Washington's refusal under Obama to deal with Hamas is but a continuation of the failed policies of Bush, writes Hassan Nafaa* In a report entitled, The Obama Administration and US Strategy: The First 100 Days, Anthony Cordesman, an expert on US strategy, tries to detect the change that has taken place in US strategy within the first 100 days of Obama in office. The report, published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on 12 April 2009, notes the limitations facing any president at the outset of his term. Cordesman says that any US president acts in the first 100 days in office under three constraints: the need for considerable time to form and test his assisting team of national security; the fact that the new administration is working through a budget approved a year earlier and in accordance with a different strategic outlook; and the fact that the existing crises have their roots in conflicts extending over half a century back in time. The report notes that restoring US status in the international economic system has been the top priority for the Obama administration, which remains committed to other vital interests around the world. Cordesman questions the new US strategy on Iraq, judging it too vague and incomplete in many aspects, and failing to provide options in the case of renewed violence before the withdrawal of US troops. He also speaks of the major shift that has come upon US strategy on both Afghanistan and Pakistan. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cordesman goes easy on Obama. He says that there is little that the US president can accomplish speedily with regards to peace between the Arabs and Israelis, considering that the Palestinian movement is divided and the Israeli government is leaning to the right while the Arab world is beset by disputes. But Cordesman notes a number of changes that may have an impact on the situation. One is that Obama appointed George Mitchell as special envoy in the region a few days after assuming office. In an interview with Al-Arabiya television on 27 January, US President Obama said that his administration would not wait, as previous administrations did, until the end of its term to tackle the Middle East but would begin immediately, dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict tirelessly and ceaselessly. Another is the new approach to Syria, with Obama taking specific measures underlining his personal interest in promoting negotiations on the Syrian- Israeli track. A third change is that the US has abandoned the term "global war on terror" out of respect for Arab and Muslim sensitivities. Although the positive aspects mentioned by Cordesman are noteworthy, they are limited to formal or procedural matters, with the focus being on instruments and policy tools rather than on substance. Moreover, the formal changes made may be intended to give the impression that something substantial is going on, although everything is still the same. This seems to be particularly clear with regards to the current administration's take on the Palestinian issue, which so far appears to repeat that of the Bush administration. Speaking at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated the US refusal to talk to Hamas or any government in which the latter is represented. Clinton said that the US couldn't offer any material support for such a government, not before Hamas has renounced terror, recognised Israel, and committed itself to the agreements and obligations accepted by the Palestinian Authority. Some may claim that Clinton's statements are nothing but a tactical ploy, aimed more to deflect domestic pressure than to reflect the substance of US policy. That's doubtful. More likely, these statements reflect the reality of US positions and can only mean that US diplomacy is once again doing the wrong thing. First of all, the US administration knows well that its conditions are utterly unacceptable for Hamas. For Hamas to accept those terms is to commit political suicide. And even if Hamas were to do what Washington is asking it to do, this would not necessarily lead to a full and just settlement or to the Palestinians regaining their legitimate rights. Many would recall that the Palestine Liberation Organisation under Arafat agreed to similar conditions in the past, an act that was nothing short of disaster for the Palestinian people. Arafat was later besieged in his headquarters and ultimately poisoned to death. Also, the refusal of the US administration to talk to Hamas or to a national unity government including members of Hamas is detrimental to Palestinian reconciliation. And with current divisions continuing to fester, there will be no hope of progress towards reconciliation. In fact, the Mahmoud Abbas government will find it hard to negotiate a settlement on its own with Israel. And even if the Palestinian Authority were to negotiate a deal, it would not be able to secure constitutional or popular support for that deal. It would also be hard for the Abbas government to provide the conditions necessary to rebuild Gaza and repair the damage it suffered in the last war. Because the US is talking tough, the new Israeli government -- extreme as it is -- might be tempted to posture further and perhaps even start a new war in Gaza in the hope of destroying Hamas, and at great risk to the region. And even if Hamas is destroyed, improbable as this may be, this may not lead to a settlement acceptable to the Palestinians. In short, the statements of the US secretary of state do not help open doors or extricate the peace process from its current impasse. If we want to have a deal that meets the minimum of Palestinian legitimate rights and is therefore acceptable to the Palestinians while at the same time meeting the minimum of Israel's security requirements and is therefore acceptable to the Israelis, then the new administration should focus on the issues at hand, not the men around the negotiating table. If the US is refusing to deal with Hamas because of its alleged extremism, then why is it talking to a government such as that of Netanyahu and Lieberman, a government as racist and as extremist as they come? To ask a national liberation movement to recognise the state it believes has usurped its rights is to make an illegal, illogical and immoral request. Legally speaking, recognition should be among countries, not non-state actors or NGOs for that matter. Also, it doesn't make sense to ask a national liberation movement to lay down its arms and recognise its enemy as a pre-condition for negotiations, at least not before some guarantee is offered as to the outcome of talks. Throughout history, negotiations between colonialists and national liberation movements were made without pre-conditions. What makes matters harder, not just on the practical level but on the legal and moral levels, is that Israel is a country like no other. Israel has no known geographical borders. Its relations with the world Jewry are ambiguous in ways that have a negative impact on the ongoing strife in Palestine. Besides, Israel wants to be a state for the Jews alone, something that poses a direct threat to all Palestinians who haven't yet been driven from their homes. When Hamas is asked to recognise Israel, what exactly does this mean? Is it being asked to recognise Israel's right to retain the lands it now occupies, or part thereof? Does recognition extend to the settlements Israel has built on occupied land, or to Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel, or to the right of all the world's Jewry to settle in Israel? Furthermore, what kind of Palestinian rights are left after Hamas recognises Israel? Who would guarantee that, after Hamas had recognised Israel, the latter would pull out of all the Palestinian land occupied in June 1967, including East Jerusalem, allow the refugees back home, and dismantle the settlements? It is only normal, and logical and moral, for the recognition to be made only once the shape and content of the settlement is decided, not a minute before. Israel's demand that it be recognised before negotiations and any settlement is meaningless. Negotiations are normally held between adversaries. Therefore, any talk of recognition should be focussed not on the parties sitting around the table, but on the outcome of the negotiations. To demand disarmament before a settlement is reached is to demand unconditional surrender -- which is neither ethical nor possible. The real question that the US should pose at present is whether Hamas is willing, as part of a national unity government, to allow a unity government to hold negotiations with Israel without preconditions. If the answer is yes, then the US should invite all concerned parties immediately to negotiations under its supervision. And the negotiations should continue until an agreement is reached that is acceptable to all parties including Hamas, or at least until a deal is made that can be offered by referendum to the Palestinian and Israeli people. After that, and not a minute before, the US may ask all parties to do what is necessary to protect the deal and make it hold. To ask Hamas for concessions just to allow it to participate as an interlocutor is both arrogant and ignorant. To make such conditions is a recipe for disaster as well as a step in the wrong direction. The current conditions set by Washington can undermine the peace process before it takes off. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
