As the Palestinian leader struggles to recover his health in a Paris hospital, Samir Ghattas* reviews the weaknesses of the post-Arafat scenarios He is now facing what may be his last battle for life. After a 40-year career on the frontline, facing confrontations of many sorts, with his main adversary, and even with members of his own ranks, Mohammed Abdel-Raouf Qudwa Al-Husseini, universally known as Yasser Arafat, popularly nicknamed Abu Ammar, and long since crowned the unrivalled leader of the Palestinian people, has become both a symbol of Palestine and one of its most important unifying factors. As he lies now in a sterile hospital room in France, summoning all the strength and will he has left to survive, he must be seeking inspiration from that lengthy record of battles from which he has emerged alive and as strong as he was when he entered them, if not stronger. Arafat's first battle was in 1966. The Syrian authorities had arrested him along with other top Fatah leaders on grounds of incitement to the murder of a key Baathist officer. When a Syrian military tribunal sentenced one of Arafat's companions to death, it seemed as though he and his recently founded Fatah movement were doomed to a premature demise. However, after six months he was released, and less than a year later he crossed the Jordan River, infiltrated into the West Bank, which had fallen under Israeli occupation in June 1967, and began to organise secret fedayeen bases. Within a few months, General Moshe Dayan suspected his presence and launched a house-to-house search that led from Ramallah to Nablus and Jerusalem. Yet despite the Israelis' tenacity, Arafat succeeded in eluding his pursuers and escaping safe and sound to the Transjordan. In February 1968, Arafat led Fatah against Israeli forces in the battle of Karama. In spite of severe losses, he once again emerged alive scoring a victory for the Palestinian resistance. Not long afterwards, in 1970, came the notorious Black September massacres in Jordan. In the midst of the carnage, it was nothing short of a miracle that Sudanese President Numeiri and Al-Bahi Al-Adgham of Tunisia were able, at the head of an Arab League delegation, to rescue Arafat and smuggle him out of Amman to Cairo. During the many years he spent in Lebanon, Arafat escaped narrowly with his life on several occasions. Besides being at constant risk from the gunfire and bombs that were ravaging the country on a daily basis, there was a direct attempt on his life by a Mossad recruit who tried to poison him. Later, in July 1981, Israeli aircraft bombarded his headquarters in Beirut; and during the Israeli siege of the city in 1982, Israeli fighters were in constant pursuit of Abu Ammar, systematically pounding the buildings in which he was thought to be hiding over a period of 80 days. Nor can one forget that famous picture of an Israeli sniper awaiting instructions to go ahead and assassinate Arafat, which would surely have happened had not the international community intervened to thwart Sharon's determination to do away with the Palestinian leader and ensured his safe conduct out of Beirut. In 1983, Arafat suddenly vanished form his headquarters in Tunis. He surfaced again several days later in northern Lebanon, having made his way clandestinely to Cyprus from where a small boat transported him to Tripoli. There, he joined up with his loyal fedayeen to put down a rebellion on the part of Palestinian insurgents who were supported by the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon. In 1986 Arafat narrowly escaped death again, saved because that day he had to delay his return to PLO headquarters in Tunis. He arrived just after the building was attacked by Israeli fighter planes which had travelled 3,000 miles from Tel Aviv with the express purpose of killing him. The headquarters were reduced to rubble in the attack, killing most of those inside. Incident after incident thus confirmed the incredible: Arafat seemed to have an almost mythic capacity to escape the clutches of death. In 1992, on his way to Libya, his plane crashed in the desert. The entire crew was killed, but no trace could be found of Arafat, who was finally discovered the next day -- alive. Less than a year later, Arafat was in Amman. It took all of King Hussein's powers of persuasion to convince him to undergo an urgent operation to remove what turned out to be a blood clot in the head, caused by the internal haemorrhaging suffered during the Libyan plane crash. A new and rather different chapter in Arafat's duel with death was opened in 1996, when Israeli security agencies started systematically circulating rumours about his ill health, his imminent demise and the power struggle that would ensue over his succession. Even the US administration was taken in for a while by these stories. During one of Arafat's many visits to Washington under the Clinton administration, the White House had a full medical team from the prestigious Mayo Clinic call on Arafat in his place of residence and conduct a complete physical. Dennis Ross was later able to report to the Palestinian delegation that Arafat's health would permit him to attend the funerals of all those who were putting around malicious rumours about his illness. Until one week ago Arafat, who had just celebrated his 75th birthday on 4 August, still seemed fit, if afflicted with a slight tremor in his lower lip. Suddenly, however, the situation turned critical and he required urgent treatment. It was only natural when the fate of a man of the stature and influence of Arafat hangs in the balance that the eyes of the world would be riveted on the pictures showing him transported from his place of confinement in Ramallah to the city