While the conservative current in Iranian politics remains strong, party diversity alone may change the character of Iran's next parliament, writes Mustafa El-Labbad Iran is commemorating the 29th anniversary of its Islamic revolution which altered the map of strategic balances and alliances in the Middle East and which brought it to the forefront of the regional arena. Iran is also in the run-up to elections for its eighth Shura Council -- the Iranian parliament -- and these elections, in turn, are the 28th nationwide poll since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. That this state has had a general election or referendum almost every year signifies that, whatever our opinion of the Iranian regime might be, popular democratic participation is one of the cornerstones of its legitimacy. Although the parliamentary elections will not be held until the middle of March, the campaign season kicked off early with the review by the Executive Electoral Supervisory Committees of potential candidates. Already these committees, which fall under the Ministry of Interior, have rejected a large number of candidates on the grounds of failing to comply with "the values of the republic". Out of the 7,200 applicants from around the country, 2,200 were rejected, of whom 400 were from Tehran alone. The list of those rejected includes former ministers in the Khatami government as well as Ali Ishraqi, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution and founder of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Although the majority of those banned could be classified as "reformists", we should be wary of the terms "conservative" and "reformist" commonly used to describe the composition of the body politic in Iran. Such classifications have a way of being fluid when it comes to Iranian politics. A salient example is the Executives of Construction Party, which includes people close to Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani, once regarded as a moderate conservative but now ranked as a pillar of the "reformist" camp. Perhaps, therefore, it would be more accurate to say that the central political rivalry in Iran today is between two blocs, as opposed to two camps. The first of these consists of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, the largest reformist party in Iran, formerly led by Mohamed Reza Khatami (brother of Mohamed Khatami, former president of Iran); the National Confidence Party, led by former speaker of parliament Mehdi Karroubi; the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution; and the Executives of Construction Party founded by Rafsanjani, who currently serves as chairman of the Assembly of Experts and of the Expediency Council in Iran. On the other side are ranked the hardline fundamentalists led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the "centre conservatives" represented by such prominent figures as Ali Larijani, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohamed Bagher Ghalibaf, former presidential candidate and currently mayor of Tehran. This "coalition" also includes the religious conservatives, centring on the clerical elite in Qum and the Combatant Clergy Association Party, and representatives of the politically and economically influential "bazaar" as represented by the remnants of the Islamic Coalition Party and Association of the Islamic Federation of the Bazaar and Trade Unions. In view of the diverse ideologies and goals of the constituent members of these blocs, it seems unlikely that either of them will enter the elections as an official coalition; nevertheless, there remains the possibility that the constituent members of each bloc will work together at some level to keep the other bloc from attaining a parliamentary majority. Thus, we can anticipate the "conservatives" fielding themselves in two lists, one representing the fundamentalist trend epitomised by the current Iranian president and the other representing moderate conservatives. Although it is not clear yet who will lead the lists, predictions have favoured current speaker of parliament Ghalam Reza Adel as head of the ultraconservatives and Ali Larijani as head of the centre conservatives. Whatever the case, the selection of the head of each list depends not so much on the charisma of candidates within their own constituencies as it does on their ability to steer their bloc to a parliamentary majority and, hence, to manoeuvre themselves into a position of succession to the speaker of parliament. The contest between Adel and Larijani is certain to be neck-to-neck as both are close to Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei. The "reformists" may enter the elections with even more lists in view of the ideological distances between them and because of the confusion created by the barring of so many reformist candidates. Even so, this bloc will be unified by a certain common ground, summed up by the slogan "moderation-competence-balance" -- terms that strike directly at the Ahmadinejad administration and, specifically, its poor economic performance. Even so, the reformist bloc may pose a greater threat to the conservative centrists than to the Ahmadinejad camp. While the former are stronger in administrative, technocratic and economic expertise they are ideologically closer to the reformists and therefore risk having votes drawn away from them. The Ahmadinejad camp, on the other hand, will still be able to play on emotive issues such as the Iranian president's defiance of the US over the nuclear issue, Iranian national pride and dignity, and the fearsome "fifth column" that supports the West and capitulates to Iran's enemies. Nor should we overlook in this regard Republican Guard Chief Mohamed Ali Jafari's exhortation that to support the conservatives is "a divine duty for every individual involved in Iranian revolutionary mobilisation". The statement is indicative of the current balance of powers inside Iran. The Republican Guard's pervasive influence on Iranian political and economic life has been demonstrated quite tangibly in recent days. Two individuals from this institution have had a concrete impact on the current parliamentary elections: Brigadier General Ali Reza Afshar, a former Republican Guard leader now serving as deputy interior minister and chairman of the Executive Electoral Supervisory Committees, and Ahmed Jannati, currently chairman of the Guardian Council, one of the functions of which is to approve candidates in various elections. While the reformists' chances in the upcoming parliamentary elections are relatively slim, there appears to be a reasonable chance of swinging the political keel in Iran away from the far right and more towards the centre. This shift can be brought about, first, if the conservative centrists succeed in breaking the Ahmadinejad camp's hold over parliament and, second, by greater parliamentary diversity in general. We should note in this context that the dominance of a single bloc or hue of the political spectrum in government, as is currently the case with the Ahmadinejad camp, is an exception to the rule in the Iranian political system. For decades, a certain balance between rival political trends, albeit bound by an ideological commitment to the Islamic revolution, has ensured a distinct plurality that formed a protective shield of sorts for the regime, both at home and abroad. The attempt on the part of Ahmadinejad to narrow the playing field by eliminating candidates through administrative procedures that it controls is clearly an attempt to perpetuate that camp's hold on power. Sadly, the ploy dulls the gleam of Iran's much vaunted democratic process and transforms the political mood on the 29th anniversary of the revolution from one of pride to one of anxiety about the present and future.
