification for Hamas to recognise Israel. It is doubtful that Israel will change its position on final status issues should Hamas recognise it. Hamas has a thousand reasons not to recognise Israel, and they do not include an intention to destroy it or cast its people into the sea. Hamas knows that those who previously recognised Israel and offered everything that could be imagined in the way of concessions gained nothing. If Israel had offered something to those who had recognised it, then Hamas would never have been voted into power in the first place. Two months ago I was invited to a dinner held by the ambassador of a European state in honour of a visiting parliamentarian. Conversation began calmly and then gradually heated up until it reached the point where it seemed as though Hamas's refusal to recognise Israel was the only reason the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unsolved. I asked if any international party could guarantee that Israel will withdraw to its 1967 borders, should Hamas show readiness to recognise Israel? I then said that if anyone could secure from Israel a written promise to withdraw to its 1967 borders, in return I could obtain from Hamas a promise to recognise Israel when that withdrawal had taken place. Asked if I truly believed Hamas was capable of sitting at a negotiating table with Israel in the future, I responded by restating my conviction that Hamas was not the problem, and that it could be part of a solution if the intentions of others were better. I do not claim to be intimate with Hamas' thinking, though I am sure its leadership realises that recognising Israel may help remove the sanctions placed on it. That, however, does not improve the chances of a real, sustainable settlement. It must also surely realise that recognition prior to a settlement would isolate Hamas from its popular base and lead to political suicide, paving the way for the imposition of Israeli conditions which would include turning the separation barrier into Israel's permanent borders and transforming what remains of Palestine into isolated cantons. If someone wants to test the real intentions of Hamas they can present to Abu Mazen a solution the Palestinian people can accept. When the Palestinian people agrees to a solution that includes the drawing of Palestine's borders, which would also be the borders of Israel, the issue of recognition from Hamas will have become redundant. The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict shows clearly that the problem has never been the recognition of Israel by Arab parties. All Arabs, including Hamas, have been and continue to be prepared to recognise Israel. Yet, there are differences between Arabs. Some have recognised Israel and signed agreements presented to them while others are prepared to recognise it but in the context of a settlement that guarantees minimum rights and dignity. Until now, Israel has not appeared ready for a settlement of the latter kind and insists on its recognition not just as a Jewish state, but as the region's most dominant state. Will Arabs accept this? Israel thinks that Arab parties begin by refusing and end by accepting less than what had been offered. Have the Arabs still not learned this lesson? * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