of light and freedom. As I write, top officials in many capitals around the world are keeping a close eye on each slightest development in Arafat's state of health and contemplating the possible scenarios which they open up. In Israel, in particular, the news of Arafat's failing health has overshadowed the Knesset's landmark vote of 26 October in favour of Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan. Political and security analysts are now devoting all their energy to studying the likely repercussions should Arafat lose his life, or find himself seriously incapacitated. It is virtually certain that either of these outcomes would throw an enormous spanner into the policy that Sharon had lobbied so intensively to have adopted. The unilateral disengagement plan was founded virtually on a single pretext, which was that Israel had no Palestinian partner to negotiate with as long as Arafat remained in power. Not surprisingly, therefore, hardly had the news of Arafat's illness broke, than Sharon was assailed by demands to retract or abolish his plan. As a compromise solution, Silvan Shalon urged Sharon to at least put the plan on hold until it could be determined what kind of Palestinian leadership would emerge in the wake of Arafat. It will be very difficult for Sharon, in the face of such pressures, to sustain the momentum he has worked to build up for implementing the disengagement plan, especially as he would be hard pressed to concoct new excuses for refusing to deal with a new Palestinian leadership. Although most Arab and Western analyses have focussed on the possible repercussions of Arafat's death on internal Palestinian politics, there is little doubt that it will also have a profound impact right across the spectrum of Israeli political life. Indeed, should Arafat depart this life, it may not be long before the Israelis realise that they were better off when he was alive. Israeli analysts are divided over the possible repercussions of Arafat's death inside Palestine. Some predict the outbreak of widespread disturbances in the territories accompanied by acts of vengeance against Israelis. Fatah has already accused Israel with effectively assassinating Arafat. Any acts against Israel, of course, will be met with the usual unbridled response, and the security situation would then spin out of control for a considerable length of time. Israel would certainly seek to capitalise on this chaos to implement its plan to dissect the West Bank and Gaza into seven separate and isolated cantons. Other Israelis forecast, and perhaps would like to see, the eruption of armed confrontation between the various Palestinian factions, and even a possible escalation into civil war. One thing is sure: Israel would attempt to fuel the conflagration, while doing all in its power to contain it within the Palestinian territories. A third, more realistic scenario, predicts that Arafat's death, rather than dividing the Palestinians, would serve as a catalyst to bring them together under a new unified leadership which would combine elements of the PLO old guard with leaders of the younger Palestinian generation. At the regional/international level, some Israeli analysts believe that the absence of Arafat would bring the creation of a "New Middle East" within closer reach. More immediately, others predict that Washington, regardless of whether Bush or Kerry wins, will be prompted to revive the moribund roadmap and shunt aside Sharon's disengagement plan. They also believe that Europe will be spurred into pressuring both the US and Israel in this direction, and might even go as far as to push for the implementation of the Geneva agreement if Israel persists in obstructing the implementation of the roadmap. However diverse the foregoing analyses and predictions, they all share a fundamental flaw, which is that they reduce the complex dynamics of the Palestinian political map to the person of a single man -- Yasser Arafat. Arafat may have worked to ensure that Palestinian leadership is intrinsically identified with his person, and he may have monopolised most of the powers of the PA executive and resisted reform even when promulgated by the Legislative Council. But Arafat is not the source of the Palestinians' current predicament: the Israeli occupation is. Moreover, certain dynamics are self-perpetuating. For example, it is difficult to imagine that Hamas and Jihad will suddenly recognise the PA simply because Arafat were to pass away. Nor can we expect a new post-Arafat PA to turn around and declare that it rejects the roadmap. For four years the Palestinian situation has been deteriorating due to the absence of a unified leadership and a unified national programme. Arafat's absence will not automatically eliminate all the obstacles that have obstructed and continue to obstruct the consensus needed to realise these aims. Indeed, the crisis may intensify with Arafat's passing, especially if one considers that the PA leadership that succeeds him will probably be compelled to resume negotiations with Israel. Such a development will definitely be opposed, not only by the opposition factions, but also by the armed wing of Fatah -- not so much because it is opposed to the roadmap, but because it fears that the implementation of the roadmap is specifically designed to reduce its power and influence. In assessing the likely position of the opposition movements, we must not rely too heavily on the statements they are issuing today. Whatever sympathy that Hamas, for example, declares today for Arafat, these declarations jar with its long-held and bitter animosity towards the Palestinian leader. One need only recall that in the opening months of the