The Qatar debacle Qatar's controversial foreign policies have brought it the belated ire of its neighbours. The decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to recall their ambassadors from Doha is unprecedented in the 33-year history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The crisis, which has been brewing for a while, came to a head over Qatar's support of the Muslim Brotherhood — especially after the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. The fact that Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi, a Muslim Brotherhood cleric based in Qatar, lashed out at Saudi Arabia and the UAE added to the long-simmering tensions in the GCC. Other factors also led to growing resentment in the Gulf. Qatar, against the advice of its Gulf neighbours, developed close ties with jihadist groups in Syria believed to be linked to Al-Qaeda. In addition, Qatar's support for the Huthi rebels in Yemen, and its involvement in NATO operations in Libya, grated against Gulf sensibilities. Qatar has strayed from GCC mainstream diplomacy for years. It allowed an Israeli commercial office to open in Doha in 1996. It was also active in the war on Iraq in 2003. And its relations with Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas were viewed with suspicion by its Gulf neighbours. When Saudi Arabia and the Emirates asked Qatar to stop its support of extremist groups, Doha flatly ignored their request. As Al-Qaradawi continued to rant against GCC member states, gentle persuasion gave way to firm chastisement. Far from this being a storm in a teacup, mistrust between Qatar and its neighbours is unlikely to subside unless Doha alters its policies substantially. For years, the GCC has been striving to contain political differences among its countries in a discrete manner. Only once in its history, the GCC decided to resort to the International Court of Justice to address a Bahraini-Qatari border dispute. These days, Gulf countries are concerned over the ripple effects of political Islam in the region. This is why they supported the Egyptian army when, backed with massive protests, it removed the Muslim Brotherhood president from power on 3 July 2013. Qatar, answering a calling that seemed to contravene the basic rules of the GCC, went on supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Clearly, it wasn't ignoring the advice of its neighbours, but doing the opposite of what it was told. Gulf countries were also displeased by the open support of Doha for Al-Nahda, Tunisia's largest Islamist party. Qatari policy is now seen not only as a threat to national security in the Gulf, but also as a breach of the Gulf Security Pact. In the past three years, Doha has been the region's top supporter of political Islam in the region. It backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia, supported armed groups in Syria, Libya and Yemen, and went on aiding and abetting extremist preachers whose political ideas were unpopular among Gulf leaders. The crisis involving Qatar may lead to its suspension from the GCC. Other punitive measures may involve the closure of borders, reinstatement of travel visas, and a halt on cooperation. What this crisis shows is that GCC countries may have been spared the turmoil of the Arab Spring, but not the consequences. Now all GCC countries are reviewing their policies, which for long survived on the assumption that consensus was achievable among neighbours. In their quest to maintain a sense of balance in the region, GCC countries will continue to discourage Qatar from taking sides with groups that may be too adventurous, inept, or outright dangerous. If you want to keep your alliances intact, Gulf officials will tell the Doha government, pick your friends more carefully. The immense human, geographical and financial assets of this region come with considerable responsibility. If abused, these assets can cause immense human suffering. Gulf countries are now awake to this fact. They are more than ever aware that surviving the Arab Spring is not going to be a walk in the park, but rather a careful sailing through rocky straits.
