Arafat may have been controversial. His legacy is not, writes Hassan Nafaa Arafat will remain a controversial figure, both locally and internationally, for the foreseeable future. It is too soon to judge either the man or his role: at times when emotions run high it is best to withhold judgement. That said, no one can deny that this controversial figure has left an indelible mark since bursting on to the regional scene in the 1960s. Regardless of what people may think of him Arafat was a towering figure in the history of this part of the world and his legacy will reverberate for many years to come. What sets Arafat apart from earlier Palestinian leaders is that he believed that the Palestinian issue belonged to the Palestinian people, however interested in that issue other Arab and Muslim countries might be. The Palestinian issue, he maintained, should be placed in the hands of an independent national movement, one capable of differentiating between its people's interests and those of others, however much those interests overlap. This national movement needed to differentiate between dream and reality; it needed to keep the dream alive without turning its back on reality. It was this belief in the necessary independence of Palestinian decision making that motivated Arafat to create Fatah, the group that embraced armed struggle and fired its first shot in a long struggle on 1 January, 1965. It was Arafat who created Fatah although the second Arab summit conference, held in Alexandria in November 1964, endorsed the creation of the PLO and the Palestinian Liberation Army. At the time everyone believed the Palestinian issue was pan-Arab -- this was the background against which Arafat insisted on the independence of Palestinian national decision making. And for a while Arafat seemed to be a revolutionary dreamer, a loner isolated from the mainstream, a man detached from the complexities, even contradictions, of Arab reality. But pan-Arabism, detached from a clear and effective mechanism for pan-Arab decision making, never amounted to much. In the case of the Palestinian cause it was, in the end, limited to the right of every Arab regime interested in a pan-Arab role to form a Palestinian "brigade" and then use it to score political points. Following the 1967 defeat the Arab official system was discredited. There was a pressing need for a new Arab order, with new leaders, new vision and new thinking. This was the backdrop against which Arafat rose to the PLO chairmanship. Soon he found himself balancing his own ambitions against those of the Arab system, reconciling the desire to promote independent Palestinian national decision making with his post as chairman of the PLO, an organisation that had Arab backing and that was a component of an Arab system still grappling with the 1967 defeat. Arafat's job was not easy. It is ironic that Abdel-Nasser, the man who paved the way for Arafat to replace Al-Shuqeiri as PLO chairman, was the first Arab leader to disagree with Arafat, though he was certainly not the last. The dispute between Arafat and Nasser was the first of disputes that led to repeated confrontations with Arab countries and regimes. The dispute with Nasser, triggered by the 1969 Rogers Plan, led Egypt to close down the Palestine radio station based in Cairo. As the rift persisted between these two icons of Arab revolution Arafat's differences with the Jordanian regime escalated as a result of the methods employed by the Palestinian resistance in Jordan. A bloody confrontation occurred in September 1970. Differences with Nasser, however, did not prevent the latter from coming to the help of the Palestinian leader. But things changed following Nasser's death. When Arafat became embroiled in the Lebanese civil war he fell out with the Syrian regime of Hafez Al-Assad and ended up in exile in Tunisia. Intense differences then surfaced between Egypt and the Palestinians following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David accords. These differences culminated in the complete estrangement that lasted throughout Sadat's rule. In the 1990s Arafat fell out with most Gulf states over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the extent that, on the eve of the Oslo accords, he had little Arab political support or financial backing. To be fair, most of Arafat's quarrels with Arab countries were the result of his desire to maintain the independence of Palestinian decision making processes. And the funeral scenes in Paris, Cairo, and Ramallah provided ample proof that the Palestinian issue is alive and that the Palestinian people have a national movement that, for all its factionalism, maintains a spirit of unity. Irrespective of who leads the Palestinians no one can contest the Palestinians' right to self determination. In my opinion this is Arafat's lasting legacy, a legacy that survived Arafat's foibles and failings. This legacy is something to which all Arabs and Muslims -- indeed the entire international community -- have yet to be reconciled. Those who claim that with Arafat's death the two-state solution also died, those that claim Arafat squandered the opportunity to create an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, are mistaken. Anyone who follows Palestinian affairs knows that the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders remains a project in process, a dream to be pursued. The materialisation of this project, the turning of this dream into fact, was what Arafat wanted most. That he died before achieving it does not diminish his legacy, a legacy that could only have been compromised had Arafat accepted less than an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and a just solution for the refugees problem based on resolution 194 of 1949. Arafat's refusal to sign any lesser agreement is what maintains the hope for a just solution. Only those intent on squandering Palestinian rights disagree with this view. Arafat is gone, but the Palestinian issue remains. It is kept alive by the Palestinian people who may have suffered immensely, who may be besieged by enemies at home and abroad, but who remain as determined as ever to defend their rights. The Palestinians have the support of Arab nations, of nations that may be disappointed with their own leaders but that know, if they forfeit their rights, their future would be no better than the present faced by the Palestinians. The Palestinians have the support of Muslim nations: they may lack good governance but have too much faith to cede religious sanctities. The Palestinians have the support of freedom activists around the world, even in Israel and the West, and these activists have enough conscience, enough moral and legal responsibility, to continue defending the right of the Palestinian people for self determination. With Arafat gone we must now face the bitter truth: Arafat, for all his foibles and failings, was not the one who impeded the settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue. Responsibility for the continuing conflict lies with those who have failed to stop the brutal expansion of the Zionist scheme. This scheme, led by Israeli extremists and supported by the global ambitions of the US rightwing, lies at the root of the escalation of Islamic violence. Many have come to see that violence as an act of self-defence, a legitimate answer to a belligerent, illegitimate and unjustified onslaught on rights that are based on immutable political, moral, and legal grounds. No new Palestinian leadership will accept what Arafat rejected. How could a leader, lacking Arafat's stature and skill, agree to negotiate with Israel before settlement activity is halted? How can you negotiate for your land when those who have occupied that land continue to settle people on it? How can a new Palestinian leadership enter talks with no time table and without a partner committed to a solution involving a Palestinian state on all the occupied land and the return or compensation of refugees. Israel's implementation of resolution 194 of 1949 is the only way Palestinians will be able to accept borders that fall short of those delineated in the 1947 partition.
