Deciphering the Riyadh Document

Qatar's foreign minister has declared the end of the crisis with Gulf Cooperation Council countries, but questions remain

It has been a week since the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states gave an approving nod to Saudi-Emirati-Qatari reconciliation efforts. And unlike the noisy withdrawal of the Saudi, UAE and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha in March, the extraordinary GCC foreign ministers meeting in Riyadh last Thursday, aimed at containing the crisis, was subtle to the point of ambiguity. Efforts to decode the resulting Riyadh Document —or otherwise what really happened —haven't stopped since.
The abrupt, carefully worded one page Riyadh Document referred to an extensive “revision” of measures in relation to foreign policy and security issues and pledged the adoption of “mechanisms” that guarantee GCC “collective” action. More to the point, the statement said that participants agreed that the policies of any individual state should not affect the interests, security or stability, or sovereignty, of any of the council's states.
This is how the 33-year-old six-member state GCC is addressing publicly their post-Arab uprisings fallout following the Riyadh-led diplomatic escalation against Doha and its possible irreversible consequences. But how much progress has been achieved? The document could be interpreted as anything from a declaration of goodwill that has yet to materialise through further talks and Kuwaiti mediation efforts, to an act of acquiescence on Doha's part to Riyadh's dictates and approach towards Egypt and the changing regional landscape.
The Egyptian media has been flooded with quotes from unidentified diplomatic and security sources echoing one narrative on a set of unwritten terms Doha is expected to meet on a two-month ultimatum. The most popular version in the Egyptian press has listed approximately five conditions, which mainly force Doha to reverse both its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and rejection of the Egyptian military's removal of president Mohamed Morsi and reflect this in the coverage of its Al-Jazeera channels, specifically its Egyptian arm, Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misr.
There have been no signs of change in Doha's posturing. Al-Jazeera's coverage doesn't seem affected and none of the Muslim Brotherhood officials and members known to have sought refuge in Qatar has been asked to leave. While vocal and prominent Egyptian Muslim scholar Youssef El-Qaradawi, a decades long Qatar resident andnational,has recently ceased to deliver his fiery Friday prayer sermons (where, in the past, he criticised the UAE and Saudi and voiced support for ousted Morsi), this doesn't qualify sufficient proof of change.
Al-Jazeera insiders say they weren't directed to alter their editorial line since the Riyadh meeting, but that if that were to happen it wouldn't be felt soon and rather would be introduced gradually.
Despite the opaqueness, observers seem to agree that the Riyadh meeting and declaration couldn't have happened without Doha's flexibility.
“Given the context of the crisis as well as the fact that Qatar attended the meeting, we can surmise that the position of Doha has shifted on a number of issues [including] Al-Jazeera's Egypt coverage and publication policies of certain research centres in Doha,” says Mansour Almarzoqi Albogami, a Paris-based academic and researcher on Saudi politics.
Concessions also rumoured to be on Qatar Emir Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani's table include terminating financial and logistical support for think tanks, newspapers and TV stations —especially those based in Europe —that are sympathetic with the Brotherhood. And according to some reports, Doha has been asked to discontinue granting Islamist dissidents from other Gulf States Qatari nationality.
On Wednesday, Qatar's foreign minister, Khaled El-Atia, announced the end of the crisis with Saudi, Bahrain and the UAE, stressing meanwhile that no concessions were made in the Riyadh meeting. In a joint presser with his Kuwaiti counterpart in Kuwait City, El-Atia said it's now up to these three countries to return their ambassadors to Doha.
“The Riyadh Document alluded to ‘principles' not concessions or terms,” argues Jamal Abdullah, a researcher with Al-Jazeera's Centre for Studies, “and like other GCC states, Qatar will commit to what other members will commit too … without infringing on any country's sovereignty.”
The view from Doha is that while Qatar hosts Brotherhood figures, the UAE hosts Hosni Mubarak's ex-premier, Ahmed Shafiq, who supported Mohamed Morsi's ouster by the military. The Emirates is also home to Mohamed Dahlan, former and expelled head of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) Preventive Security Service in the Gaza Strip, who the PA accuses of corruption and collaboration with Israel.
Because Qatar has made decades-long investments in the dossiers at hand it is unrealistic to expect it will easily concede to the other side. What's more plausible, says Elbogami, is that Qatar lost its bid on the Brotherhood, and subsequently on its influence in Egypt.
The mainly Saudi-Qatari rift that extends beyond Egypt to Doha's support for armed factions in Syria and Libya, other than those financed by Saudi Arabia, its rapprochement with Ankara and Tehran and relations with Hamas, can be traced back to the historic resentment Doha's Al-Thani dynasty harbours for what they consider a domineering Riyadh.
It remains to be seen what measures will be taken by Doha in order evaluate the volume of concessions it presumably made. But this will also reveal a thing or two about Riyadh's leverage and influence on its small neighbour. Only weeks ago Saudi's foreign minister, Saoud Al-Faisal, threatened to block Qatar's land and sea borders.
But at least two significant hierarchal changes have occurred in the Saudi monarchy since, including King Abdullah's appointment in March of Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz as deputy crown prince, making him next in line to succeed the king. And last week, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan was dismissed from his post as head of Saudi Intelligence.
There's a debate on whether or not these changes —which are likely to lead to further transformations in the House of Saud —had any impact on the Riyadh agreement, but the possibility of a new Saudi leadership in the future cannot be underestimated in its effect on the entire Gulf region.
This article was published in Al-Ahram Weekly
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/99721.aspx