Intifada Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsheh declared that the primary aim of the Intifada was to topple Arafat. Although other Hamas leaders hastened to disassociate themselves from this statement, it is doubtful that it was a mere slip of the tongue. At the same time, however, Hamas fears the possibility that Abu Mazen might succeed Arafat. The resistance organisation will not soon forget what it regarded as an unholy alliance between Abu Mazen and General Dahlan, whom Hamas charges has been subcontracted by Israel to eliminate it, or at least reduce it to the size it was before the Intifada. But if Hamas will be faced with many arduous and risky choices in the event of Arafat's death or incapacitation, so too will Fatah. Even if this movement manages to mend its rifts and reunite thanks to the quasi-tribal inclination to solidarity that motivates a political group that has recently lost its leader, it is highly doubtful that it will be able to regain the upper hand it once had when it comes to determining the post-Arafat leadership. Arafat may have founded Fatah. But Fatah is not Arafat who, by force of his personality and other factors, was the only person capable of securing the support of a majority of the Palestinian people and of persuading them to accept the decisions he had made. In spite of the gloomy clouds that hover over the current Palestinian situation, there is nevertheless some cause for optimism. So far, all the Palestinian forces have displayed a high degree of responsibility in their handling of the possibility of Arafat's passing and have hastened to affirm that such an eventuality should compel Palestinians to close ranks and unite. At the same time, although spokespersons for Arafat have denied reports of the creation of a committee to assume some of the powers and duties of the president during his absence, the new "triumvirate" is doing precisely that. An interim measure of this sort was, of course, essential in order to prevent a political vacuum, even if Arafat's absence is only temporary until he is treated and convalesces. However, such a situation cannot persist should Arafat be out of action for longer than expected. As to exactly what might transpire, though, it is difficult to say. One can, for example, imagine a peaceful handover of power in accordance with democratic processes. In this case, we might expect the Fatah Central Committee to meet and nominate Secretary of the PLO Executive Committee Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as their presidential candidate, which nomination would then be approved by the PLO Central Council. Then, within a short period of time, elections would be held for the PA presidency and for a new parliament, unless a motion is passed to defer parliamentary elections for a set period and to restrict the first polls to the election of a successor to Arafat. In either case, certain conditions must prevail for a peaceful and democratic handover to succeed. Above all, Israel must avoid actions that will weigh upon the political climate in Palestine and set popular opinion against Abu Mazen. At the same time, Arab governments must offer the Palestinian candidate a base of support and legitimacy, while the international community, and particularly Europe, should also put its weight behind Abu Mazen's candidacy. However, there are also many factors working against Abu Mazen: not only his general lack of charisma but, more importantly, Hamas whose hostility towards him may prompt it either to field its own candidate or to call for a boycott of the elections. In spite of these weaknesses, Abu Mazen still stands the best chance among all possible candidates of succeeding Arafat. Moreover, even if he is only to serve an interim term, this phase will mark a crucial turning point in Palestinian history, and one that will leave its imprint for many years to come. Naturally, circumstances might arise that would prevent or obstruct general elections for a successor to Arafat. In this case, the Legislative Council and the PLO Executive Committee might pass a bill appointing Abu Mazen temporary PA president until general elections can be held. Another possibility is that Fatah political bureau chief Farouq Qadoumi (Abul-Lutf) will advance himself as Arafat's successor, although the chances of his succeeding in such a bid would be slim. Abul-Lutf does not have the prerequisite base, having remained both in the opposition and outside the Palestinian territories for so long. However, while nothing is known for sure, certain scenarios can be ruled out in advance. In particular, there is no basis for believing that the promotion of a representative of the younger generation is possible at this time. Among the candidates that have been canvassed in this regard are Dahlan, Al-Rajoub and Marwan Al-Barghouti. Unfortunately, to think in these terms is to ignore the socio-political composition of Palestinian society at this time. Similarly, we can rule out the possibility of a unified Palestinian leadership; for the current balance of power in Palestine is inimical to the realisation of this hope, at least in the foreseeable future. There remains one final question to which, I believe, observers have not given sufficient consideration. What would transpire if Arafat recovered? Will Israel allow him to return to Palestine? If so, would it put him back under house arrest in Ramallah, or would it dispatch him to Gaza to test his intentions and his ability to run the Strip after the Israeli withdrawal? These questions beg even more questions, all of which will remain pending until Arafat has emerged one way or the other from his hospital in Paris. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies in Gaza.
