Samir Ghattas* discusses the puzzling phenomenon of the consummate durability of Sharon, Peres and Arafat Recent political developments have highlighted a number of curious similarities in Israeli and Palestinian affairs. Ariel Sharon, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat are all knee-deep in trouble with the parties they have led for years. All around us, it is Sharon versus Likud, Peres versus Labour, Arafat versus a younger Fatah generation. To complicate things further, the three leaders still have massive public support. As a result, rebels from their own parties are unable to unseat them. Thrice defeated within Likud, Sharon has the support of most Israelis. Even after his latest defeat in the coalition battle, opinion polls in Israel show his approval rate up 6 points. Neither Benyamin Netanyahu, Silvan Shalom nor Uzi Landau, his most vocal critics within Likud, can touch him. A similar scenario is unfolding within Labour. A majority of Labour leaders oppose Peres, but the latter's desire to join Likud in a coalition government enjoys the support of most Israelis. None of Peres' detractors -- men such as Ben-Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Ehud Barak -- seems capable of challenging Peres for Labour leadership in the near future, although they may be tempted to do so if early elections are held. Across the divide, Arafat is not in better shape. He faces strong opposition from Fatah's new generation and inside the Palestinian Legislative Council. Yet, he has the support of most Palestinians. People have challenged Arafat. But each single time, the challenger ends up stepping back or stepping down. Former Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) resigned and disappeared from the political scene. Current Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei (Abu Alaa) retracted his resignation along with his earlier criticism of Arafat. Even Mohamed Dahlan, the man Western sources once billed as Arafat's successor, has swallowed his pride following three meetings arranged by mediators with the leader in Ramallah. What we have here is a puzzling phenomenon; one in which party rebels rise against their own leaders, humiliating them on occasion, but the leader survives, almost unscathed. What this phenomenon reflects is a serious flaw in the current structure of political relations, between leaders and their parties as well as between parties and the general public. Regardless of what one may think of him, Ariel Sharon has for a long time orchestrated events in the region, forcing others to react to his own initiatives, going always on the offensive. But Sharon, who created Likud 31 years ago and who succeeded in raising its Knesset share from 19 to 40 seats, has faced three political defeats within his own group. Likud voted against a project to create an independent Palestinian state, then against the Gaza disengagement plan, then against the formation of a coalition government with Labour (by 843 votes versus 612). These defeats have turned Sharon into a lame duck within his own party. Indeed, Sharon is a man with no party, Likud is a party without a people, and the people want something new but cannot come up with it. This has never happened before, not at any moment in Israel's history. Only Sharon is to blame for this political situation. He looked the other way when hordes of extreme rightists -- even men involved in organised crime -- took control of important posts within Likud. Repeatedly, he took up national matters with Likud rather than with the entire nation. This was his choice. Some Israelis say that had Menachem Begin consulted Likud before pulling out of Sinai, the Yamit settlement would not have been evacuated; that had David Ben Gurion consulted Mapam about turning Israel into a nuclear power, the Dimona reactor would never have been built. It was Sharon's hesitance, as well as his Zionist ideological roots, that prevented him from depending on the 925,000 Israelis who voted for him in the recent elections. Sharon let down these voters when he allowed some 800 of Likud's extreme right members to decide on crucial national issues. Despite his latest defeat, Sharon is not discouraged. He is determined to implement his plan to pull out of Gaza and several isolated settlements in the northern West Bank by the end of next year. Sharon may yet win over a large section of Likud rebels. He may even succeed in putting together a new government coalition, either with Labour or the religious parties. Or, he may call, for the fifth time in one decade, for early elections. All of the above are things Sharon can do. What he cannot do, however, is heal the malaise of Israel's political scene. This malaise, most observers believe, is a sign that old Zionist parties have outlived their usefulness and may soon become relics. Some go as far as suggest that Sharon should split from Likud and form a new political party, one that suits Israel's changed political map. At his age, however, Sharon would be lucky to survive the Gaza withdrawal debacle. Three defeats have taken their toll on Sharon. But this does not mean that any of Likud's rebels can yet send him into early retirement at his Al-Naqab ranch in the Negev. According to an opinion poll published in Ma'ariv on 27 August, Sharon is still way ahead of Netanyahu at the polls (53 per cent for Sharon, 24 per cent for Netanyahu). The same goes for Labour. The party that had monopolised government in Israel since its creation and up to 1977 is a shadow of its former self. In the last elections, its Knesset share dropped to 19 seats, its worst performance ever. After Mitzna's resignation, Labour went through rough times. Fearing possible disintegration, the party once again chose Peres as its leader. Now past 80, Peres seems determined to become foreign minister, even under Sharon. Instead of trying to put his party's affairs in order and recapture public support, Peres prefers to join Likud in a coalition government, arguing that this is what most Israelis want. He faces strong opposition from key party officials -- just as is the case with both Sharon and Arafat. Peres' critics were particularly vocal when he declared his intention to run for prime minister in the coming Israeli elections, a decision that was at odds with the agreement that restored Peres to Labour's leadership. Opinion polls show Peres ahead of all his party rivals (26 per cent for Peres, 11 per cent for both Vilnai and Ben-Eliezer). Still, Peres has no chance against Sharon in general elections. This is perhaps why he prefers to be foreign minister than an opposition leader. Again, Peres is a man with no party behind him, Labour is a party with no majority, and the Israeli public has no way of getting its message across. The Palestinian case should be different and yet the above symptoms abide. Arafat, who co-founded Fatah over 45 years ago, is now pitted against many of Fatah's young leaders. This is why he is averse to holding a Fatah general congress -- the last such event was 13 years ago. If held, Arafat suspects, such a congress may replace most of his elderly associates. Arafat is reluctant to implement the reform programme approved by the Legislative Council two years ago. The Council, made up mostly of Fatah's supporters, demands sweeping changes in the decision-making process, including the powers of the president. There is no sign yet that Arafat is going to yield to such demands, despite mounting opposition within his own party and despite the fact that some of his former supporters are joining opposition factions. Should this situation last any longer, Arafat may end up a leader without a party, Fatah's public support may dwindle, and the Palestinian people may be left at a loss. A new phenomenon is emerging across the Israeli- Palestinian divide, a curious and alarming one. What is alarming is not the fate of an individual, but the implications for the region, the stalemates and inaction ahead. With no political progress expected, violence is likely to rise. * The writer is director of the Maqdis Centre for Political Studies.
