The Palestinian political process seems to be going nowhere fast as Israel deigns to throw President Mahmoud Abbas scraps from the negotiating table, writes Khaled Amayreh in East Jerusalem When Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas met with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the latter's official residence in West Jerusalem 16 July, Olmert delivered "glad tidings" to Abbas about his intention to free 250 Fatah prisoners and pardon some 180 Fatah militiamen on condition they hand over their weapons and formally pledge to abandon the armed struggle against Israel. However, when Abbas requested that Israel restart the stalled final-status talks with the PA, a peremptory Olmert told Abbas "to stop talking about the occupation because now is not the right time to discuss a final settlement." Instead, Olmert told the frustrated leader that his Ramallah-based government would have to get stronger in order to be able to defeat Hamas and consequently create "a suitable environment for peace." Olmert didn't elaborate on what he meant by a "suitable environment," but one of his aides explained that if Abbas succeeded in eliminating or at least neutralising "the forces of extremism and terror," Israel and the PA could then reach a compromise. Needless to say, in Israeli diplomatic jargon, a suitable environment denotes one thing, and that is a Palestinian willingness to give up on the right to East Jerusalem and the right of return. Additionally, Palestinians must acquiesce to accepting a truncated, Bantustan quasi-state on the remaining pieces of land in the West Bank, cut off from other Palestinian towns and surrounded by Jewish settlements. Prior to the meeting in West Jerusalem, PA official Saeb Erekat vowed to make "the endgame" the sole and only subject of discussion between Abbas and Olmert. However, when Olmert refused even to listen to requests pertaining to ending the occupation or even restarting a genuine political process, Erekat realised that Olmert was the master of the day and Abbas's weak position rested entirely on "Israeli goodwill." This is probably what prompted Riyadh Al-Maliki, the minister of information in the Ramallah-based government, to comment that "we don't give much weight to these meetings." Nonetheless, it was clear that Olmert didn't want Abbas to return to Ramallah completely empty-handed. In addition to the slated release from Israeli custody of 250 Fatah prisoners, most of whom have almost completed their sentences and are due for release shortly, Olmert promised Abbas that he would also unfreeze an additional amount of Palestinian tax revenue, withheld by Israel. Furthermore, Olmert promised Abbas that Israel would tighten its siege on the Gaza Strip, including keeping the Rafah border crossing closed for as long as deemed necessary to "strengthen Abbas" and weaken Hamas. At one point during the meeting, Abbas appealed to Olmert to free imprisoned Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, arguing that his release would bolster Fatah vis-à-vis Hamas. Olmert responded by saying that he was not sure that the release of Barghouti would serve the interests of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. A few weeks ago, the Israeli internal security service, the Shin Bet pointed out in a report presented to the Israeli government that the release of Barghouti would actually weaken Abbas and strengthen the "Arafat camp". This is the group within Fatah which refuses to accept any settlement which does not include a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories as well as a fair settlement of the refugee problem pursuant to UN Resolution 194. The release of the Fatah prisoners is unlikely to be boost Abbas's popularity amongst Palestinians since it portrays him as president of only one faction (Fatah), not the entire Palestinian people. Moreover, the decision by Israel to pardon Fatah-affiliated militiamen in the West Bank in return for giving up the armed struggle against Israel could prove an embarrassment for Abbas and his government since it doesn't include any commitment by Israel to stop its incursions and raids into Palestinian population centers. However, the crux of the matter remains Israel's unwillingness to grant Abbas any political achievement with which he could face an increasingly frustrated and sceptical Palestinian public. Indeed, the Israeli government continues to refuse repeated requests by Abbas to withdraw from the erstwhile (area-A), where according to the defunct Oslo Agreement, the PA is supposed to have full authority. Moreover, the Israeli army is adamant about keeping some 600 roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the West Bank which effectively ensures daily life for Palestinians remains a recurring nightmare. Recognising the deadlock with Israel, and the failure and/or inability of the international community, including the Bush administration, to pressure the Jewish state to stop the unrelenting carving up of the West Bank for more Jewish settlements thereby rendering any possibility of a two-state solution obsolete, Abbas continues to desperately attempt to make some political progress as he faces off with Hamas. In this context, Abbas ordered the PLO Central Council (PLOCC) to convene in Ramallah later this month ostensibly in order to neutralise or possibly dissolve the Hamas-controlled Legislative Council, already paralysed by the Hamas-Fatah showdown as well as by the abduction and incarceration by Israel of more than 40 Palestinian lawmakers. The embattled Palestinian leader hopes that the council will reassert the supremacy of the Fatah- dominated PLO over the PA, thus rendering the Gaza-based Hamas government as well as the legislative council itself practically irrelevant. The PLOCC, however, is not an elected body and many of its members have either died of old age or are too old to fulfil their responsibilities. Abbas hopes the councillors will strengthen his hand against Hamas and will lend another layer of legitimacy to the Salam Fayyad government. Last week, Abbas asked Israel to allow a number of key PLO leaders, including Democratic Front leader, Nayef Hawatmeh and the head of the PLO's Political Department, Farouq Al-Qaddumi, to travel to Ramallah in order to take part in the PLOCC deliberations. Israel agreed in principle, but insisted on several humiliating conditions including restricting the duration of the visits. Eventually, both Hawatmeh and Al Qaddumi, opted not to attend, saving themselves the humiliation and embarrassment they would suffer at the hands of the Israeli occupiers. This week, a number of Palestinian National Council (PNC) members based abroad made several proposals to reform the PLO, including organising elections in Palestine and the Diaspora for the various PLO bodies. However, it is unlikely that Abbas and his Fatah Party will accept any far-reaching reform of the PLO, lest they lose their grip on it. The Americans and Israelis are also unenthusiastic about empowering any Palestinian political institution which could place restrictions on the Palestinian leadership, especially with regard to negotiations with Israel. In the final analysis, Abbas and his government are expected to face a real predicament sooner or later due to Israel's intransigence in ending its 40-year-old occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. This week, the noted Israeli journalist Danny Rubenstein pointed out that despite all the fanfare surrounding Abbas and the wholesome praise and support he is receiving from the West, the Palestinian leader has actually nothing to offer the Palestinian people. Writing in Ha'aretz, Rubenstein argued that Abbas's strategy of creating a viable Palestinian state was reaching a dead end. "Abu Mazen and Fatah have nothing to sell the Palestinian public. The vision of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, gradually dissipated during the Oslo Peace process." Rubenstein added that "it was not corruption and an absence of leadership that brought down the Fatah movement (in the last elections) but rather the fact that the political path of Abbas and his friends had reached a dead end, and could not be resurrected. "And all of this is leading to one result, namely the death of the two-state solution and the inevitability of the one-state solution."
