A revival in America's reputation ultimately rests not on diplomacy but substantive policy change, writes Amr Abdel-Atti* US President-elect Barack Obama will inherit a heavy legacy of domestic and foreign policy crises. Foremost among his challenges will be to address the attrition that two Bush terms wrought on America's image, especially in the Arab world, that area that is so economically and strategically important to the United States. Following 11 September, official and public opinion in the US became increasingly obsessed with two interrelated questions: "Why do the Arabs hate us?" and "How do we improve the image of the US in the Arab world?" The Bush administration gave high priority to what it termed "public diplomacy" aimed at better familiarising Arab and Muslim opinion with the US, out of the conviction that if the Arabs/Muslims knew the US better they would not hate it so much. So, in the battle to win Arab hearts and minds, the Bush administration inaugurated Sawa Radio in 2002, HI magazine in 2003 aimed at Arab youth and supposedly reflecting the American way of life, and Al-Hurra (Freedom) TV in 2004. It also stepped up networking in Arab societies through organisations that sponsor scholar grants, training and awareness-raising programmes, and conferences, such as the Fulbright Commission. Yet, as many and diverse as the strategies and instruments of Washington's public relations campaign towards the Arab world were they still failed to achieve their objective. The US's image not only did not improve, but according to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre between 27 March and 21 April last year of 24,000 respondents in over 24 countries, it deteriorated further. In Jordan, one of Washington's closest allies in the region, 79 per cent of respondents had a negative view of the US. In Egypt, another major US ally, 22 per cent of respondents had a negative image of the US and 39 per cent of them regarded it as an enemy. In Turkey, a NATO member, 70 per cent of respondents ranked the US as an enemy and only 12 per cent acknowledged having a positive image of the US. Proof of the failure of Bush's public diplomacy campaign is also to be found in the spate of resignations tendered by officials responsible for it, starting with Charlotte Beers in February 2003, only a year and a half after having been put in charge of improving the US's image in the Arab and Islamic world. Ambassador Margaret Tutwiler did not fare better; she lasted only six months before handing in her resignation. Beers and Tutwiler were quickly joined by Karen Hughes and Egyptian Dina Habib Paul. Further testimony can be found in the dismissal of Norman Pattiz, who had originated the ideas of Sawa Radio and Al-Hurra TV, and then of the director of Al-Hurra, Mufaq Harb, who was replaced by a former CNN official, probably because the latter would agree to policies that Harb would not. The train of resignations and dismissals were the natural consequence of the Bush administration's determination to cling to the very policies and modes of behaviour that had alienated so much of the Arab world. If anyone stands a chance of improving the US's image in the Arab world, Obama does, especially when compared to his pre-4 November rival, Republican candidate John McCain. Firstly, President-elect Obama is extremely popular in the Middle East at both the official and people levels. If given the opportunity to vote, the overwhelming majority of Arabs would have voted for him over McCain, in spite of his campaign statements concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Arab press and media, including various Internet sites, were also clearly pro-Obama. Secondly, during the campaign Obama was consistently critical of the Bush administration and neoconservative policies. His "anti-Bush" position, as it was called, earned him kudos as the candidate for change in both style and substance. He is viewed as the one most determined to roll back Bush's policies in the region; to steer away from Bush's arrogant heavy-handedness and towards a more cooperative approach to regional problems within the framework of US alliances and of international organisations. Thirdly, Obama has been against the war in Iraq from the outset, giving credence to his call to withdraw US forces and to his pledge to take a diplomatic instead of a confrontationist approach in dealing with the various contentious issues of the Middle East. In sharp contrast to the Bush administration and even McCain, Obama is in favour of dialogue with Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas, albeit with certain preconditions with regard to the latter two that have borne arms against, or do not officially recognise, Israel. However, it still remains the case that if Obama is to improve the US's image in the Arab world he has to change those policies and attitudes that were directly responsible for sewing anti-US hatred: - The Bush administration's complete identification with almost every Israel position in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its indulgence of virtually every Israeli whim, from allowing Tel Aviv to sabotage the roadmap and build the separation wall, to turning a blind eye to stepped-up Israeli settlement activity and the confiscation of more Palestinian territory. Under Bush, US double standards also reached new heights, with Washington continually exempting Israel from standards of accountability that it exacts from other countries in the region. - The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003. These actions caused Arabs to regard US policy as an extension of British and French colonial enterprises in their countries, complete with all the attendant cruelties. The horrors of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay remain imprinted on people's minds as proof of the Bush administration's flagrant abuse of human rights in the course of pursuing its imperial goals in the region. Washington's relentless escalation of tensions with Syria and Iran heightened the sense among the Arab public that the US was determined to fulfil that vision for the "American Century" drawn up by the neoconservatives surrounding Bush. - The Darfur crisis, towards which the US began to bring to bear the same confrontationist approach in spite of the fact that the Sudanese government had yielded to US pressure and accepted a power-sharing formula with the south. - The deterioration of US-Arab relations in general. On the one hand this was the product of Washington's harsh attacks on Arab governments for their human rights records or, in the case of some, for their alleged sheltering of terrorist organisations. On the other, it resulted from Washington's frequent disregard for the opinions of Arab parties or its refusal to consult with them on the core issues of the Middle East, aggravating misgivings towards the US. - The perception that Washington was deliberately linking Islam with terrorism also contributed to alienating Arab/Muslim opinion. Statements to the effect that Islam bred terrorism, and Bush's purported "slips" referring to the American "crusade" in the region and to Islamic "fascists" could not have been better calculated to sew anger and hatred. - The campaign to spread democracy is devoid of substance. This campaign exposed the cynicism of the current administration, especially when it actively opposed the arrival to power through democratic mechanisms of forces that Washington regards as inimical to its interests. A case in point was the Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections in early 2006. Although these elections had been observed by international monitors and found to have been largely clean, officials in Washington issued statements to the effect that the Arab people were not ready for democracy. Increasingly it became clear to the Arab people that the democracy that the Bush administration was interested in had less to do with democratic principles and practices than producing outcomes that served US interests. Obviously, Obama has a formidable hill to climb. Improving the US's battered image in the Arab world will not be easy, especially in view of the fact that negative impressions in the Arab mind were not formed overnight but rather as the product of a relatively long pattern of American behaviour and policy. To alter this image, Obama will ultimately have to introduce radical changes in Washington. After all, it is impossible to separate national policy from public diplomacy. The latter cannot succeed where the former fails. The only type of public diplomacy that can succeed in the long run is one founded on sustainable policies, and policies are sustainable only if they continue to promise to fulfil mutual interests. * The writer is a political researcher in American affairs and coordinator of Taqrir Washington website.
