Mustafa El-Labbad looks at the significance of the return of Rafsanjani to high position in Iran's ruling elite If Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's recent election as chairman of the Assembly of Experts restores some balance between various camps of the Iranian regime, it by no means signifies a radical change in tack. After all, Rafsanjani has been an integral part of the ruling order since the victory of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. His influence would ebb at times, but never to the degree of exclusion from the narrow circle of decision-makers in Tehran. Rafsanjani's star began to rise in Iran's post-revolutionary skies while they were still lit by Ayatollah Al-Khomeini. He was Iran's de facto commander-in-chief during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) and it was he who issued the decision to accept the ceasefire. Following Khomeini's death, it was Rafsanjani who orchestrated the transfer of power to the current supreme leader Sayed Ali Khamenei, whose extensive powers over executive decisions, the armed forces, the judiciary, the Guardian Council, the national media and the clergy dwarf the powers of the president. Rafsanjani served as the first speaker of the Majlis of Iran, the post-revolutionary parliament, after which he was catapulted to the presidency, from 1989-1997. He was then appointed head of the Expediency Discernment Council, which resolves legislative differences between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians. With his recent appointment as chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani added a new post to his impressive CV. It is not an insignificant position. This 86-member body, consisting exclusively of clergymen elected by popular vote, is the sole authority empowered to elect or dismiss a supreme leader. Yet, in spite of the fact that he is now both the head of this assembly and the head of the Council of Guardians, his combined constitutional authorities are still not as extensive as Iran's number-two man, the president, let alone the supreme leader. The Iranian political order is curious for the diversity and subtle shifts of tides beneath its seemingly uniform surface. Because this order encompasses different camps of opinion, it has generally succeeded in manoeuvring through the shoals of domestic and external changes and in accommodating varied and sometimes conflicting interests, thereby retaining an even keel and projecting an impression of conformity and widespread popular support. Perhaps for this reason, as stable as the helm has been -- since the revolution there have only been two supreme leaders, Khomeini and Khamenei -- the posts below that have been in constant flux, their occupants coming and going in tandem with the rise or fall of the influence of this political wing or that in light of developments at home and abroad. As a result, no analysis of "the contemporary situation in Iran" can stay afloat for long, unable as it is to withstand the perpetually shifting variegations in the Iranian political map and a seesawing in the balances of power experienced by few other Middle Eastern regimes. The constant/variable dynamic does not apply only to Iran's ruling elites. For example, in contrast to Tehran's regional policy of expanding its sphere of influence in promotion of its national interests, its domestic policies transform and remould themselves with the same fluidity as the rise and fall of its ruling elites, albeit within the same parameters. One imagines the mythical roc, casting the shadow of its wings over the void below, yet whose very wings are forever mutating as it tilts and swerves in the air. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad soared to the forefront of the political scene in Iran following his victory in the presidential elections two years ago. His foremost rival in those elections was Rafsanjani. His victory signified a major transformation in the balances of power in Iran, for henceforward it was no longer possible to draw that customary distinction between "conservatives" and "reformists", as the remnants of the latter were driven from the Islamic revolutionary establishment. Henceforward, the "reformist/conservative" classification was firmly consigned to the past as the roc tilted irrevocably to the right. However, in deference to the dynamics of Iran's laws of equilibrium, the "wing" that remained diverged into three: moderate conservatives led by Rafsanjani, to the left; urban radicals centring around Ahmadinejad and strongly allied to the Revolutionary Guard, to the right; and traditional conservatives as represented by the Ayatollahs in Qum and Tehran and leaders of the "bazaar" making up the tail wing in the centre. In the pilot's seat remains the supreme leader, hands firmly at the controls of the levers regulating the balance between political forces, for which the terms "left" and "right" serve more to locate their relative positions on a geopolitical territory than shades of political opinion. Although Rafsanjani had effectively served as co-pilot from Khomeini's death in 1989 until the presidential elections of 2005, and although he holds the posts of chairman of the Assembly of Experts and head of the Council of Guardians, his influence now barely exceeds that of a speaker of a major party in parliament, in this case the moderate conservatives. In large part this is due to the rising power of the Revolutionary Guard, which stands in the way of Rafsanjani's return to centre stage. In sum, his relatively restricted powers in the two positions he currently occupies are insufficient to lever him back into the co-pilot's seat or even a higher position yet. Rafsanjani has tasted almost all the senior offices in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He's been minister, speaker of parliament, president, head of the Council of Guardians and, now, chairman of the Assembly of Experts. However, if he has set his sights on it, the position of supreme leader remains well out of reach. He has risen again within the fold of senior Iranian decision-makers, in spite of his relatively advanced years and his reverberating defeat in the presidential elections against Ahmadinejad. However, his rise is reminiscent of Sisyphus, the legendary Hellenic king doomed for all eternity to push a rock up a hill only for it to go tumbling down to the bottom again.
