Sceptics -- particularly in the Arab world -- think Obama means more of the same. Their arguments are absurd, writes Amr Hamzawy* As much as Arab commentators have tried to assess the significance of the Obama victory in terms of US and global politics, Arab concerns quickly overshadow those analyses that then hone in almost exclusively on US policies towards the Middle East. One is further struck by the tendency of commentators to swing towards one of two positions. The first is to maintain that there will be no substantial change in US policies. The second is to strike a note of cautious optimism that the Obama administration will be able to develop a new and balanced formula for Washington's role in the Middle East. Sceptics rest their case on some familiar arguments that have an element of historical credence but are grossly oversimplified. The most prevalent of such arguments goes as follows: first, the US has permanent interests in the region that will never change regardless of what administration comes to power. These are the security of Israel and the security of oil resources in the Gulf that requires a military presence in the region and the marginalisation of opponents to the US. Second, these interests place certain restrictions on US policy. For example, the US can not back Palestinian and Arab rights when it engages diplomatically in questions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and it can not accept a reduction in its military presence in the Gulf or consider serious talks with Iran, Syria and the resistance movements in Lebanon and Palestine. Third, Obama is the product of the US ruling establishment and has now been handed the torch to safeguard and promote these interests. Therefore, Arabs who imagine that he will radically change tack in American policy towards this region are deluding themselves and do not grasp the complexities of how US policies are formulated or the true nature of the long-term strategies that lay concealed in the offices of the Pentagon and State Department. Lastly (and this is perhaps the most morally and politically erroneous line of the argument), as has been the case with most previous administrations, American Jewish friends of Israel -- such as Rahm Emanuel and Joseph Biden -- have been handed highly sensitive positions in the Obama administration, which means that there will be no serious departure from the policies that, in the final analysis, cater to Israeli interests and aspirations. Yes, the US has permanent interests in the Middle East. However, the presumption that these interests automatically give rise to the same policies is analytically absurd and an exercise in ideological reductionism devoid of substance and meaning. In fact, the history of US policy and practice in the region belies that nonsense. Has not Washington swung between times of blind and unmitigated military and political support for the Hebrew state and periods of more subtle, less one-sided diplomacy in which it earnestly sought negotiated solutions that guaranteed at least the partial fulfilment of Palestinian rights? Did not the US contextualise its priority of safeguarding oil resources in the Gulf in two completely different ways, one contingent upon strategic alliances with ruling regimes in the Gulf organised, in part, around a policy of containment against perceived sources of threats to these resources, whereas the other relied almost exclusively on the direct and intensive utilisation of military might? Have not we, the Arabs, paid a heavy toll over the past few years as the consequence of the domination of the military instrument over diplomacy in US foreign policy towards the Middle East and looked mournfully back at previous administrations that followed saner approaches to the problems of this region and that were much more prepared to negotiate with friend or foe instead of bullying everyone with the marines? The contention that Obama is the product of the ruling establishment in Washington and is therefore unable and probably unwilling to overturn its fundamental priorities or to go beyond its unwritten red lines appears equally facile. In all events, when asserted with such absolutist certitude, and especially when combined with our customary Arab suspicions of anyone bearing a Jewish name in a key position in Washington, the attitude hampers our ability to grasp the extent of diversity in opinion in the US establishment on matters of foreign and domestic politics and the dynamics that every new administration, especially one that won a sweeping popular mandate, uses to move across the realms of difference. And then why refuse to acknowledge the self-corrective mechanisms in American democracy, which were amply demonstrated with Obama's election, which may have major repercussions on the formulation of foreign policy and may have set into motion a serious process of introspection on the type of policies that have proven so detrimental to American interests? Arab scepticism with regards to the likelihood of change in US policy towards the Middle East under Obama stems from a static view of politics that sees not only permanent interests but also fixed attitudes and immutable mechanisms for policy formation. Behind this view is a rhetoric that may identify with the convictions of Arab popular opinion and that vindicates itself on the basis of the false premise that holds that the relative good that might come to the Arabs from a more balanced US policy does not outweigh the absolute evil of the presence among us of the superpower and its ally Israel. As for the cautious optimists, among whom I count myself, they do not subscribe to the presumption of the immutability of US foreign policy and simultaneously grant that no forthcoming administration could possibly be as bad as the two Bush administrations. However, they have so far failed to formulate a convincing analysis that translates their anticipation into a clear perception of the contours of the changes likely to occur. Some of us have drawn up what might best be described as petitions to the new administration listing such demands as withdrawing militarily from Iraq, calling off the Bush war on terrorism, resolving the Palestinian cause and renewing the promotion of democracy and human rights in the Arab world. Yet, it appears that we have overlooked that fact that the first two issues are already high among Obama's priorities for change while the Palestinian cause and promoting democracy have not yet received significant attention or assumed distinct form in his agenda. Others seem to have ignored the link between the demand for change and the timeframe in which Obama can formulate his priorities and put his policies into effect in the Middle East. The new president has a long list of domestic and international crises before him in which the Arabs may not necessarily figure foremost. He will certainly have to dedicate his first years to the urgent questions of Iraq, Iran and terrorism and only then will he find the time and energy to contemplate reformulating the other articles of US policy. Finally, apart from a handful of exceptions, advocates of cautious optimism have not taken into full consideration the obstacles that hampered the efficacy of the Bush programme to promote democratisation and respect for human rights. Foremost among these obstacles were Washington's relations with the autocratic Arab regimes allied with the US and its attitudes towards the militant and non-militant Islamist opposition movements and what it regards as their potential threat to US interests. These problems will not fade the moment Obama takes the oath of office in January and neither he nor anyone in his team possesses the magic wand to make such contradictions go away. If the cautious optimists are to be realistic, what they must do is to continue to assess the priorities of the next administration and the nature of and limits to the changes it will make. This task will only become clearer when we know who the most influential people around Obama will be and the nature of the balances of power between them. Certainly, we will then be better poised to refute the ready-to-hand, overly simplistic forecasts of sceptics. * The writer is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
